Peebles & Peebles and A. N. Yancey, for the appellant. Rinaker & Rinaker, for the appellee. 802 PHILLIPS, J. Appellee filed a bill for dower and partition of certain lands alleged to have belonged to Emily C. Cook at the time of her death, he being her surviving husband. Her title was acquired by the following deed: "The grantor, Thomas Stewart, of, etc., for and in consideration of one dollar in hand paid, doth hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey, and warrant to Mary A. Stewart and Emily C. Stewart, of Macoupin county, the following real estate, to wit: The southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 14, and the southeast quarter of the northeast quarter of section 15, all in township No. 12 north, range 8 west, in Macoupin county, state of Illinois. And I, Thomas Stewart, as for myself, retain possession and reserve the use, profits, and full control during my life; and further, in case either of the grantees dies without a heir, her interest to revert to the survivor. "Dated this 10th day of March, 1883. "THOMAS STEWART. (Seal)" The trial court held the creed dower and partition. Appellee insists that the deed conveys the title in fee simple to the grantees therein, and that the last clause in the deed, containing the following words, to wit: "And further, in case either of the grantees dies without a heir, her interest to revert to the survivor," is inoperative and void. He alleges that he is the owner, as such heir to his deceased wife, of the undivided half of the undivided half of said lands above mentioned. Appellant denies the right of appellee to any right, title, or interest of, in, or to the said tracts of land in said deed mentioned. Her contention is, that, by the deed from Thomas Stewart to her and the deceased wife of appellee, the grantees took simply a life estate, with a contingent remainder to the survivor in fee. fee vested in the grantees, and deThis appeal is prosecuted. 303 By the thirteenth section of chapter 30 of the Revised Statutes it is provided: "Every estate in lands which shall be granted, conveyed, or devised, although other words heretofore necessary to transfer an estate of inheritance be not added, shall be deemed a fee simple estate of inheritance, if a less estate be not limited by express words, or do not appear to have been granted, conveyed, or devised by construction or operation of law." By section 9 of the same chapter the words "convey and warrant" to the grantee are declared to be a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, with certain covenants, etc. This deed is clearly within the letter and spirit of section 9, and, by the two sections above named, a fee simple estate was vested in the grantees. It is an established principle of construction of contingent remainders, that an estate cannot, by deed, be limited over to another after a fee already granted. The term "remainder" necessarily implies what is left, and, if the entire estate is granted, there can be no remainder. This deed effected an absolute fee simple conveyance by the first clause of the deed and vested the estate. By the last clause an attempt is made to mount a fee upon a fee, which can only be done by executory devise: Smith v. Kimbell, 153 Ill. 368; Fowler v. Black, 136 Ill. 363; Griswold v. Hicks, 132 Ill. 494; 22 Am. St. Rep. 549. It is a further principle of construction of deeds, that if the terms used vest a fee in the first taker, other parts of the instrument showing an intention to give a less estate will not control: Carpenter v. Van Olinder, 127 Ill. 42; 11 Am. St. Rep. 92. Under the statute, the conveyance being to the grantee and her heirs and assigns, the terms have, in law, a definite meaning. By the use of terms of a definite legal meaning, the intention can be determined from the language used. If that language means a certain thing, and nothing else, then the only reasonable construction is, that what was intended was expressed in the language used. The 304 language used did not create an estate in joint tenancy nor a life estate. Under these principles, this deed reserved to the grantor a life estate and vested a fee in the grantees, and the clause, "and further, in case either of the grantees dies without a heir, her interest to revert to the survivor," must be held to be inoperative, as a limitation of the fee. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed. ESTATES-LIMITATION OVER AFTER FEE GRANTED. - If the first taker under a will is given an estate in fee or for life, coupled with an unlimited power of disposition, the fee or absolute estate vests in the first taker, and any limitation over is void: Bradley v. Carnes, 94 Tenn. 27; 45 Am. St. Řep. 696, and note; Combs v. Combs, 67 Md. 11; 1 Am. St. Rep. 359, and especially note. BARRETT V. MT. GREENWOOD CEMETERY ASSOCIATION. [159 ILLINOIS, 385.] WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, POLLUTING. — The owner of lands through which flows a brook or small watercourse is entitled to an injunction to prevent the owners of a cemetery from constructing a sewer through and over their premises, so as to drain into the brook, if the effect of such sewer must be to carry poisonous exhalations from decomposing human bodies into the watercourse, thereby polluting its waters. WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, FURTHER POLLUTION. The fact that a watercourse is already polluted and contaminated by various causes does not entitle other persons to add thereto, nor preclude persons through whose lands the watercourse flows from obtaining relief by injunction against its further pollution. NUISANCES - CUMULATIVE REMEDIES. - The equitable remedy to prevent the creation or continuation of a nuisance is not taken away by a statute giving a remedy by indictment. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED TO PREVENT A LANDED PROPRIETOR FROM CAUSING filthy and contaminated water to percolate from his soil into the adjacent lands, to the injury of his neighbor. NUISANCES.-AN INCORPORATED CITY OR TOWN WILL NOT BE PERMITTED to empty its sewage into a stream of water, where the result is the pollution thereof. A NUISANCE CANNOT BE AUTHORIZED BY A CONTRACT between a municipality and a cemetery association, to the injury of a third person. Whitehead & Stoker and W. H. Holden, for the appellants. Runyan & Runyan, for the appellees. Holden & Buzzell, for the appellee town of Worth. 386 CARTER, J. This was a bill in equity, filed in the cir cuit court of Cook county by certain landowners, who are appellants here, to enjoin appellees, two cemetery corporations, from constructing a certain sewer so as to drain their cemeteries, and especially to underdrain certain wet and swampy portions thereof, used and to be used in burying the dead, into a running stream of water flowing through appellants' lands. The sewer empties into the brook where it crosses Morgan avenue, above appellants' lands, and is being constructed eastward along said avenue between said cemeteries, with lateral extensions or spurs extending into the cemeteries for drainage, and especially designed to drain certain swampy portions thereof as appear unfit for burial purposes unless underdrained. The sewer is being constructed under a contract between the two cemetery compa nies of the one part and the commissioners of highways of the town of Worth of the other part, whereby the former are to construct the sewer at their own expense, and to pay all damages to private property, and the town is to keep the same open and in repair for the use of the cemetery companies, and the adjoining property owners are to have the right to connect. There is but little dispute as to the law of the case, the controversy relating chiefly to matters of fact. The testimony was taken by the master to whom the cause was referred. Many witnesses were examined, and the evidence is too voluminous to be set out to any considerable extent here. The testimony shows, however, that said brook is a small, shallow stream, which rises north of Morgan avenue or One Hundred and Eleventh street, in the town of Worth, and flows southerly, fed by springs along its course, across said avenue through the sixty acres of land owned by complainant G. D. Barrett, thence south through a one hundred acre tract owned by complainant W. B. Brayton, and across Raymond avenue or 387 One Hundred and Fifteenth street, and through land owned by complainant Saxton, and thence through an eighty acre tract owned and occupied by complainant Ira S. Brayton and eighty acres owned and occupied by Friederich Joehnke; thence across Lyon avenue or One Hundred and Nineteenth street, over a forty acre tract owned by complainants John T. Dale and George D. Robinson. South of Morgan avenue, two and one-half miles in a direct line, but four miles by the brook, complainant August C. Roeber occupies a block of ground, on which he has constructed icehouses, and where he conducts an ice business of five thousand dollars or six thousand dollars a year. The brook that runs through the lands of other complainants north of his premises empties into Stony creek about three-fourths of a mile above his place. He has harvested ice from Stony creek, and sold the same in Chicago and vicinity for fourteen years past, for refrigerator and domestic purposes. The lands of the other complainants are used for pasturage and farming purposes, and the water of the brook is used for stock, and to some extent is used in the homes of the occupants of the land for domestic purposes. This brook running through said lands receives the washings of the streets, and from manured lands used for raising cabbages adjoining it north of the land of complainants, and in times of freshets the brook is muddy, but is clear in its natural condition. Ditches have been constructed along Morgan avenue, and surface water coming south on Johnson avenue, which intersects Morgan avenue, is carried along these ditches into the brook. Dr. Bayard Holmes testified, as an expert bacteriologist, that bodies buried in boxes of wood would sooner or later be so liquefied as to be practically incorporated with the soil in which they were buried, and that the subterranean drainage of a cemetery draining into a sewer of brick and mortar, as ordinarily built, if drained into a spring brook, would carry contamination and pollute such brook for five miles or more, and that brook, being dammed for ice 388 making within four miles from the cemetery, would result in a pond from which ice of a very pernicious quality would be harvested; that the water from a brook into which such sewage drained would be unhealthy for cows, and unfit for drinking purposes or for cooking water for domestic use. The testimony of other witnesses showed that the lands through which the brook runs into which the drainage from the cemeteries emptied, would be unfitted for dairy purposes and stockraising by reason of the contamination of the water by the sewage. We have read and considered all the evidence with care, and are of the opinion that it sustains the conclusions reached by the master. In his report, the master found "that injurious products of decomposition do emanate from animal bodies buried in the earth; that these emanations do enter into the soil in which said bodies are buried; that the surface water percolating through the soil takes up these emanations; that if the sewer referred to is constructed, with the lateral drains extending into the said cemeteries referred to in the bill of complaint filed in this cause, these unwholesome products of decomposition will percolate through the soil and penetrate the sewer, and will be carried by the said sewer and emptied into the spring brook, and that the contents of the said sewer will contaminate the waters of the spring brook to a greater extent than they are now contaminated from any cause shown to exist, and will contaminate the waters of the said spring brook to a greater extent than they would be containinated from any natural cause or from any conditions existing prior to the construction of the proposed sewer"; that the preponderance of the evidence on the main issue was in favor of the complainants, and that the material allegations of their bill were sustained. The circuit court sustained exceptions to this report and dismissed the bill, and its decree has been affirmed by the appellate court. 389 We think there was error in affirming the decree. The very purpose of the sewer was to furnish underdrainage, as well |