which he refused to do. Thereupon, at the suggestion of these two directors, the superintendent of public instruction of the county saw him and requested him to quit teaching the school, and on his failing to do so declared his license as a teacher revoked. This suit was then instituted, and the appellee did not teach the school thereafter. The appellee taught the school for three weeks, and we think there was testimony sufficient to warrant the finding of the chancellor that he was a competent teacher and performed his duties properly, and that the revocation of his license was made without notice or hearing, and therefore was unauthorized and invalid. The undisputed testimony, however, shows that the contract for teaching the school was entered into by only two of the directors of the district. The third director had no notice of, and was not present at, the meeting at which this contract was made, and did not know that the contract had been made. He did not know that appellee had been employed as such teacher, and there was no evidence adduced showing that he knew that appellee was teaching the school during said three weeks. It appears that the two directors who signed the contract lived in one end of the district and the third director lived at some distance at the other end; that there were two schools in the district; and that the directors had a general understanding or tacit agreement that the two directors would employ a teacher at one of these schools and the third director at the other. The third director testified that he did not know of appellee's contract until the suit was instituted; that if he had known that any one was complaining of his employment he would not have signed the contract, and that he joined the other directors in their action in seeking to restrain appellee from further teaching the school.

As stated by counsel for appellee in their brief, the sole questions presented by this appeal for determination are:

(1) Whether the contract signed by only two directors of the school district was binding, and

(2) If not, was it acquiesced in and ratified by the third director so as to validate it?

It has been repeatedly held by this court that a contract entered into at a meeting of a school board at which only two of its members are present, and of which meeting the third had no

notice, is invalid. School Dist. v. Bennett, 52 Ark. 511; Burns v. Thompson, 64 Ark. 489; Springfield Furniture Co. v. School Dist., 67 Ark. 236; School Dist. v. Adams, 69 Ark. 159; School District v. Allen, 83 Ark. 491; School Dist. v. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335.

The manifest purpose of the school law in providing for a board consisting of three members is to obtain the advantage of the counsel of three directors at a meeting for transacting the school district's business. The fact that the testimony in this case shows there had been a general understanding or agreement between the directors of this school district that two of them could act in the absence of the third and without prior notice to him of a meeting for such action would not meet this requirement of the statute. Such an agreement or custom would simply lead to the encouragement of a neglect of and failure upon the part of one of the directors to perform his duty, for which a penalty is prescribed by our statute.

It is conceded that the contract made by two directors with appellee was, according to the undisputed evidence adduced in the case, invalid at its inception, but it is urged that it was acquiesced in and ratified by the third director and thus made binding on the district. Reliance for this contention is made upon the case of School District v. Goodwin, 81 Ark. 843. In that case it was held that the contract for the employment of a school teacher, made at a meeting of two directors of which the third had no notice, was binding if acquiesced in and ratified thereafter by the absent director. In that case, however, the testimony tended to prove that the teacher opened and began teaching the school under her written contract with the knowledge and acquiescence of this absent director. The teacher continued to teach the school for two months, and the absent director, as the secretary of the school board, drew warrants in this teacher's favor for each of the completed months which she taught. Testimony showed that all parties in authority, including the absent director, had knowledge of the fact that the contract of employment had been made with the teacher when she opened the school, and by their acts and conduct acquiesced in the contract, defective though it was, by knowingly permitting her to continue teaching for nearly half of the life of the contract. It was held that such evidence

was sufficient to prove the acquiescence in and the ratification of the contract by the entire board.

In the case at bar, however, the undisputed evidence shows that the absent director did not know that the contract of employment had been made with appellee, or that he was teaching the school. Without such knowledge the absent director could not have acquiesced in the contract which was made, and therefore there could not have been any ratification of it by him. It follows that the contract under which appellee was proceeding to teach this school was invalid and not binding upon the school district. The decree is accordingly reversed, and this cause is remanded with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

APPEAL

CRANDELL v. HARRISON.

Opinion delivered September 30, 1912.

AND ERROR-LOCAL ASSESSMENTS-TIME FOR APPEALING.

Under Kirby's Digest, § 5542, providing that abutting property owners may be required to construct sidewalks, and that if the owner refuse to do so the same may be done by the city and a lien declared in favor of the city, the same to be enforced by "suits in equity to be brought in the manner and under the terms now provided by law for the foreclosure of property by improvement districts so far as applicable," and Id., § § 5706, 5709, providing that in foreclosure suits by improvement districts the transcript on appeal shall be filed in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decree was rendered, held, that an appeal from decree enforcing a lien in favor of a city for the construction of a sidewalk will be dismissed where the transcript is not filed in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decree appealed from was rendered. Appeal from Boone Chancery Court; T. Haden Humphreys, Chancellor; appeal dismissed.

J. W. Story, for appellant.
Pace & Pace, for appellee.

MCCULLOCH, C. J. This is an action instituted by the city of Harrison against appellant to enforce a lien in favor of the city for the cost of constructing a sidewalk in front of appellant's property, which he had refused, upon notice, to construct. A decree was rendered in favor of the city, and an appeal was taken to this court, but the transcript was not filed

here until nearly sixty days after rendition of the decree. The statute provides that if the property owner fails or refuses, after notice, to construct a sidewalk, the same may be done by the city at the owner's cost, and a lien shall be declared in favor of the city, the same to be enforced by "suits in equity to be brought in the manner and under the terms now provided by law for the foreclosure of property by improvement districts, so far as applicable." Kirby's Digest, § 5542. The statute regulating foreclosure suits by improvement districts provides that on appeal to this court the "transcript shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty days after the rendering of the decree appealed from," and that "no appeal shall be prosecuted from any decree after the expiration of the twenty days herein granted for filing the transcript in the clerk's office of the Supreme Court." Kirby's Digest, §§ 5706 and 5709. It is manifest from the language of the statute that the Legislature meant to provide a method of procedure in suits like this the same as in improvement district suits and to place the same restrictions thereon with reference to appeals as well as all other steps taken in the litigation. This being true, it follows that the appeal has not been prosecuted by filing transcript within the time prescribed by the statute, and, as no excuse is given for the delay, the question whether this court has the power to extend the time for cause does not arise. The appeal is therefore dismissed.

1.

UNITED STATES BEDDING COMPANY v. ANDRE.

Opinion delivered October 14, 1912.

AGENCY-IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF AGENT.-' -To justify an implication of authority in an agent, it must appear that the act of the agent is not merely advantageous to or convenient for the principal, or even effectual in transacting the business in which he is engaged, but the act must be practically indispensable in order to execute the duty delegated to him. (Page 114.)

2. SAME-AUTHORITY OF TRAVELLING SALESMAN.-A travelling salesman has no implied authority to enter into a contract for advertising his principal's business in a newspaper or upon bill boards. (Page 114.)

3. SAME AUTHORITY OF AGENT.-One who deals with an agent is put upon notice of the limitations of his authority, and must ascertain what that authority is, and, if he fails to do so, he deals with the agent at his peril. (Page 115.)

Appeal from Mississippi Circuit Court, Osceola District; Frank Smith, Judge; reversed.

W. J. Lamb and J. W. Rhodes, Jr., for appellant.

One dealing with an agent is bound to ascertain the nature and extent of his authority; and, if he deals with the agent without such knowledge, he does so at his own peril. 62 Ark. 33, 40; 92 Ark. 315, 320; 94 Ark. 301, 305; 102 S. W. 1066, 1069. The alleged contract was not within the apparent scope of authority of the agent. The duty of a travelling salesman is to solicit and transmit orders for goods, and extends no further. 46 Ark. 210, 214, 215; 43 Pac. 383; 86 Pac. 845; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L., (2 ed.) 224; 53 Am. Rep. 745; 18 L. R. A. 667, note; 102 S. W. 1068.

Appellee, pro se.

The proof shows that the travelling salesman acted for the appellant in making the contract, and that appellant ratified it. 37 N. E. 1084; 115 Mo. 1. See, also, 49 Ark. 320; 96 Ark. 456; 93 Ark. 528.

FRAUENTHAL, J. This is an action instituted by appellee to recover for certain work and labor which he alleged he performed under a contract made with appellant through its agent. Appellee is engaged in a bill-posting business in the town of Osceola, and appellant is a mercantile corporation located in the city of Memphis. In the conduct of its business, appellant had in its employ a travelling salesman who was authorized to solicit orders for and make sales of its goods. Among its customers in Osceola was a retail firm to whom in shipping goods it also sent large printed advertisements which could be posted on bill boards. Appellee claimed that he had entered into a contract with appellant's salesman whereby he was employed to post said advertisements on his bill boards. Appellant denied that such contract was entered into by its salesman, and claimed that if it was he was unauthorized to make it.

The trial resulted in a verdict for appellee for the amount for which he sued.

The testimony on the part of appellee tended to prove that on March 10, 1911, Mr. Swift, the manager of said retail firm in Osceola, called him to his place of business and stated