When we turn to the instructive chapter of the Analogy, on the moral discipline of life, the formation of character by habits and conduct, the connexion of our destiny with our duty, we should place it in connection with the great chapter on the Atonement. May we not then be led to appreciate more fully the force and truthful power of the words of our blessed Lord, that whosoever cometh to Him, and heareth His sayings, and doeth them, he it is who builds upon a rock -his foundation is secure? We thus see how the believer, trusting in Christ, taught by the Holy Spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God, by the discipline of life adapted for its moral purposes, may go on from strength to strength; conduct forming habits, habits fixing character, and character capacitating or the joy of heaven. And thus the analysis of our moral nature and the moral system of God, and the light thrown upon both by Revelation, make clear and consistent what otherwise we could not reconcile-salvation and reward; the one not of works, the other according to works. The righteous judge who freely gives the one, Himself awards the other, in both remembering mercy. Let me then commend this work to your earnest, patient, and prayerful study. It is adapted, under God's blessing, to invigorate your minds and elevate your hearts. Difficulties, whether of belief or of practice, are part of our trials here on earth. We must seek the aid of Him without whom we can do nothing. We must seek for the guidance of the Holy Spirit who can lead us into all the truth. "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief!"

BEFORE we enter upon the immediate subject of the first chapter of the Analogy, there are one or two points connected with the general lecture of the last evening to which I would wish to advert. One of the members asked me at the end of it, "What is the meaning of a practical proof?" Now, I have told you I wished, whenever I could, to make Butler his own interpreter. He states in exact terms what he means by a practical proof:-"The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together, to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted—such a proof as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the actions of men who act upon thought and reflection."-(Part I., chap. vi., par. 15). A practical proof, then, is that which is sufficient for men to act upon; that is the kind of proof proposed in the introductory chapter, where he starts with the definition of probability. Butler tells you that probability admits of all degrees, from the lowest presumption until we arrive at what we call moral certainty, and he says "probability is the very guide of life." Observe the distinction is between what is strictly

called demonstrative, mathematical certainty'-(such, for instance, as the proposition that two and two make four, which cannot be otherwise, there can be no degree in thatit is conclusive, certain and necessary)—and 'probability.' Now, probability admits of various degrees, until it reaches from the lowest presumption to the highest moral certainty. Then he says, Religion is is a practical thing: he speaks of it as Natural' and Revealed;' as comprehending both branches of it-this is practical (as he says) not speculative. Man is here in this life to act-certain duties are imposed upon him he has these duties to perform, and Religion guides him in the discharge of them, the duties flowing indeed from his relation to God-God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit. As Religion is then a practical thing, you have to discharge the duties incident to this relationship which you occupy. You act upon what? Not upon demonstration, for that you cannot have, and that is the reason he refers to every-day life to show that in all the ordinary affairs of life. probability in its various degrees is held sufficient to guide us. When an insurance office insures the life of an individual, they are not certain whether the man may die to-morrow, or at the end, perhaps, of thirty or forty years; they have established probabilities to act upon, which are deemed sufficient to guide them. So if, in a court of law, we sit on a trial in which a man's life is involved, all we can have is that "moral certainty" which will satisfy the consciences of twelve men on their oaths. So that in common life it is not mathematical certainty, but probability in its various degrees, upon which we act. This is the foundation upon which he goes-this is the key to his argument from analogy. He puts his argument in this way. If you raise objections founded upon speculative suggestions-objections to religion-and say, it cannot have come from God because there are these difficulties about it;

well then, he says the same difficulties equally arise in the constitution and course of nature where you do act-these difficulties there meet you, and you put them aside-you doubt them, or perhaps you think them to be false, or act as if they were so. He inquires what are the principles on which we act, and he applies these principles to religion. Thus he takes the constitution and course of nature as his basis.

We now come to what he says is the foundation of our hopes and fears, a future life, and there can not be, certainly, a subject more interesting and more momentous to beings such as we are, than the consideration that there is to be a future state of existence, with which our present state is mysteriously and irrevocably connected. Therefore, that being implied in all religion—a future state of existence-he begins the first chapter by taking up the subject of the future life. With regard to this chapter, those of you who have read it may have felt as many persons have felt in reading it—disappointment. This is a very common feeling experienced on reading the first chapter of Butler's work-people feel disappointed at the close of the chapter. But, perhaps, persons who have read the whole of the book, and considered the whole scope of the argument together, and treated this chapter as a part of the whole work, will not feel so strongly (if at all) this disappointment. Butler's object was to carry out the exact, precise view he had of bringing to bear the analogy of the constitution and course of nature upon religion, and in this first chapter, upon that part of religion which concerns the fact of a future life simply, the mere fact of a future life; he goes on afterwards to pursue the argument further, and to show that we are under the moral government of God. In this chapter he proposes to show what analogies there are in the constitution and course of nature that we can bring to bear on the fact of a future life. Now, the great office of analogy is to repel objections—to refute disproofs-to remove

unfavourable presumptions. It is seldom used for the purpose of direct proof; it is not suited for that. It clears the way, it makes a matter credible,-leaves it open for the application of proper proofs, which it confirms. If you look at the concluding section of this (first) chapter, you find he says::—“This credibility of a future life." That is all he professes to establish. "This credibility of a future life which has been here insisted upon, how little soever it may satisfy curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion in like manner as a demonstrative proof would." What he means by that is this:-This doctrine of a future life may be true. His argument with the Deists is that they could not be safe unless they were able to disprove religion. "Because," he says, with regard to a future state of existence, “it may be true." You may be here under the moral government of God; you may hereafter be in a state of misery or eternal happiness, and that state may be connected with your faith and conduct in this life. Hence, even supposing it to be a doubtful matter, how should a person act where conIn the ordinary sequences so momentous are at stake! affairs of life, just in proportion to the importance of consequences you will give these consequences what is called "the benefit of a doubt." That is what he means by saying that "the credibility of a future life answers all the purposes of religion" and answers the purpose he had in view in the chapter, which was to show that it was probable, in the sense in which he defines probability In the first section of the chapter he

:- "Whether it be not from

proposes the argument thus:thence (that is, the analogy and course of nature) probable that we may survive this change and exist in a future state of life and perception." Now, in this chapter the objection which the materialist puts forward, of the destruction of the soul along with the body, is removed by the presumption