cuted. The order of the Circuit Court overruling the demurrer of the relators to the answer of the School Board must be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to that court to give judgment for the relators on the demurrer, awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus, as prayed in the petition. Cassoday, J.: thereby be promoted, and they so declared in | ing this sect," and persuaded "them concerning the preamble. Religion teaches obedience to Jesus both from the law of Moses and from the law, and flourishes best where good govern- prophets.' Of course "the sect of the Nazament prevails. The constitutional prohibition renes," subsequently acquired the more honorwas adopted in the interests of good govern- able name of "Christians." As the centuries ment, and it argues but little faith in the vital rolled on and Christians became more numerity and power of religion to predict disaster to ous, disputes arose among themselves, from its progress because a constitutional provision, time to time, in matters of faith, doctrine, pracenacted for such a purpose, is faithfully exe- tice and interpretation of certain passages of scriptures, and these led to repeated divisions and subdivisions until the different sects of Christians became very numerous. There is no purpose here of indicating that the Holy Scriptures,-the Old and New Testament, if considered as a whole and fully comprehended, would exclude from the promises therein contained any of the human race complying with the essential conditions therein prescribed; but since every translation made by man must be more or less imperfect, and since the application of particular passages is liable to be made with partial apprehension, and biased or even distorted judgment, it is easy to perceive how texts of scripture may be read with such an emphasis and tone as to become excessively sectarian. While the members of any particular sect may be willing to have one of their own number read the Bible in the public schools, yet they are not always willing to concede the the same to a member of a sect believing in an opposite faith or doctrine. But the law is impartial and has given no rights to any one sect that are not equally secured to every other. The relation of the church to the Scriptures has been a subject of controversy ever since the Reformation. Upon that question even Protestants have differed. Some have gone so far as to say that "the Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants;" while others have declared that "the living church is more than the dead Bible, for it is the Bible and something more. The gravity of the questions involved in this case are fully appreciated. They have received the careful consideration of all the members of the court. The writing of the formal opinion has fallen to the lot of Mr. Justice Lyon. At his suggestion a separate presentation of one branch of the case is here made. Before entering upon its direct discussion, however, but as leading to it, a few general observations may not be wholly unprofitable. It is undoubtedly true, as once observed by Mr. Justice Baldwin, that "in the construction of the Constitution we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief and the remedy." Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 723 [9 L. ed. 1260]. A few years later Mr. Justice Story said: "Perhaps the safest rule of interpretation, after all, will be found to be, to look to the nature and objects of the particular powers, duties and rights, with all the lights and aids of contemporary history; and to give to the words of each just such operation and force, consistent with their legitimate meaning, as may fairly secure and attain the ends proposed.' Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 16 Pet. 610, 611 [10 L. ed. 1087]. These observations were of course made with reference to our Federal Constitution, but they are equally applicable to our State Constitution. In so far as the rules there suggested may aid in the construction of the provisions of our Constitution here involved, they may properly be invoked. It is probably in this view that counsel have dwelt so extensively up on the history of the Christian Church and its status under different charters and Constitutions, although much of it has a very remote, if any, bearing upon the questions here presented. All are familiar with the fact that the Jews in the time of the apostles, were divided into "the sect of the Sadducees" and "the sect of the Pharisees." Faul declared in the presence of Agrippa "that after the straitest sect of their religion, he had "lived a Pharisee;" and when Tertullus charged him with being "a ringleader of the sect of the Nazarenes," he boldly confessed "that, after the way which they" called "heresy," or, as the new version has it, "a sect," he had worshiped or served the God of his fathers; and afterwards to the "chief of the Jews" at Rome, he discoursed "concern The relations of church and state have been the subject of discussion for many centuries; and at certain times and in certain nations of Europe one particular sect has been the established church of the state, and at other times or in other nations the belief of some other sect has been the established religion,-while other sects, not so favored were either exterminated altogether, or permitted to remain on conditions more or less disagreeable and humiliating. These discriminations naturally generated bitterness, enmities and even cruel war among brethren. Many of the early immigrants to this country had felt the despotism of such intolerance and came hither in consequence of it. They came from different countries of Europe and consequently had experienced different types of intolerance. Some of them were as narrow-minded in such matters as their oppressors had been, and hence no sooner acquired civil power than they themselves became intolerant toward all sects except their own. Such divisions, controversies and contentions among professing Christians were supposed by many to be repugnant to the sublime teachings and fraternal spirit revealed to the world through Jesus Christ. Many of the colonists-especially when they came to the formation of state governments-proved to be sufficiently broad and liberal to exact nothing for themselves nor their particular sect, that Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678 [27 L. ed. 442]; Cardwell v. American River Bridge Co. 113 U. S. 205 [28 L. ed. 959]; Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543 [30 L. ed. 487]; Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co. 123 U. S. 288 [31 L. ed. 149]: Willamette Iron B. Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 9 [31 L. ed. 632]. State in the Union. Our State Constitution expressly prohibits any religious test as a qualification for office, or the exclusion of any witness in consequence of his religious opinion. § 19, art. 1. they were unwilling to grant to every other citizen and his particular sect. This benign spirit seemed to extend as its wisdom became more manifest by experience. True, the Constitution of South Carolina, adopted in 1778, declared that the "Christian Protestant Religion" was the "established religion" of that State; but that was modified in 1790 so as to The question therefore recurs whether the secure freedom and prevent discrimination or provisions of our State Constitution, here inpreference in worship or religion. The Con- volved, when construed with reference to the stitution of North Carolina of 1776_excluded evils, or supposed evils, thereby sought to be from office all non-believers in the Protestant suppressed, and the object or purpose thereby religion or the divine authority of the Old or sought to be secured, permitted or prohibited New Testament; while the Constitution of Del- the stated reading of the Bible as a text-book aware, of the same year, made every official sub- in the public schools. Wisconsin, as one of scribe to a confession of faith; but that was ab- the later States admitted into the Union, havrogated sixteen years afterwards, and equal pro- ing before it the experience of others, and tection was extended to all sects. So the first probably in view of its heterogeneous populaConstitutions of Maryland, Massachusetts and tion, as mentioned in the opinion of my assoNew Hampshire, and, later, of Connecticut, ciate, has, in her Organic Law, probably furprovided for the support by taxation or other-nished a more complete bar to any preference wise, of the Christian or Protestant Christian for, or discrimination against, any religious religion, with more or less toleration guaran- sect, organization or society, than any other teed to other sects. Such direct sanction and toleration seem to have been inspired by a lingering attachment for, or a sympathy with, the European theory of union between church and state. But the several States of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Vir- Aside from the clause just referred to, and ginia from the first, and later Maine and Rhode the one against sectarian instruction, so fully Island of the New England States, and every considered by my brother Lyon, our State or nearly every State admitted into the Union Constitution provides that, (1) "the right of after the organization of the federal govern every man to worship Almighty God according ment, expressly secured, in effect, in their re- to the dictates of his own conscience shall never spective State Constitutions, the equal freedom be infringed; (2) nor shall any man be comof every religious sect, organization and society, pelled to attend, erect or support any place of with a guaranty against preference or discrim- worship, or to maintain any ministry, against ination. So firm had become the public con his consent; (3) nor shall any control of or inviction in favor of a broad liberality and equal terference with the rights of conscience be perprotection in such matters, at the time of the mitted, or any preference be given by law to organization of our national government, that, any religious establishments, or modes of woralthough the Federal Constitution, as origin- ship; (4) nor shall any money be drawn from ally adopted, did not mention nor refer to the the treasury for the benefit of religious socisubject, yet the first session of the first Con-eties, or religious or theological seminaries." gress proposed the first amendment to that instrument prohibiting Congress from making any "law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' notwithstanding no power had therein been granted to enact such a law, and no such law could be legally enacted without such grant of power first being made. The learned counsel for the School Board contends, in effect, that the third of the "articles of compact between the original States, and the people and States" carved out of the old "Northwest Territory," is still in force in Wisconsin; and that under it this State is required and bound to directly foster and encourage "religion" through schools and education. Assuming such to be the meaning of the article, which is, to say the least, debatable, still it is only necessary here to say, in addition to what is said by my associate, that, by the adoption of our State Constitution, and the admission of the State into the Union, that article became superseded and ceased to be longer in force. This has in effect been firmly settled by the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U. S. 3 How. 212 [11 L. ed. 565]; Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U. S. 3 How. 609 [11 L. ed. 742]: Strader v. Graham, 51 C. S. 10 How. 94, 97 [13 L. ed. 341, 342]; 18, art. 1. The The decisions of courts in States having no such constitutional prohibition, of course, can have no application to the case at bar. question thus presented is not one of sectarian predilection, nor of religious belief, nor of theological conception, nor of sentiment, but one of fundamental law. It is no part of the duty of this court to make or unmake, but simply to construe, this provision of the Constitution. All questions of political and governmental ethics-all questions of policy,-must be regarded as having been fully considered by the convention which framed, and conclusively determined by the people who adopted, the Constitution more than forty years ago. The oath of every official in the State is to support that Constitution as it is, and not as it might have been. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co. 52 Wis. 58; Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 672 [32 L. ed. 1063]. That oath is to be kept sacred, with strict integrity of purpose, and without any sectarian, religious or political bias or equivocation. In considering the meaning of the section of the Constitution quoted, we are to remember that canon of construction adverted to by my associate, and aptly expressed by Marshall, Ch. J., in these words: "Although the spirit of an in strument, especially of a Constitution, is to] Viewed in this light, and it will readily be be respected not less than its letter, yet the perceived that these clauses operate as a per spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words. petual bar to the State, and each of the three It would be dangerous in the extreme to inferdepartments of the state government, and every from extrinsic circumstances that a case for agency thereof, from the infringement, control which the words of an instrument expressly or interference with the individual rights of provide shall be exempted from its operation." Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 202 [4 L. ed. 550]. Similar expressions have come to us from the same court within a year. "If the words convey a definite meaning which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning apparent on the face of the instrument must be accepted, and neither the courts nor the Legislature have the right to add to it or take from it." Lake Co. v. Rollins, 130 U. S. 670 [32 L. ed. 1062]. The first and third clauses of the section of the Constitution quoted are similar in their scope and may therefore be considered together. They read: (1) The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; . . . (3) nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment, or modes of worship.' every person, as indicated therein, or the giving of any preference by law to any religious sect or mode of worship. They presuppose the voluntary exercise of such rights by any person, or body of persons, who may desire, and by implication guarantee protection in the freedom of such exercise. We neither have nor can have in this State, under our present Constitution, any statutes of toleration, nor of union directly or indirectly between church and state, for the simple reason that the Constitution forbids all such preferences and guarantees all such rights. But the exercise of such rights by one person, or any given number of persons, cannot be so extended as to interfere with the exercise of similar rights by other persons, nor so far as to prevent the legitimate exercise of the police powers of the State in preserving order, securing good citizenship, the administration of the law, and the Sabbath as a day of rest. Stansbury v. Marks, 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 213 [1 L. ed. 353]; Com. v. Wolf, 3 Serg. & R. 48; Com. v. Lesher, 17 Serg. & R. This language is quite similar to and may 155; McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566; Sihave been taken in part from the Constitution mon v. Gratz, 2 Penr. & W. 412, 23 Am. Dec. of Pennsylvania, as well as other States. In 33; Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259; Ferriter v. commenting upon a similar clause in the Penn- Tyler, 48 Vt. 469; State v. Judge of Section sylvania Constitution, in the celebrated Girard “A.," 39 La. Ann. 132. Will Case, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the whole court, observed: "Language more comprehensive for the complete protection of every variety of religious opinion could scarcely be used; and it must have been intended to extend equally to all sects, whether they believed in Christianity or not, and whether they were Jews or infidels. So that we are compelled to admit that although Christianity be a part of the common law of the State, yet it is so in this qualified sense that its divine origin and truth are admitted, and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the annoyance of believers or the injury of the public. Such was the doctrine of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Updegraph v. Com. 11 Serg. & R. 394;" Vidal v. Girard, 43 U. S. 2 How. 198 [11 L. ed. 234]. In commenting upon a similar clause in the Ohio Constitution, Mr. Justice Thurman, speaking for the whole court, said: "We sometimes hear it said that all religions are tolerated in Ohio; but the expression is not strictly accurate; much less accurate is it to say that one religion is a part of our law, and all others only tolerated. It is not by mere toleration that every individual here is protected in his belief or disbelief. He reposes, not upon the leniency of government, or the liberality of any class or sect of men, but upon his natural, indefeasible rights of conscience, which in the language of the Constitution are beyond the control or interference of any human author ity." Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 300. In considering the two clauses quoted from our Constitution, we are to bear in mind the general proposition, conceded by all, that our State Constitution is not a grant, but a limitation of powers. State v. Forest Co. 74 Wis. 615. Such statutes come within no constitutional prohibition and are founded upon an impregnable basis. The two clauses mentioned recognize the existence of different religious establishments or sects, and different modes of worship, but they do not have so direct a bearing upon the question here presented as the second and fourth clauses, which will now be considered. The second clause of the section quoted is to the effect that no man shall "be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.' Is the stated reading of the Bible in the public schools, as a text book, "worship" within the meaning of this clause? As indicated in the clauses already considered, the word "worship" as here used, includes any and every mode of worshiping Almighty God. Webster has defined it as: "The act of paying divine honors to the Supreme Being; religious reverence and homage; adoration paid to God, or a being viewed as God. . . . The worship of God is an eminent part of religion, and prayer is a chief part of religious worship.' Worcester defines it as: "3. Adoration; a religious act of reverence; honor paid to the Supreme Being, or by heathen nations to their deities. Worship consists in the performance of all those external acts, and the observance of all those rights and ceremonies, in which men engage with the professed and sole view of honoring God. .. They join their vocal worship to the choir of creatures wanting voice. 4. Honor; respect; civil deference." The Imperial defines it as: "4. Chiefly and eminently the act of paying divine honors to the Supreme Being; or the reverence and homage paid to im Hin religious exercises, consisting in adoration, confession, prayer, thanksgiving and | was held that such electors had no authority to the like." In theology, we are told, that, "the honor which is due in a peculiar sense to God consists supremely in religious worship; in making him the object of our supreme affection; and rendering to him our supreme obedience." 1 Dwight, Theol. 555. Certainly the reading of the Holy Scriptures, as the eternal word of God, in obedience to the often repeated injunction therein contained, whether by the individual in private, or in the family, or in the public assembly, is an essential part of divine worship. Every sermon is based upon some text of Scripture. Most prayers are preceded by the reading of some passage of Scripture, as an intelligent guide to the thoughts of the worshiper or worshipers. The sermon on the mount contains the prayer taught by the blessed Lord. Is it possible for any genuine believer in the Christian religion to read or listen to the reading of that sermon, and especially that prayer, without being filled with a holy sense of honor, reverence, adoration and homage to Almighty God, which is the very essence of worship? thus divert its use. The present chief justice, There are cases of a contrary import, but it is very certain that, as against an objecting taxpayer, such school-house cannot be devoted to a use expressly forbidden by the Constitution of the State-as for instance as a place of worship. There is another feature of the clause we are considering which requires attention. Under our statutes, the children of the relators, between certain ages, were bound to attend some public or private school for a certain period of each year. S. & B. Ann. Stat. § 489a (chap. 121, Laws 1879, chap. 298, Laws 1882, chap. 73, Laws 1887), superseded by S. & B. Ann. Stat. 4896 (chap. 519, Laws 1889). In the case of a poor man incapable of educating his children at private expense, they are "compelled to attend" such school without the consent of themselves or their parents, notwithstanding it is, in a limited sense, a place of worship; and in the case of men of property, it might impose an unauthorized burden. This, as we understand, is prohibited by the clause of the Constitution we are considering. The fourth clause of the section of the Constitution, quoted, declares, in effect, that no money shall "be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries." As argued by the learned counsel for the School Board, the word "treasury" in this clause, probably refers to the state treasury. But we are to remember that the school in question receives annually from the state treasury its proportionate share, not only of the school-fund income ( 554, Rev. Stat., §3, chap. 124, Laws, 1885, chap. 277, Laws, 1887), but also of the one-mill tax, § 1070a, S. & B. Ann. Stat. (chap. 287, Laws 1885). We must hold that the stated reading of the Bible in the public schools, as a text-book, may be "worship" within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution under consideration. If, then, such reading of the Bible is worship, can there be any doubt but what the school-room in which it is so statedly read is a "place of worship," within the meaning of the same clause of the Constitution? Counsel seem to argue that such place of worship should be confined to some church edifice, or place where the members of a church statedly worship. Some of the earlier Constitutions having similar clauses, used the words "building" and "church." Manifestly the words, "place of worship," were advisedly used, as applicable to any "place" or structure where worship is statedly held, and which the citizen is "compelled to attend, "or the taxpayers are compelled "to erect or support." The mere fact that only a small fraction of the school hours is devoted to such worship in no way justifies such use as against an objecting taxpayer. If the right be The question thus recurs, whether the money conceded, then the length of time so devoted thus drawn from the state treasury for the becomes a matter of discretion. If such right maintenance and support of the school in does not exist, then any length of time, how-question is for the benefit of a religious semiever short, is forbidden. The relators, as tax-nary within the meaning of this clause of the payers of the district, were compelled to aid in the erection of the school-building in question, and also to aid in the support of the school maintained therein. S. & B. Ann. Stat. § 430, 430 (a). Constitution. A seminary, is defined by Webster, as a "place of training; institution of education; a school, academy, college or university, in which young persons are instructed in the several branches of learning which may qualify Being thus compelled to aid in such erection them for their future employments." It maniand support, they have a legal right to object festly includes institutions of learning or eduto its being used as a "place of worship.' In cation of different grades. But a religious fact it has been held that it can be devoted to seminary of any one grade is just as effectually no other use as against an objecting taxpayer. | forbidden as a religious seminary of any higher School District No. 8 v. Arnold, 21 Wis. 658. or other grade. The thing that is prohibited In that case a temperance society obtained permission from a majority of the electors present at a school meeting, duly called, to hold its meetings in the school-house. But it is, the drawing of any money from the state treasury for the benefit of any religious school. If the stated reading of the Bible in the school, as a text-book is, not only, in a limited sense, worship, but also instruction, as it manifestly is, then there is no escape from the conclusion that it is religious instruction; and hence the money so drawn from the state treasury was for the benefit of a religious school within the meaning of this clause of the Constitution. The Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and some other States differ so widely from ours as to make the adjudications in those States almost wholly inapplicable to the question here presented. It is conceded that no decision has been found, under constitutional provisions like ours, squarely sustaining the ruling of the learned trial court. Some things have been said in some of the cases cited, arising under somewhat similar constitutional provisions, that may seem to support it. Among these are: Donohoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 61 Am. Dec. 256; Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444; Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa, 367; Millard v. Board of Education, 121 Ill. 297, 8 West. Rep. 372. "The interest of 'the school fund,' and all other revenues derived from the school lands, shall be exclusively applied . . . to the support and maintenance of common schools in each school district," etc. Art. 10,'§ 2, subd. 1. "The Legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free, and without charge for tuition, to all children between the ages of four and twenty years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein." Art. 10, § 3. "Each town and city shall be required to raise by tax annually, for the support of common schools therein, a sum not less," etc. Art. 10, § 4. "Provision shall be made by law for the distribution of the income of the school fund among the several towns and cities of the State, for the support of common schools therein," etc. Art. 10, § 5. These provisions of the Constitution are cited together to show how completely this State, as a civil government, and all its civil institutions, are divorced from all possible connection or alliance with any and all religions, religious worship, religious establishments or modes of worship, and with everything of a religious character or appertaining to religion. And to show how completely all are protected in their religion and rights of conscience, and that no one shall ever be taxed or compelled to support any religion or place of worship, or to attend upon the same, and more especially to show that our common schools, as one of the institutions of the State created by the Constitution, stand, in all these respects, like any other institution of the State, completely excluded from all possible connection or alliance with religion, or religious worship, or with anything of a religious char The main case, largely involving other considerations, is based, in part, upon decisions under Constitutions widely differing from ours, and was decided under a Constitution containing none of the provisions upon which especial stress is here laid. The same is partially true of the Vermont case. The same is true in a limited sense of the Iowa and Illinois cases; and in neither of which is any adjudication cited. The following cases seen to be in harmony with the conclusions we have reached: State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373; Cincinnati Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211; State v. White, 82 Ind. 278, 42 Am. Rep. 496; Spencer v. Joint School Dist., Dorton v. Hearn, Schofield v. Eighth School Dist. and Weir v. Day, supra. They are, moreover, in harmony with prior decisions of this court. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59; School Dist. No. 8 v. Arnold, supra.acter, and guarded by the constitutional prohiIn the Nevada case the decision was adverse to the use of the Catholic Bible. We deem it unnecessary to enter upon an extended analysis of the numerous adjudications cited, since the constitutional provisions here involved rest upon us with an imperative command. The unanimous result of our deliberations is as directed by Mr. Justice Lyon. Orton, J., concurring: I most fully and cordially concur in the decision, and in the opinions of Justices Lyon and Cassoday, in this case. It is not needful that any other opinion should be written, but I thought it proper to state briefly some of the reasons which have induced such concurrence in the decision. "The right of every man to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, nor shall any control or interference with the rights of conscience be permitted or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.' Const. art. 1, § 18. "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification for any office of public trust, under the State, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity, in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion." Const. art. 1, § 19. | bition, that "no sectarian instruction shall be allowed therein." They show also that the common schools are free to all alike, to all nationalities, to all sects of religion, to all ranks of society, and to all complexions. For these equal privileges and rights of instruction in them, all are taxed equally and proportionately. The constitutional name, common schools," expresses their equality and universal patronage and support. Common schools are not common as being low in character or grade, but common to all alike, to everybody and to all sects, or denominations of religion, but without bringing religion into them. The common schools, like all the other institutions of the State, are protected by the Constitution from all "control or interference with the rights of conscience," and from all preferences given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship. As the State can have nothing to do with religion, except to protect everyone in the enjoyment of his own, so the common schools can have nothing to do with religion in any respect whatever. They are as completely secular as any of the other institutions of the State, in which all the people, alike, have equal rights and privileges. The people cannot be taxed for religion in schools, more than anywhere else. Religious instruction, in the common schools, is clearly prohibited by these general clauses of the Constitution, as religious instruction or worship in any other department |