A reasonable and fair construction of these words was contained in the court's instruction. It would be most unreasonable to hold that, merely because this space was a portion of the right of way, one seeking passage on the trains of the company, or called there on business to meet a relative or friend, on business or in the discharge of a social duty, should be charged with want of care for his welfare. There was ample space upon a wellworn and smoothly trodden path, and the court committed no error in declaring this space not a part of the roadbed: Follis v. Pacific Mut. etc. 99 Assn. (Iowa, April 8, 1895), 62 N. W. Rep. 807: Standard Life etc. Ins. Co. v. Langston, 60 Ark. 381. The judgment is affirmed.

Burgess and Sherwood, JJ., concur.

Accident Insurance; Evidence of Cause of Death.

Burden of Proof.-Under a policy of insurance agreeing to pay a specific sum on proof of the death of the insured from bodily injuries effected through external, violent, or accidental means, provided, always, the death shall not have been produced by any of the various acts enumerated in the policy, it devolves upon the plaintiff to establish that the death of the insured was caused by external, violent, and accidental means. He thus makes out a prima facie case entitling him to recover. To prevent such recovery, the burden of proof is upon the insurer to show that the death arose from one of the excepted causes enumerated in the policy: Anthony v. Mercantile etc. Assn., 162 Mass. 354; 44 Am. St. Rep. 367; Cronkhite v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 116; 17 Am. St. Rep. 184; Coburn v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 145 Mass. 227; Mallory v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; 7 Am. Rep. 410; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661; Home Ben. Assn. v. Sargent, 142 U. S. 691.

The Death of the Insured is Never Presumed to have been Self-inflicted, nor to have been caused by his negligence. On the contrary, the death is presumed to have been the result of an accident, and the burden of proof is upon the insurer to rebut this presumption. Thus, upon proof being made to the effect that the decedent, who was insured against death by accident, appeared at his home with marks of extreme violence visible upon his back, which seemed to have been inflicted recently, and from which he subsequently died, it is presumed that such injuries were not self-inflicted, and were not caused by the negligence of the insured, but that they were the result of accident. The insurer, to escape liability, must assume the burden of proving that the death resulted from some cause against which he did not insure, or that there has been a breach of some agreement or condition in the policy on account of which he is relieved from liability: Cronkhite v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 116; 17 Am. St. Rep. 184.

In an action upon a policy insuring against bodily injuries, "effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the meaning of this contract and the conditions hereunto annexed," one of which is, that "the party insured is required to use all due diligence for personal safety and protection," the burden of proof is on the insurer to show that the assured did not use such due diligence: Freeman v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 144 Mass. 572. Under a certificate of membership in an accident association, containing a provision that "members are required to use all due diligence for personal safety and protection," and that no claim shall be made under the certificate when death or injury may

have happened in consequence of any voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger," the burden of proof is on the insurer to show that the insured did not use such diligence, or that he did thus expose himself to such danger: Badenfeld v. Massachusetts etc. Assn., 154 Mass. 77; Neill v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 7 Ont. App. 570.

Suicide.-Under policies of life or accident insurance, where the death of the insured has occurred, and there is no evidence of the cause, the presumption always arises, that the death was the result of natural or accidental causes, and not an act of self-destruction: Guardian etc. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; 22 Am. Rep. 180; Insurance Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256; 25 Am. St. Rep. 685; Mallory v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; 7 Am. Rep. 410. If such policies provide that the insurer shall not be liable in case of the death of the assured by his own hand, the plaintiff need only prove the death of the insured, and the insurer who sets up the cause of death as suicide then has the burden of proof to show that the injuries which caused the death were intentional on the part of the insured: Walcott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 221; 33 Am. St. Rep. 923; Stormont v. Waterloo etc. Assur. Co., 1 Fost. & F. 22; Phillips v. Louisiana etc. Life Ins. Co., 26 La. Ann. 404; 21 Am. Rep. 549; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661; Hancock etc. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 41; Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. St. 225; Schultz v. Insurance Co., 40 Ohio St. 217; 48 Am. Rep. 676; Goldschmidt v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 486; Wright v. Sun Mut. Life Ins. Co., 29 U. C. C. P. 221.

Nothing appearing to the contrary, the legal presumption is, that a man died from a natural cause, and not from an act of self-destruction. The mere fact of death in an unknown manner creates no presumption of suicide, nor does the finding of a coroner's jury, that the cause of death was insanity, tend to prove the commission of suicide; and, if recovery upon a policy of insurance is resisted, on the ground that the insured committed suicide, the defendant must satisfy the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the injuries causing death were intentionally inflicted by the assured: Walcott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 64 Vt. 221; 33 Am. St. Rep. 923. The mere fact of death in an unknown manner, and that the body is found without marks of violence upon it, does not create a legal presumption of self-destruction, and the insurer, alleging suicide, must prove it: Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa. St. 225. Under a policy stipulating against liability if the assured shall commit suicide, whether sane or insane, if the evidence is conflicting, and quite evenly balanced as to whether the death was caused by the intentional or accidental act of the deceased, it is to be presumed that death resulted from accident: Ingersoll v. Knights of Golden Rule, 47 Fed. Rep. 272; Guardian etc. Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35; 22 Am. Rep. 180. If there is any doubt, arising from the evidence, whether the death of the insured was the result of accident or of suicide, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the legal presumption that it was the result of an accident: Keels v. Mutual etc. Life Assn., 29 Fed. Rep. 198. If the policy provides that, "in case the insured shall die by his own hands, this policy shall be null and void, except that, in case he shall die by his own hands while insane," the amount to be paid shall be the amount of premium actually paid, with interest, the mere fact that the insured was insane when he took his life is not sufficient to defeat a full recovery of the amount of the policy. To defeat such recovery, the defendant must show that the insured knew the physical nature of the act he was about to commit, and that it would result in self-destruction, but he need not show that the insured was legally or morally responsible for his acts: Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Daviess, 87 Ky. 541.

Under policies stipulating for nonliability in case the insured dies by his own hand, if it is admitted or proved that he committed suicide while insane, the insurer is still liable, though the insured intended to take his life and understood the physical nature and effect of his act: Schultz v. Insurance Co., 40 Ohio St. 217; 48 Am. Rep. 676; Manhattan

Life Ins. Co. v. Broughton, 109 U. S. 121; but the burden of proof, in the first instance, is upon the party seeking to recover under the policy, to prove that the insured was insane at the time he killed himself, and that his self-destruction was not the act of one responsible for his actions: Weed v. Mutual etc. Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y. 561; Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 7 Heisk. 567; 19 Am. Rep. 623; Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters, 42 Md. 414; Moore v. Connecticut etc. Life Ins. Co., 1 Flip. 363; Gay v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 9 Blatchf. 142; Terry v. Life Ins. Co., 1 Dill. 403; affirmed 15 Wall. 580.

STATE V. JULOW.

[129 MISSOURI, 163.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ENJOYMENT OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY.-A constitutional guaranty of the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property carries with it all that effectuates and renders complete the unrestrained enjoyment of that guaranty.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.— A constitutional guaranty of the enjoyment of the right of property includes the right to acquire property by labor or contract, and of terminating a contract at pleasure, being civilly liable for any unwarranted termination.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-DEPRIVING AN OWNER OF PROPERTY of one of its essential attributes is depriving him of his property, within the meaning of a constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

LAW OF THE LAND AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW are legal equivalents, but everything which may pass under the form of statutory enactment need not necessarily be considered the law of the land.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.-A statute declaring that to be a crime which consists alone in the exercise of a constitutional right, as that of terminating a contract, is unconstitutional and void.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYÉ.-A STATUTE WHICH ATTEMPTS to make it a crime for an employer to insist, and to impose as a condition of employment, or continued employment, that his employé shall withdraw from or refrain from joining any trade or labor union, is unconstitutional and void, as seeking to deprive the employer of a constitutional right without due process of law.

EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYÉ-CLASS LEGISLATION.—A statute making it an offense for an employer to impose as a condition to employment, or continued employment, that his employés shall not belong to a trade or labor union, is unconstitutional, and void as class or special legislation.

POLICE POWER.-The power to prohibit an employer from exercising his constitutional right to insist that his employés shall not belong to a trade or labor union is not within the police power of the state.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE ABRIDGED by legislation under the guise of police regulation.

Appeal from a judgment imposing a fine of fifty dollars, under an information based upon the following statute:

"Section 1. No employer, superintendent, foreman, or other person exercising superintendence or authority over any mechanic, miner, engineer, fireman, switchman, baggageman, brakeman, conductor, telegraph operator, laborer, or other workingman, shall enter into any contract or agreement with any such employé, to withdraw from any trade union, labor union, or other lawful organization of which said employé may be a member, or requiring said employé to refrain from joining any trade union, labor union, or other lawful organization, or requiring any such employé to abstain from attending any meeting or assemblage of people called or held for lawfu! purposes, or shall, by any means, attempt to compel or coerce any employé into withdrawal from any lawful organization or society.

"Sec. 2. Corporations, and the managers, superintendents, overseers, master mechanics, foremen, officers, and directors, and others exercising authority for and on behalf of corporations doing business in this state, shall be subject to the provisions of this act, and, upon conviction of the violation of any of its provisions, to the punishment prescribed by it.

"Sec. 3. Any person or corporation violating any of the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

S. D. Jones & Williams, for the appellant.

R. F. Walker, attorney general, for the state.

171 SHERWOOD, J. 1. The defendant alleges various grounds why the act under which he was convicted is unconstitutional. Among them these: "Because the act of the legislature under which the said information was drawn is unconstitutional and void, because it violates the following provisions of the constitution of the state of Missouri: 1. "That all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry': Const., art. 2, sec. 4; 2. "That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law': Const., art. 2, sec. 30; 3. "That the act of the legislature aforesaid violates the constitutional provision forbidding the legis lature to grant 'to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or 172 immunity': Const.,

art. 4, sec. 53. That the act aforesaid violates the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""

For the present purpose, it will be assumed that defendant attempted to do the act with which he is charged, and that it lay in his power to compel, or coerce, Simmonds to withdraw from a lawful organization with which he was connected; because, by so doing, all discussion of matters merely preliminary to the main question herein involved will be avoided.

A similar provision to that contained in section 30, article 2, of the constitution, is found in the fifth amendment to the constitution of the United States, providing, among other things, "nor deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." In section 30 of the constitution, as well as in a like section in the federal constitution just recited, it will be noted that the rights of life, liberty, and property are grouped together in the same sentence; they constitute a trinity of rights, and each, as opposed to unlawful deprivation thereof, is of equal constitutional importance. With each of these rights, under the operation of a familiar principle, every auxiliary right, every attribute necessary to make the principal right effectual and valuable in its most extensive sense, pass as incidents of the original grant. "The rights thus guaranteed are something more than the mere privileges of locomotion; the guaranty is the negation of arbitrary power in every form which results in a deprivation of a right."

These terms, "life," "liberty," and "property," are representative terms, and cover every right to which a member of the body politic is entitled under the law. 173 Within their comprehensive scope are embraced the right of self-defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests, the right to buy and sell as others may-all our liberties, personal, civil, and political; in short, all that makes life worth living; and of none of these liberties can anyone be deprived, except by due process of law: 2 Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., sec 1950.

Now, as before stated, each of the rights heretofore mentioned carries with it, as its natural and necessary coincident, all that effectuates and renders complete and full, unrestrained enjoyment of that right. Take, for instance, that of property; necessarily blended with that right are those of acquiring prop