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fying emergency, is wrongfully there, assumes under way observed it, and was aware from all the risks incident thereto and cannot re- | his knowledge of the time of the trains, that it cover for injuries to which his being in that was in serious danger of a collision which place contributed. might occur at any moment. He threw down his cigar, passed into the baggage portion of the compartment car, stood at the door with his hand upon the knob, prepared to jump and did jump just before the two trains collided.

Bates v. Old Colony R. Co. 6 New Eng. Rep. 553, 147 Mass. 255, 265; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Langdon, 92 Pa. 21, 27; Peoria & R. 1. R. Co. v. Lane, 83 Ill. 448; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Clemmons, 55 Tex. 88; Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439 (24 L. ed. 506).

The mere existence of danger, or the mere knowledge of danger, or much less a mere apprehension of danger, does not in itself constitute an emergency.

A person who is in danger must still exercise due care, and a degree of care proportionate to the danger which he is in. It is only when the danger is so great, sudden and imminent that a prudent man might act instantly and without reflection, that he is excused for doing the wrong thing.

Lund v. Tyngsboro, 11 Cush. 563; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506; Shearm. & Redf. Neg. 4th ed. § 89, notes and cases cited.

If due care required the plaintiff to remain where he was, in the smoking car, or to go to the rear car, and, instead of doing either, he went into the baggage car, and was negligently or wrongfully there, and while there an emergency arose which made it unsafe for him to return to the passenger car or remain in the baggage car, he cannot recover for injuries sustained in jumping therefrom, although, being in that position, due care required that he should jump, for it was his own wrongful act which brought upon him the necessity.

Lucas v. New Bedford & T. R. Co. 6 Gray, 64, 72; Little v. Brockton, 123 Mass. 511, 515.

Mr. Stillman B. Allen, for plaintiff: The question whether the plaintiff was using due care in going into the baggage car, in standing there, in opening the door and in jumping, was properly submitted to the jury. See Buel v. New York Cent. R. Co. 31 N. Y. 314-319; Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. 493; Sears v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 310; Woolley v. Scovell, 3 Man. & Ry. 105; Filer v. New York Cent. R. Co. 49 N. Y. 47; Dyer v. Erie R. Co. 71 N. Y. 228; Twomley v. Central Park, N. & E. R. R. Co. 69 N. Y. 158; Mobile & M. R. Co. v. Ashcraft, 48 Ala. 15; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 26 Minn. 278; Iron R. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U. S. 13 Pet. 181 (10 L. ed. 115); Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1; Worthen v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 125 Mass. 99; South Covington & C. Street R. Co. v. Ware, 84 Ky. 267.

Devens, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

It was admitted that the collision between the train on which the plaintiff was a passenger and another train coming in the opposite direction, occurred through the negligence of defendant's servants. The question for the jury was only whether the plaintiff was, himself, in the exercise of due care, or was guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury. The plaintiff had taken his seat in that portion of the compartment car, used, also, for the baggage, which was appropriated to smokers, and was reading his paper when the train started. He did not at first notice that the train had commenced its journey, but after it was fairly

If a passenger is in so dangerous a situation by reason of the peril arising from an accident for the occurrence of which those who undertake to transport him are responsible, as to render his jumping a reasonable precaution, and is injured thereby, they are answerable to him in damages even if he might safely have retained his seat. Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1; Sears v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 310; Worthen v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 125 Mass. 99; Linnehan v. Sampson, 126 Mass. 506.

It is the contention of the defendant that the action of the plaintiff in going into the baggage compartment shows a lack of due care on his part which should prevent him from maintaining this action, that he was wrongfully there, without any justifying emergency, and thus that he assumed all the risks incident thereto. Bates v. Old Colony R. Co. 147 Mass. 255, 265, 6 New Eng. Rep. 583.

The plaintiff did not go into the baggage compartment for the purpose of being there transported, but in order to do something to save himself if a collision occurred. He was accustomed to the management of railroads, had often worked upon them, and might expect that he could, with a reasonable chance of safety, leap from the train when collision was imminent. The defendant urges that as by his own admissions it appears that plaintiff knew that the place he assumed was more dangerous than that he left, and that the rear car was the safest place in the train, these facts are conclusive that the plaintiff was negligent in going there. No such conclusion follows. The place where he sat and the rear car were safer if plaintiff proposed to do nothing to extricate himself from the peril in which the defendant had placed him. He could not in either place ascertain when the collision would take place and could there only abide the shock. could he get to the end of the rear car without danger. He could not tell when the collision would occur; it might be that he would be thrown down in passing from one car to the other or in walking along the alley of the car with his back to the engine when he would be in most serious danger. Even if all the passengers in the two cars who remained in their seats in ignorance of the impending danger had escaped without injury it would not be conclusive that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in going into the baggage car, or had recklessly or unwisely misjudged what was prudent for him to attempt. Buel v. New York Cent. R. Co. 31 N. Y. 314, 318.

Nor

The prudence of the plaintiff's conduct is not necessarily to be tested by the results of the accident to others in a different position. Even if it were, as the case reported shows that serious injury did result to those who were sitting or moving in those parts of the train appropriated to passengers, it is entirely possible that plaintiff would have sustained more serious injury if he had remained in his

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APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court of Denver in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover the amount alleged to be due on a promissory note to which defendant claimed certain offsets. Affirmed.

Commissioner's opinion.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion. Mr. Luther S. Dixon, for appellant: No title to the acceptances passed, or could have passed, to the Bank as a holder for value, until they were actually credited upon its books.

Bank of the Metropolis v. New England Bank, 47 U. S. 6 How. 212 (12 L. ed. 409); Sweeny v. Easter, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 166 (17 L. ed. 681); United States v. State Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 30 (24 L. ed. 647): Wyman v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 5 Colo. 30; Warner v. Lee, 6 N. Y. 144; Scott v. Ocean Bank, 23 N. Y. 289; Hoffman v. Miller, 1 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 676, 9 Bosw. 334; Dickerson v. Wason, 47 N. Y. 439; Clark v. Merchants Bank, 1 Sandf. 498, affirmed, 2 N. Y. 380; Wilson v. Smith, 44 U. S. 3 How. 763 (11 L. ed. 820).

The indorsements by Coors to Everett, made for the purpose of enabling Everett to collect, did not operate to ciothe Everett with the legal title as against Coors, and so of the indorsements by Everett to the Bank for the same purpose.

Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 25 (7 L. ed. 37).

A bank receiving negotiable paper from another bank for collection obtains no better title thereto, or its proceeds, than the remitting bank had, unless the collecting bank become a purchaser for value without notice of any defect of title.

Commercial Bank v. Marine Bank, 3 Keyes,

337.

Messrs. Patterson & Thomas for appellee.

Reed, C., delivered the following opinion: Coors, the appellant, who was defendant below, was, and for many years had been, a brewer at Golden, Jefferson County. His sales were mostly by car lots or large quantities, shipped to various parties, and sold on time. It was his custom on the shipment to fill an order, to draw a draft payable to his own order, and, at the expiration of the time of credit given, send the draft to the consignee for acceptance, to be returned to him. F. E. Everett was a private banker at Golden, and had been for many years. In July, 1884, he died insolvent. He kept an account and transacted business with appellee in Denver, and acted as agent and correspondent of appellee at Golden. Appellant, Coors, transacted his business and kept his account with Everett until the time of his death. His accepted drafts, when returned to him, were by him indorsed in blank, and deposited with Everett, the proceeds to be placed to his credit when collected. When in need of money, he made his notes payable to Everett, by whom they were discounted. It appears that Everett was in the habit of re-discounting these notes with appellee, which fact was not known to Coors; and, as appellee was in the habit of transmitting the notes at maturity to Everett for collection, Coors did not, necessarily, know that the notes had been rediscounted.

On the 26th of March, 1884, Coors made his note to Everett for $1,500, payable ninety days after date, with interest. On the 8th of May, Coors made a note for $1,000. with interest,

NOTE.-Banking; ownership of paper indorsed in! must show not only that balances were suffered to

blank.

remain upon the faith of the remittance, but also Where an owner of a note indorsed it in blank that defendants, relying upon the remittance, inand placed it for collection in a bank, which in- curred some liability or actually did, or forebore to dorsed it payable to its account and transmitted it do, something by which their condition was worse to defendants for collection, who collected it with- than it would otherwise have been. lbid. out notice as to who was the real owner, defend- Banking; receiving paper for collection. See ants are liable to the cwner for the amount col-notes to Freeman v. Citizens Nat. Bank (Iowa) 4 L. lected, unless they have purchased the note, or R. A. 422; Pittsburgh Fifth Nat. Bank v. Ashmade advances, or given credit upon it in igno- worth (Pa.) 2 L.R. A. 491; Manufacturers Nat. Bank rance of the true owner. Hackett v. Reynolds, v. Continental Bank (Mass.) 2 L. R. A. 699; Corn 5 Cent. Rep. 521, 114 Pa. 328. Exch. Bank v. Farmers Nat. Bank (N. Y.) 7 L. R. A. 559. See generally, Pickle v. People's Nat. Bank (Tenn.) 7 L. R. A. 93, and cases referred to in note.

To constitute a defense to an action for the proceeds of the note brought by the owner, defendants

payable to Everett sixty days after date, which | der the circumstances proved, as above stated, was the note on which this suit was brought. appellee could not acquire title to the drafts; Both notes were indorsed in blank by Everett, second, that by the language used in the letters of and re-discounted for him by the appellee. Everett in regard to the Coors drafts, appellee After the death of Everett, Coors opened an was notified, or should have been, that they account with the appellee. were not the property of Everett, but of Coors. The language relied upon was as follows:

On the 8th day of May, 1884, Coors drew a draft on Keppler & Co., of Leadville, payable at sixty days, for $471.90. On the 21st of May he drew a second draft on Keppler for the same amount, at sixty days. On the 27th of May he drew his draft on Dyer & Northington, of Rawlins, Wyo., for $748.25, at sixty days. On May 14 he drew his draft on Crystal Bros., Pitkin, Colo., for $228, at seventy-five days, -all of which drafts were accepted by the drawees, returned to Coors, indorsed by him in blank, and deposited with Everett for col

lection. The drafts above described amounted in the aggregate to $2,131.12. The drafts were not discounted by Everett, nor passed by him to the credit of Coors.

On the 24th of June, when the two notes of Coors for the sums, respectively, of $1,500 and $1,000, were nearing maturity, Everett applied to appellee to have the Coors drafts above described, and perhaps others, discounted to meet the maturing notes. On the 27th of June an interview was had on the same subject, at which appellee declined to discount drafts to meet both notes, but discounted drafts on Crystal Bros. for $228, Keppler's draft of May 21 for $471.90, and draft on Dyer & Northington for $748.25, to pay the note of $1,500. The note, having been paid by Everett to appellee, was returned to Everett; and Coors, knowing nothing of the discount of his drafts by Everett to pay the note, and having no knowledge of the re-discount of the note by appellee, paid the same to Everett. The other drafts, not discounted, were left with appellee for collection. When collected, the proceeds were to be put to the credit of Everett.

At the time of Everett's death, the note of Coors for $1,000 was unpaid in the hands of appellee. There was at that time, or afterwards, a small balance in its hands, the proceeds of collections of Coors' drafts, to the credit of Everett. At the time of the bringing of this suit there was also in the hands of appellee a small balance to the credit of Coors. This suit was brought to recover the amount of the $1,000 note. The defendant pleaded payment, and set up as counterclaims the amounts received by appellee on each of the above-mentioned drafts of Coors, collected by appellee. The case was tried by the court without a jury, who allowed as offsets the balance of proceeds of the Coors drafts to the credit of Everett in the hands of the appellee, and the balance on the account of Coors in the Bank to the credit of Coors, leaving a balance on the note of $364.18, for which appellee had judgment. There was no serious dispute in regard to the facts. It was not claimed that Coors had any knowledge of the re-discounts of the notes made by Everett with appellee, nor the transfer and discounts of his drafts left for collection with Everett; nor is it claimed that appellee had any actual notice or knowledge that Everett was not the owner of the drafts of Coors.

The contention for Coors is: first, that un

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and handed Jenkins, cashier of appellee, dated And from a memorandum made by Everett, June 27, on which Everett had written: 20,144. Rem. June 6th, Keppler & Company, "Discount A. Coors accept'cs, coll'n No. Leadville, due June 23 & 26th, $468.75," etc.

We do not think the position of counsel on this last point tenable, and that there was anything in the language used by which appellee could be informed of anything in regard to the ownership of the drafts. It can only be regarded as description to designate the paper. We can find no authority, and none is cited by counsel, where it is held that any such descriptive language can be construed to indicate ownership; and certainly no such interference could arise when Everett was the holder of them, properly indorsed without limitation, and dealing with them as his own.

The only question to be determined is whether Coors, having indorsed the drafts in blank to Everett for the purpose of having them collected and the proceeds placed to his credit, and Everett, wrongfully assuming to be the owner, could sell and dispose of them, and appellee, without knowledge of the want of ownership in Everett, could be invested with good title, so as to retain the proceeds as against Coors.

It is a well-settled rule of law that one who acquires negotiable paper, in the usual course of business, before maturity, in good faith, for a valuable consideration, from one capable of transferring the same, becomes a bona fide holder, and takes it devested of all prior equities. See 4, chap. 1, Code.

Wy

And it has been so held in this court. man v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 5 Colo. 30, and Merchants Bank v. McClelland, 9 Colo. 608. It is contended by the able counsel of appellant that "it was the duty of the bank proposing to purchase from Everett to have sought Coors, and ascertained from him whether Everett had any authority to sell or not." This is not in harmony with the law or the decisions of this court.

In Merchants Bank v. McClelland, supra, it was said by the present chief justice, at page 610, 9 Colo.: "If there is nothing upon the face of a negotiable instrument or in the written indorsement or assignment to notify the assignee that the instrument was originally given upon an illegal consideration (gambling

debts excepted), or obtained through fraud, the assignee who pays value therefor, and takes the same in good faith before maturity, may recover as against the maker. This is true, even though such assignee be in possession of facts or circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion in the mind of a person of ordinary prudence, and though he is guilty of negligence in not first following up such information, for the purpose of discovering the fraud or illegality to which the suspicious circumstances may seem to point." The rule adopted in this court is that of the federal courts and a majority of the States. See Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 42 U. S. 1 How. 234 [11 L. ed. 115]; 47 U. S. 6 How. 212 [12 L. ed. 409]; Swift v. Smith, 102 U. S. 442 [26 L. ed. 193]; Hotchkiss v. Nat. Shoe & Leather Bank, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 354 [22 L. ed. 645]; Murray v. Lardner, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 110 [17 L. ed. 857]; Brown v. Spofford, 95 U. S. 474 [24 L. ed. 508].

We are aware that in the State of New York, and some other States, following its decisions,

the rule, as adopted in this State, is considerably modified. But the federal rule, as here adopted, appears to be the better rule, better founded in reason, and necessary in the interest of commerce, that requires that such paper should be allowed to pass from hand to hand with the greatest freedom possible consistent with safety; and it works no injustice to the owner of paper to say that he shall be held responsible for his own acts, and not an innocent party who has been misled by them. Coors could by a word have limited his indorsement so as to protect himself and others. That he failed to do so was not the fault of appellee, but his own, and he must suffer the loss according to a principle so well known that a repetition here is unnecessary. The judg ment should be affirmed.

Pattison and Richmond, CC., concur.

Per Curiam:

For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment is affirmed.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (2d Div.).

Esther K. PORTER et al., Admrx., etc., of
Oliver Porter, Deceased, Appts.,

v.

Franklin PIERCE et al., Respts.

(...... N. Y...............)

A deed made and delivered on Sunday passes the title.

Batsford v. Every, 44 Barb. 618, and cases there cited.

The redemption on Sunday is not prohibited by statute or by the common law.

See People v. Luther, 1 Wend. 43.
Sunday has, in no case, been excluded in

Sunday is to be deemed a dies non in de- the computation of statute time.

termining a creditor's right to redeem premises sold on execution from a prior redeeming cred

itor under a statute requiring him to redeem

within twenty-four hours after the former redeems, where his redemption must be made at the sheriff's office, which the law does not require to be kept open on Sunday. In such case redemption may be made on the following Monday, if the prior redemption was made on Saturday.

(April 15, 1890.)

APPEAL by plaintiffs from a judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, Fourth Department, affirming a judgment of the Cortland Special Term dismissing the complaint in an action brought to set aside a sheriff's deed to a creditor who had attempted to redeem certain premises from an execution sale, and to compel the giving of a deed to plaintiffs. Affirmed.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Mr. O. U. Kellogg, for appellants: If the last day of the fifteen months happens on Sunday the redemption may be made on that day, if the sheriff is at his office, and accepts the tender.

Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27. See Sayles v. Smith, 12 Wend. 57.

NOTE.-Sunday. See notes to Henderson v. Reynolds (Ga.) 7 L. R. A. 327: Anderson v. Bellinger (Ala.) 4 L. R. A. 680; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Yopst, (Ind.) 3 L. R. A. 224. See note to Parsons v.

A non-juridical day. Lindsay (Kan.) 3 L. R. A. 658.

Ex parte Dodge, 7 Cow. 147.

tion, is a ministerial act, not a judicial act, and
The redemption of land, sold under execu-
must be made within the time limited.
Rice v. Davis, 7 Lans. 393.

An ordinary contract is valid although made on Sunday.

Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. 425-429; Maxson v. Annas, 1 Denio, 204-206; Miller v. Roessler, 4 E. D. Smith, 234; Shuman v. Shuman, 27 Pa. 90.

Messrs. Pierce & Stone, for respondents: The "twenty-four hours" contemplated by the Statute within which the second redemption may be made are twenty-four business hours, and by the general and universal custom of the country, in contemplation of which it must be presumed the Statute was passed, Sunday is not a day of business, and the running of statutory time was suspended during the twenty-four hours of November 1.

Thayer v. Felt, 4 Pick. 354; People v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42; salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Anonymous, 2 Hill, 375; Whipple v. Williams, 4 How. Pr. 28; Van Vechten v. Paddock, 12 Johns. 178; Vanderwerker v. People, 5 Wend. 530; Campbell v. International L. Assur. Society, 4 Bosw. 299; Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Conner, 5 Cent. Rep. 408, 103 N. Y. 502, 509; Edmundson v. Wragg, 104 Pa. 500, 49 Am. Rep. 590; Cressey v. Parks, 75 Me. 387, 46 Am. Rep. 406, and cases collected at p. 409; Barnes v. Eddy, 12 R. I. 25; Shaw v. Williams, 87

Ind. 158, 28 Alb. L. J. 68, 69; Ormsby v. Louis- | Sunday cannot, for the purpose of performing ville, 79 Ky. 197, 20 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 269; Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69; Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426; Hammond v. American Mut. L. Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 306; Barley v. Bennett, 33 Ga. 146; Kuntz v. Tempel, 48 Mo. 71.

Bradley, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The premises in question were sold by the defendant Borthwick as sheriff of the County of Cortland, upon two executions issued upon judgments held by the defendant Pierce as administrator, etc., of Thomas Galvin, deceased, against Mary Sullivan, and bid off by Pierce as such administrator on the first day of August, 1884. No redemption was made within the year, and on Saturday, the 31st day of October, 1885, at 12 o'clock noon, Esther K. Porter, as assignee of Oliver Porter of a judgment recovered on that day by him against Mary Sullivan, redeemed the premises from the sale by paying the sheriff the amount paid for them on such sale with interest, and by presenting the requisite papers for such purpose to the sheriff, who delivered to her the certificate required by the Statute. Code, § 1469.

a contract, be regarded as a day in law, and, when it is due on Sunday, performance on Monday following is in time. Avery v. Stewart, 2 Conn. 69, 7 Am. Dec. 240; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill, 263; Campbell v. International L. Assur. Society, 4 Bosw. 299.

When the Statute requires that something be done within a given time, it must be so done, and although the last day be Sunday, it must be embraced in the computation of the time. Ex parte Dodge, 7 Cow. 147; People v. Luther, 1 Wend. 42.

This is not uniformly the rule applied when the time is less than a week. Anonymous, 2 Hill, 375.

But, however that may be, the situation in the present case was peculiar; and although the transaction of the redemption made by the defendant may not come within acts prohibited by law to be performed on Sunday, there was a difficulty in the way of the exercise of that right by him on that day, arising out of the Statute, which provides that a redemption made by a creditor on or after the last day of the fifteen months, must be made at the sheriff's office. Code, § 1455.

And it cannot then lawfully be made elseMorss v. Purvis, 68 N. Y. 225. The sheriff is required himself, or by his under-sheriff or deputy, to be in attendance at the sheriff's office, and keep it open on that day, and each day thereafter on which redemption can be made. But the sheriff is not required to have his office open on Sunday. 2 Rev. Stat. 285, § 55.

The next day was Sunday, and on Monday following (November 2, at 11:15 A. M.), the defendant Pierce, as such administrator, proceed-where. ed to redeem the premises upon a judgment recovered by him as such administrator against Mary Sullivan November 19, 1884, and then took a certificate of redemption from the sheriff, who afterwards made to him a deed pursuant to such redemption. The certificate made to Esther K. Porter was afterwards assigned by her to the plaintiff, and he brought this action to set aside that deed and to require the defendant Borthwick to make to him a deed. And the ground upon which such relief is sought, is that the redemption by the defendant Pierce was not made within the time in which by the Statute he was permitted to make it.

The statutory provision from which was derived the right to make that redemption is that "a creditor who might have redeemed within fifteen months after the sale, may redeem from any other redeeming creditor, although the fifteen months have elapsed; provided that he thus redeems within twenty-four hours after the last previous redemption.' Id. § 1454.

This was not done by the defendant within the requisite time, and his redemption was ineffectual if Sunday should have been included within the time in which he was permitted to make it. That day, like any other, occupies time, and, except so far as prohibited by the common law or the Statute, transactions on that day, not in themselves immoral, are not unlawful or invalid. Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27; Sayles v. Smith, 12 Wend. 57.

But for reasons founded in public policy, the maxim dies non juridicus is given a liberal construction and effect, so as to embrace in it that which may be deemed within its purpose and meaning. Field v. Park, 20 Johns. 140; Van Vechten v. Paddock, 12 Johns. 178.

It is now quite well established that the observance of the Sabbath day as such is a right which may be enjoyed without molestation by transactions of a secular character. Hence

The defendant, therefore, had not the right to make the redemption on Sunday. The purpose of the Statute was that a judgment creditor should have such right, and for its accomplishment twenty-four hours after the making of the next previous redemption. If the Statute should be given the construction and effect to include Sunday within that time when the last day of the fifteen months falls on Sunday, the redemption made on the Saturday before might operate to defeat the right of redemption by another creditor however diligent he might be in his attempt to exercise it. The effect would be the same if the last day of the fifteen months was Saturday and a redemption made on that day. It might be made at the last moment of Saturday, and the twentyfour hours would expire with Sunday. In practical effect the lawful denial of the exercise of the right of redemption on Sunday would be no different than the inhibition of it by law on that day. The Statute is entitled to a construction which will permit its purpose to be effectuated. The legislative intent evidently was to permit, within the time prescribed, any creditor entitled to do it, to effect redemption by way of protection of his right as such; and that he should have twenty-four hours for that purpose. It would therefore seem that to carry out such intention when Sunday intervened, it must be deemed dies non within the contemplation of the Statute. And the statutes before referred to may be treated as in pari materia, and taken to provide for redemption within twenty-four hours of the day or days in which the sheriff is required to be in attend

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