shown by the small numbers who had joined the enemy. notwithstanding the severe and long-continued struggle. It not resulting from the disaffection of the people, the cause must be "the impolicy and mismanagement of the rulers." Too much readiness had been shown to make concessions of the powers implied in the original trust. Too sanguine a reliance on foreign aid. The resources and th energy of England and the enthusiasm of her people had been underestimated. There was too confident an expectation of peace. But if an early peace should be concluded, the contingencies of that peace to the United States ought to present motives for increased exertions. It might involve a sacrifice of part of the territory of the United States.-The conclusion was, that, we ought without delay to ENLARGE THE POWERS of CONGRESS. Every plan, of which this is not the foundation, will be illusory. The private exertions of the States will never suffice. Nothing but a well-proportioned exertion of the resources of the whole, under the direction of a common council, with power sufficient to give efficacy to their resolutions, can preserve us from being a CONQUERED PEOPLE now, or can make us a HAPPY PEOPLE hereafter."

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This being admitted, "the principal difficulty," he stated, "yet remains to fix the public judgment definitively on the points which ought to compose that enlargement. Nothing short of the following articles can suffice: The POWER OF REGULATING TRADE comprehending a right of granting bounties and premiums by way of encouragement; of imposing duties of every kind as well for revenue as regulation; of appointing all officers of the customs; and of laying embargoes in extraordinary emergencies. Second. A moderate levied tax, throughout the United States, of a specific rate per pound or per acre,

granted to the Federal Government in perpetuity; and, if Congress think proper, to be levied by their own collectors. Third. A moderate capitation tax to be also vested in perpetuity, and with the same condition of collection. Fourth. The disposal of all unlocated land for the benefit of the United States. Fifth. A certain proportion of the product of all mines discovered or to be discovered, with the same right of collection. Sixth. The appointment of all land (as well as naval) officers of every rank."

“The three first articles are of IMMEDIATE NECESSITY, the three last would be of great present, but of much greater future utility; the whole combined, would give solidity and permanency to the UNION. The great defect of the confederacy is, that it gives the United States no property, or, in other words, no revenue, nor the means of acquiring it, inherent in themselves, and independent on the temporary pleasure of the different members. And power without revenue in political society, is a name. While Congress continue altogether dependent on the occasional grants of the several States, for the means of defraying the expenses of the Federal Government, it can neither have dignity, vigor, nor credit. Credit supposes specific, permanent funds for the punctual payment of in terest, with a moral certainty of the final redemption of the principal." This subject is argued at some length.

The revenue, it was admitted, would be deficient. This deficiency must be supplied by loans, and such loans can only be effected on the basis of a revenue vested in Congress. One of the means of loaning indicated, is a national bank.

The succeeding numbers were written at this time, but their publication was accidentally delayed.

The fifth is devoted to an argument of the necessity

TRADE.

of vesting Congress with the power of REGULATING This is widely discussed, and the consequences of conflicting State tariffs are distinctly portrayed. The policy of England, of France, and of Holland, in the protection of their infant manufactures, is adduced as an example, and the advantages of a revenue derived from import duties are indicated. A plan is proposed to meet the embarrassments resulting from State tariffs, if adhered to; and the question how far the consumer pays the duty is examined, a wise caution being given against a too ready resort to abstract reasonings, without regard to the many exceptions that must be admitted, in questions affecting the existence and collective happiness of the States.

The sixth, and concluding number, depicts the consequences of not vesting Congress with this power of regulating trade. But while urging a power of regulation, the discretion, which is his great characteristic-a discretion of exertion, never leading to indecision or want of energy, -is also seen.

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Easy duties on commerce, especially on imports," he remarks, "ought to lighten the burdens which will unavoidably fall upon land." "The great art is to distribute the public burthens well, and not to suffer them, either first or last, to fall heavily on parts of the community."

While the necessity is shown of granting to the Federal Government adequate funds, the policy of its relying on a compound of permanent and occasional supplies is exhibited. "The Federal Government," he observes, "should neither be INDEPENDENT nor too much DEPENDENT. It should neither be raised above responsibility or control, nor should it want the means of maintaining its own weight, authority, dignity and credit. To this end, permanent funds are indispensable; but they ought to be of such a nature and so moderate in their amount, as never to be inconvenient."

The collection of the national revenues, by officers appointed by Congress, is shown to be essential to the success of the system, and is urged from the farther consideration, that their appointment, and also that of all military officers, of every rank, would be the means of creating, in the interior of each State, a mass of influence in favor of the Federal Government. "The great danger," he says, has been shown to be, " that it will not have power enough to defend itself, and PRESERVE THE UNION; not that it will ever become formidable to the general liberty. A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and intrigues of different members. Force cannot effect it.

"A contest of arms will seldom be between the common sovereign and a single refractory member, but between distinct combinations of the several parts against each other; a sympathy of situations, will be apt to produce associates to the disobedient. The application of force is always disagreeable; the issue uncertain. It will be wiser to obviate the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of individuals in each State in support of the Federal Government, as will be a counterpoise to the ambition of others, and will make it difficult for them to unite the people in opposition to the just and necessary measures of the Union. There is something noble ana magnificent in the perspective of a great FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC, closely linked in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home, respectable abroad; there is something proportionably diminutive and contemptible, in the prospect of a number of petty States, with the appearance only of union,-jarring, jealous, and perverse, without any determined direction,— fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignificant

by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. Happy America, if those to whom thou hast entrusted the guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy future repose, but miserable and undone, if their negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her banners on the ruins of thy tranquillity!"

Such were the sentiments of a man, whose views have been so much, and so designedly misrepresented; whose strong solicitude for the liberties of America, saw in the constitutional strength of each department of government, the only security against usurpation; who sought to connect with every grant of power, its appropriate check; and, who having advised every precaution for the public safety, which the most prudent foresight could suggest, believed that a generous confidence on the part of the people, was as essential to their happiness, as an honest administration by their rulers.