representing the debt, may be at the date of the assessment. As in determining the question distinctions have been drawn from the character of the instrument representing the credit it will be necessary to treat the various classes separately.

I. State and Municipal Bonds.-While some of the earlier cases were disposed to treat negotiable bonds as corporeal property, the later ones recognize them as choses in action, or intangible, personal property.24 As a general rule, intangible property is presumed to have its situs, for the purposes of taxation, at the domicil of the owner. Thus, bonds of one State, owned by a resident of another, are liable to taxation in the latter, although declared to be exempt from taxation by the laws of the State which issued them.25 But bonds sent into another State for safe-keeping and not for the purpose of evading taxation are not taxable at the owner's domicil.26 Unless there is some contract specially exempting them a State may tax its own bonds, provided the bonds are in the State.27 So bonds of a State left with an officer of the State, as required by its insurance laws, are taxable in the State, although they are owned by a nonresident. 28 Where the ordinances of a city exempted its bonds from taxation, they may be made liable to city taxation by a State statute.2 A city cannot tax its bonds when they belong to a nonresident and are kept outside the city.30 A statute authorizing a tax "upon the taxable property of the State" will not be construed to authorize a tax on bonds of the State..31

29

II. Credits. Credits, consisting of notes, bonds, accounts, etc., are intangible property. They are proper subjects of taxation; 32 although in California it seems to have been

24 1 Schouler on P. P. 93.

25 Appeal Tax Ct. v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; People v. N. Y. Tax Com'rs, 76 N. Y. 64.

26 State v. Howard Co. Ct., 69 Mo. 454; Valle v, Zeigler, 20 Cent. L. J. 271; See Poppleton v. Yamhil, Co., 8 Or. 337.

27 Champaign Co. Bk. v. Smith, 7 O. St. 42.

28 People v.

Home, Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533.

29 Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; See State v. Woodruff, 37 N. J. L. 139.

30 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 462; See Deviguier v. New Orleans, 16 Fed. Rep. 11; U. S. v. Erie R. Co., 9 Ben. 67.

31 Miller v. Wilson, 60 Ga. 505; Macon v. Jones, 67 Ga. 480; See Augusta v. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Jackson v. Railway, Chase's Dec. 268.

Burrough's on Tax, 57; Alabama etc. v. Lott, 54 Ala. 499.

ruled otherwise.38 But in the cases which have recognized credits as proper subjects of taxation there is a lack of uniformity as to locality where they may be taxed.

(1.) There are cases which seem to have held that a credit must be considered as having its situs at the debtor's residence, so as to make it taxable there.34 But the doctrine of those cases has been generally repudiated. Thus, where a city undertook to tax its own bonds held by a nonresident and required its treasurer to withhold from interest due on such bonds the amount of the tax imposed, the tax was, held illegal, the court saying: "Debts are not property. A nonresident creditor cannot be said to be, in virtue of a debt due to him, a holder of property in the city.' 35 And in another case the court say: "The bonds are undoubtedly property; but property in the hands of the holders, not property of the obligors. So far as they are held by nonresidents of the State, they are property beyond the jurisdiction of the State." 36

**

37

Importance has been attached to the fact that a note was made payable at a specified place and for this reason it was held taxable at that place. That view, however, is opposed to the principle of the cases above cited and is contrary to the conclusion reached in another case.38

(2.) Another class of cases assert that credits may be taxed at the domicil of the owner, without regard to the place where the instruments representing the debt or its security, is kept. If the notes or other instruments are kept at the owners' residence there could be no question about the legality of a tax upon them at that place.89 struments evidencing the

When the inndebtedness are

33 People v. Hibernia Bk., 21 Am. R. 704 (51 Cal. 243.) 34 Bridges v. Griffin, 33 Ga. 113; Harper v. Com'rs., 26 Ga. 566; See Wilson v. Mayor, 4 E. D. Smith 675; Susquehannah v. Com., 72 Pa. St. 721.

35 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432.

36 Cleaveland etc. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300; See. also, City v. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387; Collins v. Miller, 43 Ga. 336; Arraphoe Co. Com'rs v. Cutter, 3 Col. 349; State v. Earl, 1 Nev. 394.

37 Ankeny v. Multnomah Co., 3 Ore. 386. 38 St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258.

39 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Johnson v. Oregon City, 3 Ore. 13; Hoyt v. Com'rs, 23 N. Y. 224; Hammersley v. Freney, 39 Conn. 176; Irwin v. Turner, 47 Ga. 382; New Orleans v. Ins. Co., 30 La. Ann. 876, Pt. 2; State v. Perkins, 24 N. J. L. 489; Davenport v. R. R. Co., 12 Iowa 593.

*

kept in a State other than that of the owners' residence, there is more difficulty in reaching a proper solution, and the conclusions reached are not harmonious. Thus, when a citizen of Connecticut loaned his funds in Chicago, taking the notes of the borrowers, secured by deeds of trust on Chicago property, for the sums loaned, he was held taxable on such notes in Connecticut, notwithstanding the notes, etc., were left with the trustee in Chicago.40 In discussing the character of a credit in that case, the court said: "It has not a visible or tangible form. The note, bond or account, even, may be evidence of a debt, but it is not the debt itself. The specific money, when loaned and received by the borrower, is no longer the property of the creditor. * It is a personal right and accompanies the person of the creditor. The right to receive is valuable and through it an income is derived. That right may with propriety be taxed. The obligation to pay is a burden and has never to our knowledge been the subject of taxation. It seems to us, therefore, that the appropriate place to tax money at interest is where the creditor resides; and that for that purpose it may with propriety be said to be located with the creditor." That case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the appellant there contended that it was taxing property beyond the jurisdiction of the State, and an interferance with commerce between the States; but the court disposed of the case by saying: "The creditor it is conceded is a permament resident within the jurisdiction of the State imposing the tax. The debt is property in his hands. ** That debt, although a species of intangible property, may for the purposes of taxation, if not for all others, be regarded as situate at the domicil of the creditor. It is none the less property because its amount and maturity are set forth in a bond. That bond, wherever actually held or deposited, is is only evidence of the debt; and if destroyed the debt-the right to demand the money loaned with the stipulated interest-remains. Nor is the debt affected, for the purposes of taxation, by the fact that it is secured by a mortgage on real estate situate in Illinois. * The debt then having its situs at the

40 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 19 Am. R. 546 (42 Conn. 426.)

creditors' residence, both he and it are, for the purposes of taxation, within the jurisdiction of the State. It is consequently for the State to determine ** whether such property owned by one of its residents shall contribute by way of taxation to maintain its government." 41

On the other hand, where a citizen of Kansas sold his land in Illinois, took notes of the purchaser for the price payable at specified dates and deposited them, together with his bond to convey upon payment of the price, in a bank in Illinois, it was held that he was not taxable in Kansas on account of the money to accrue to him on such notes; the court remarking that there was no property, tangible, or intangible, in Kansas for its laws to protect. The court distinguishes the case from one "where both the owners of the notes and the notes are in the same State." 42 In Fisher v. Rush County, it is said that "a resident is not subject to taxation in respect to business interests beyond the State, and which the laws of the State cannot reach or protect." In New York it was held that mortgage securities in custody of one's agents, residing in other States and having authority to manage and re-invest the same, are not taxable at the owners' residence, in New York, as personal estate within that State.43 And in Missouri it was held that a citizen, who had bonds of a private corporation on deposit in New York, was not taxable in Missouri on account of such bonds.4

(3.) Can intangible property, such as notes, etc., be taxed in a State or town where they are kept when the owner is not a resident? Does the fact that the note or other instrument is in the State or town make the credit, which it evidences, property in the State or town so as to be subject to taxation, independent of the owners' residence?

The answer to these questions seems to be that if the instruments are only temporarily in the State or city they are not liable to taxation; but if they are in an agent's hands as

41 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 498; S. P. Hunter v. Board etc., 11 Am. R. 132 (33 Iowa 376) and People v. Park, 23 Cal. 138.

42 Wilcox v. Ellis, 19 Am. R. 107 (14 Kan. 588;) Fisher v. Rush Co., 19 Kan. 414; Latrobe v. Baltimore, 19 Md. 13.

43 People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; People v. Gardner 51 Barb. 352.

44 Valle v. Zeigler, 20 Cent. L. J. 271.

custodian with authority in him to collect, reinvest, etc., then they are liable, notwithstanding the nonresidence of the owner. Thus contracts for the sale of land in the hands of agents, residing in a town, may be taxed to the agent in such town, although the owner is a nonresident.45 In the case juscited the court remarks: "The debts due upt on these contracts are personal estate, the same as if they were due on notes and bonds; and such personal estate may be said to exist where the obligations are held. * If this kind of property does not exist where the obligations are held, where does it exist?" So notes belonging to a nonresident, but in the hands of an agent in the State, and secured by mortgage on lands in the State, are taxable in the State.46 So, if a nonresident loans his money in a State through an agent, who holds the notes, collects and reloans the funds, such notes are property in the State so as to be subject to taxation.47 But where, on removing to another State, one left his notes and accounts in the hands of attorneys to be collected and remitted to him; and, also, left bonds in a bank for safe keeping; it was held that much notes, accounts and bonds were not subject to taxation in the State where kept, because the property, "had not been left in this State to be invested by an agent here with some degree of permanency in business." 48

(4.) While the cases generally recognize credits as proper subjects of taxation a distinction has been made between different classes of credits. In California under a constitution which required "all property in this State to be taxed in proportion to its value" credits were held not to be property within the meaning of the constitution, and not subject to taxation, apparently because the court concluded that they were incapable of an appraisement which would be uniform with the valuation of tangible property." 49 In Massachusetts damages due a land owner as compensation for land taken for a public street were held not taxable until the amount

45 People v. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y. 390

46 Redmond v. Rutherford etc., 87 N. C. 122. Catlin v. Hall, 21 Vt. 152; See State v. St. Louis etc., 47 Mo. 594.

48 Herron v. Keeran, 26 Am. R. 87 (59 Ind. 472.) To same effect, Horsman v. Byrns, 68 Ind. 247; Williams v. Wayne etc., 78 N. Y. 561.

People v. Hibernia Bk, 21 Am. R. 704 (51 Cal. 243.)

was "fixed and receivable as his absolute personal estate." 50 An award in favor of an individual by arbitrators on the Alabama claims, for damages sustained, does not constitute a taxable credit until an appropriation is made by Congress for the payment of the award.51 A sum payable on a contingency is not a taxable debt until the contingency has happened. 52 An annuitant can be taxed only on the sum actually due and unpaid at the time of the assessment. 53

III. Stocks in Corporations.-Stock means the right an individual has to a share of the dividends which may be declared by a corporation, during its existence, and to a share of its effects, at its dissolution. It is intangible property. The stock certificate is not property, but merely evidence of the holders rights to a portion of the assets. It resembles a chose in action; and as to taxation is governed substantially by the same rules. Having no locality, shares of stock are regarded as following the person of the owner and are taxable at his residence, whether the corporation be foreign or domestic. 54 And shares may be taxed to the holders notwithstanding the capital and property of the corporation is taxed to the corporation itself.55 Where a domestic corporation is taxed on its property, shares of stock held by citizens in the corporation will not be held liable to taxation, if the statute is susceptible of a different construction.56 Shares of stock in a national bank are taxable where the bank is situate, without regard to the residence of the

50 Lowell v. Street Com'rs, 106 Mass. 540; Arnold v. Middleton, 41 Conn. 206.

51 Bucksport v. Woodman, 68 Me. 33; See Scully v. People, 104 Ill. 349.

52 People v. Argnello, 37 Cal. 524; See Smith v. Byrns, 43 Ga. 191.

53 State v. Shurtz, 41 N. J. L. 279; State v. Slutte, 43 N. J. L. 414; State v. Jones, 39 N. J. L. 650.

54 Appeal Tax Ct. v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; Worth v. Ashe Co. Com'rs, 33 Am. R. 692 (82 N. C. 420;) Great Barrington v. Co. Com'rs, 16 Pick. 572; Dwight v. Boston, 12 Allen 316; McKean v. County etc., 49 Pa. St. 519; Bradley v. Bauder,38 Am. R. 547 (36 O. St. 28;) Seward v. Rising Sun, 79 Ind. 351; Griffith v. Watson, 19 Kan. 23; Dyer v. Osborn, 23 Am. R. 460 (11 R. L. 321;) Holton v. Bangor, 23 Me. 264.

55 Belo v. Com'rs, 33 Am. R. 688 (82 N. C. 415;) Cook v. Burlington, 44 Am. R. 679 (59 Iowa 251;) Memphis v. Ensley, 6 Baxt. 553; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573.

56 State v. H. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 37 Mo. 265; Savings Bk. v. Portsmouth, 52 N. H. 17; See Osborn v. New York etc. Co., 40 Conn. 491; Bangor etc. v. Harris, 22 Me. 533.

owner. 57

This result is due to the operation of our national banking laws. "The acts of Congress have made certain property taxable here, which without these acts might not be so taxable." 58 There are cases which seem to have asserted the right of a State to tax shares of stock in corporations created by the laws of such State, even when such shares were held by non-residents.59 That view might be sustained where the effect of the law is to tax the corporate property through the shares of the stockholders. But, if the shares be considered as property in and of themselves (not merely as evidence of property), then they cannot be taxed when held by a non-resident.60 Either the person or the property on which the tax is to be imposed must be in the jurisdiction of the State to render the tax legal.61

Under the laws of New York a resident is not taxable on account of stock owned by him in a foreign corporation.62

County Taxation.-Whether tangible, personal property belonging to a citizen, when situate at a place other than his residence, should be taxed at his residence, or at the place where it is actually situate, must be determined in each instance by reference to the laws of the State; for some of the States have adopted the one system, while others have adopted the other; and a citation of the cases would occupy too great space. But some of the points decided will serve to illustrate general principles. Thus, where property was taken from one county to another and was assessed in both, the assessment first made was held to be the only valid one.63 judgment foreclosing a mortgage is taxable in the county where the mortgagee resides, not where the mortgaged premises are situ

A

57 Curtis v. Ward, 58 Mo. 295; Commercial Bk. v. Mobile, 62 Ala. 284; Tappan v. Merchants N. Bk., 19 Wall. 490; See Laflin v. Citizens Bk., 85 Ind. 341 as to taxation of real estate belonging to Nat. Bank.

58 Providence etc., v. Boston, 101 Mass. 575.

59 Paxton v. McCosh, 12 Iowa 527; Baltimore v. Baltimore etc., 57 Md. 31; Pittsburgh etc., v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73.

60 State Tax on Foreign held Bonds, 15 Wall. 322; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 268; Worthington v. Sebastian, 25 O. St. 1; See Nashua etc. v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 389.

61 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432; Conwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind. 150; Strong v. O'Donnell, 10 Philad. 575; Union Bk. v. State, 9 Yerger, 490.

62 Trowbridge v. Com'rs, 4 Hun 595; People v. Com'rs, 5 Hun 200; See Smith v. Exeter, 37 N. H.556 63 People v. Holliday, 25 Cal. 300.

ate.64 The rule would be the same although the payment of the debt depended entirely on a sale of the mortgaged premises.65 Funds can only be assessed to an agent, who has control and management of the same, when the owner is a non-resident of the State." Intangible property, such as bank stock, is not taxable at any other place than the owner's domicil, unless made so by positive enactment.67

Municipal Taxation. -Municipal corporations have no inherent power of taxation. They are restricted to such subjects of taxation as are authorized by their charters.68 They cannot tax money or credits of their citizens unless specially authorized by their charters.69 Authority to tax all property in their limits refers to property subject to manual occupation, and does not include moneys, stocks and bonds.70 Where authorized by its charter a city may tax choses in action belonging to its citizens." It may tax stocks and bonds belonging to its inhabitants. 72 It may tax the capital of a coporation located and doing business in the city.73 Bank stock cannot be taxed elsewhere than the owner's domicil unless expressly authorized by statute.74 But money due to a nonresident on written contracts, which are held by an agent in the city, was held to be taxable as personal property in the city.75 A city may tax shares of stock owned by an in

64 People v. Eastnan, 25 Cal. 601; People v. Whartonby, 38 Cal. 461; State v. Williams, 33 N. J. L. 77; See State v. Runyan, 41 N. J. L. 98.

65 State v. Jones, 24 Minn. 251.

66 Boardman v. Tompkins etc., 85 N. Y. 359; Lord v. Arnold, 18 Barb, 104.

67 Howell v. Village etc., 35 Mich. 471; Salem I. F. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 511; Conwell v. Connersville, 15 Ind. 150; See Amesbury etc. v. Amesbury, 17 Mass. 461.

68 Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; State v. Maysville, 12 S. C. 76; State v. Shortridge, 56 Mo. 126; Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 435; See Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225.

69 Pullen v. Com'rs, 68 N. C. 451.

70 Mifllintown v. Jacobs, 69 Pa. St. 151; Goep v. Borrough etc., 28 Pa. St. 249: Covington v. Powell, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 226; Johnson v.Lexington, 14 B.Mon. 648; Louisville v. Herning, 1 Bush 381.

71 Johnson v. Oregon City, 3 Ore. 13; Trustees v. Mc Connell, 12 Ill. 138.

72 Wilson v. Alderman, 74 N. C. 748; Madison v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 261.

78 Mayor etc v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570; New Orleans v. Peoples Bk. 27 La. Ann. 646.

74 Howell v. Village etc. 35 Mich. 471.

75 People v. Ogdensburg, 48 N. Y. 390; See People v. Com'rs, 59 N. Y. 40; St. Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 258; Bridges v. Griffin, 33 Ga. 113.

habitant, although a tax thereon has been paid in the State where the corporation is located.76

Tangible personal property, having an actual situs in a city, is taxable there for corporate purposes." It may tax property found in its limits, although the general revenue law directs that personal property shall be assessed at the owner's residence. The general revenue law relates to State and county, not to municipal taxation.78 Authority to tax property in its limits does not authorize a tax against a resident for property having its situs outside of the city.79 Nor can a city tax a horse and carriage which a non-resident uses daily to convey him to and from his business house in the city.80 Nor can a city tax a steamboat, belonging to a corporation, unless the principal office of the company is in the city.81 Cities are not, unless by charter, restricted to the same subjects of taxation as the State.82

Domicil. It is not always an easy matter to determine what is the domicil or residence of an individual within the meaning of our tax laws. And it is still more difficult where the being or entity is a corporation or copartnership with numerous offices. The cases illustrating this topic are too numerous to be all cited.

I. Domicil of Persons.-A person's domiicil or residence is his home, or the habitation which he has fixed in any place without a present intention of removing therefrom.83 When one has once acquired a residence it will be presumed to continue at the same

76 Seward v. Rising Sun, 79 Ind. 351; See Minturn v. Hays, 2 Col. 590.

77 Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Dunleith v. Reynolds, 53 Ill. 45; Dillon on Mun. Corp. § § 625-628.

78 McGregor v. State Bk. 12 Iowa, 79; City etc; v. State, 2 Spears, 719; See American T. Co. v. Buffalo, 20 N. Y. 388; Barrett v. Henderson, 4 Bush, 255; Hilgenburg v. Wilson, 55 Ind. 210.

79 Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160; New Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481; State v. Rahway, 24 N. J. L. 56; See Mills v. Weston, 22 Mo. 384.

80 City etc. v. State, 2 Spears 719; See St. Charles v Nolle, 51 Mo. 122; Moore v. Fayetteville, 80 N. C. 154. 81 Union S. Co. v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y. 351; See Pelton v. N. T. Co., 37 O. St. 450; St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall, 423; Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill. 160.

82 Orange etc. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Gratt. 176; State v. City etc., 10 Rich. L. 240; Burrough's on Tax. § 131; Dillon on Mun. Corp, § 611.

831 Am. Lead'g Cas. 706 and note; Green v. Beckwith, 38 Mo. 384.

place until a change is affirmatively shown.84 It will continue at the old place until he has acquired a new one, or until there is satisfactory evidence of its abandonment. 85 Though he may leave his residence with the intention of never residing there again, he will remain liable to taxation there until he acquires a new one, or leaves the State.86 But when he has once passed out of the State for the purpose of acquiring a new home, he ceases to be subject to taxation at his old home.87 If a person has more than one dwelling that in which he usually sleeps is his residence.88

II. Domicil of Corporation. Where the charter or certificate specifies the location of the company's office, it is conclusive as to the location of the corporation for the purposes of taxation.89 When the charter specifies no particular place as the locality of the company, the place where the governing power is located and exercised (not where the principal labor of the employees is done), is the home office, and it is to be taxed there.90 The fact that part of the capital of a domestic corporation is invested in foreign countries does not entitle it to an exemption from taxation to the extent of such investment.91 State may tax any foreign corporation to which it grants the privilege of doing business in the State.9 So a State or city may tax tangible property, which has its situs in such State or city, although it is owned by a foreign corporation.93 III.

92

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Estates of Deceased Persons and Wards.-Owing to a diversity in statutes, the decisions relating to taxation of estates in the

84 Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62; State v. Cooper, 36 N. J. L. 367; Culberson v. Floyd Co.. 52 Ind. 361. 85 Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. 231.

86 Bulckely v. Williamson, 3 Gray 493; McCutcheon v. Rice Co., 2 McCrary 337; Boland v. Boston, 42 Am. R. 424 (132 Mass. 89;) See Church v. Rowell, 49 Me. 367. 87 Colton v. Longmeadow, 12 Allen, 598; Briggs v. Rochester, 16 Gray, 337.

88 Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170.

89 Pelton v. N. T. Co., 37 Ohio St. 450; Western T. Co. v. Schew, 19 N. Y. 408; see New Orleans v. People's Bank, 27 La. Ann. 646.

90 Middletown etc. v. Middletown, 40 Conn. 65; State v. Warford, 37 N. J. L. 397; People v. Oswego, 6 Thomp. & C. 673; see Dubuque etc. v. Dubuque, 17 Iowa, 120.

91 Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 104 U. S. 111; People v. Nat. Gold Bank, 51 Cal. 508.

92 Erie etc. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492; W. U. T. Co. v. Lieb, 76 Ill. 172; W. U. T. Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 521; Atty-Gen. v. B. S. M. Co., 99 Mass. 148.

93 St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 40 Mo. 580; see Gardiner etc. v. Gardiner, 5 Me. 133.