insufficient to stop the inquiry, Butler then took up that which forms so important a part of the matter to be considered. "There is" (says Mr. Mill in the same chapter from which Bishop Fitzgerald has made the extract to which I have already referred) "a general presumption against any supposition of Divine agency not operating through general laws, or, in other words, there is an antecedent improbability in every miracle which, in order to outweigh it, requires an extraordinary strength of antecedent probability derived from the special circumstances of the case." (Vol. ii. p. 160). Then how are you to get at the special circumstances? You must not shut out, in the first instance, the consideration of the evidence, for it may remove the objection altogether; and if you find that the probability which the special circumstances supply, is such as to outweigh the antecedent presumption against any miraculous interposition, then, whether the strength of this probability be extraordinary or not, the case of the miracle is established. Nor is it necessary that it should be extraordinary. For if you eliminate (as Butler has done) this presumption as it stands prior to any evidence, you have only to find in the circumstances a suitable occasion for the Divine interposition, and thus you remove the presumption. Mr. Mill admits "that a miracle considered merely as an extraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by our senses or by testimony;" in this he exactly follows in the wake of Butler. But he suggests that it cannot, in the strict sense, be proved that it is a miracle, because it may possibly be the result of some unknown natural cause.

This supposition, however; only shews that the evidence is not demonstrative, and it leaves the moral inference as clear and certain as before. For "proved" the word "demonstrated" should be substituted, and then how does the matter stand? There are extra-ordinary facts established by fair testimony,

and the proper inference is to be drawn by a moral and intelligent being from all the circumstances submitted to him. Assuming that there is an intelligent Author of Nature and Ruler of the universe (which is Butler's postulate), there is an adequate cause for whatever is not in itself impossible as a contradiction. What remains? Is the special interposition consistent with His character, and is the occasion proper for His interference? Has the transaction those congruous moral accompaniments which are reasonably to be expected? This is not a matter for "strict demonstration,” but for the proof which leaves no doubt in the conscience; and it satisfies the heart, just as the inference we derive from the world without and the voice within, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature-a Moral Governor of the world. This too may not be capable of" strict demonstration," but it is capable of proof sufficient to leave him without excuse who is not convinced. If he has already drawn this conclusion, he has but to go through a like process, in considering the facts and circumstances of an alleged miracle; if he has not, and so does not believe in the existence of a God, he cannot be expected to admit the possibility or the proof of a miraculous interference of an Almighty Creator with the course and order of the world.

We cannot "demonstrate" the motive with which man sometimes acts—and yet it is a material element in the consideration of the most important questions of public justice. On the right determination of it, human life and liberty are forfeited according to law. And how is it determined? Not by any demonstration. In the correspondence with Dr. Clarke (see Serm. Bell and Daldy's Edition, p. 356) Butler says, "My using the word demonstration instead of proof which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact." It is an inference

from the facts-a reasonable inference and a moral probability, such as we act on in the most important concerns of life. You cannot demonstrate all that you may prove, but this may be as certain to the moral conviction as demonstration to the reason, or as evidence to the senses.

Mr. Mill admits that the miracle, as an extraordinary fact, may be certified "by our senses or by testimony." So far as Butler deals with miracles as exceptions to physical order, he has anticipated this admission of Mr. Mill; for, in his fourth "particular observation" Butler says that "miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience, but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature." This shews that he had not overlooked the points of contrast, which made the comparison with ordinary events inadmissible. He excludes such a comparison. The very nature of a miracle is exceptional. The presumption against it, in the first instance, is fitly compared to that which would present itself to the mind of a person acquainted only with the daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting the earth and the common powers of matter, upon first hearing of comets and other such extraordinary phenomena, or of such powers as magnetism, electricity, &c. So that it is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles. Whether there is or not, he says is not important, inasmuch as he has already shewn that, even assuming that the presumption is peculiar, it is not such in its degree as to render miracles incredible. He gives a reason for avoiding the very discussion required by some of the comments which impute mistake and fallacy to his reasoning. He shews plainly that he did not consider it to be relevant to the only question which he took to be material at this stage of the argument.

Thus you find that the presumption against miracles, of which he speaks throughout, is that which belongs to them as a class that antecedent improbability of which Mr. Mill speaks as being in every miracle; but this may be overcome by a greater probability, that may be derived from the special circumstances of the case. This improbability is not (properly speaking) in the miracle at all, but arises from the presumption that is drawn by our limited knowledge, and, therefore, is capable of being removed by the proof which enlarges our knowledge, and so takes away the ground of the presumption.

PRESUMPTION AGAINST MIRACLES.

CONTINUED.

THE Consideration of the preliminary objections which have been made to the credibility of Revelation as miraculous, included that of the supposed peculiar presumption against any Divine interference with the course of Nature after it has been settled and during its continuance; or, in other words, the supposed peculiar presumption against miracles in general. Butler proceeds to establish, first, that if there is a peculiar presumption against miracles in general, i. e., against any miraculous interposition, it appears to be relatively unimportant; and there is certainly no such presumption as to render miracles in any sort incredible; and, next, that as the moral system of the world enables us to see reasons for such interposition, this gives a positive credibility to the history of miracles, in cases where these reasons hold. Thirdly, that if we compare miracles as a class, not to the ordinary but to the extra-ordinary phenomena of nature, then it is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the lowest degree, against miracles as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena; but that this is of no importance to determine, as the only material question is, whether there is any such presumption as to render miracles in any sort incredible. It is the degree, not