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verter. Counsel for appellants maintain, that while the fee passed out of Henry I. Venable by his deed to the trustees of the voluntary society, it was not legally conveyed by them to the incorporation, and that the latter did not have title to the property 218 when it was dissolved, or at any other time. While we do not concur in that view, we do not deem it important to enter upon a discussion of the question, for the reason that the further contention that the title did not revert to the devisee of Henry I. Venable, if all that is or can be claimed on behalf of appellee is admitted, must be sustained. On that theory the question recurs, What interest or title in and to the premises did Henry I. Venable have when he made his last will and testament, or at the time of his death? That it did not revert to him personally is beyond controversy, because he died long prior to the dissolution of the incorporation. Did he, nevertheless, have such an interest as he could convey, assign, or pass by will? The authorities are clearly to the effect that he did not. He had no future estate in the land, “but only what is called a naked possibility of reverter, which is incapable of alienation or devise," although it would descend to his heirs: Tiedeman on Real Property, enlarged ed., sec. 385. As said in Washburn on Real Property, volume 2, page 739: “So if A sell land to a banking company, and they hold it till their charter expires, it will revert to him or his heirs. But such a right is not a reversion. It is a naked possibility of reverter, which he could not convey or assign”: Citing, among other authorities, Nicoll v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121.
It is clear from these authorities, as it seems to me to be upon principle, that Henry I. Venable had no title whatever to the land after he conveyed it to Blackburn and others, and hence conveyed none to his widow, Martha A. It follows that appellee took nothing by her quitclaim deed from the latter. Had Venable died after the dissolution of the Edgar Collegiate Institute, the title would have revested in him on appellee's theory of the case, and would have passed under his will as after-acquired property. But no such case is presented here.
The doctrine that real estate held by a corporation at its death or dissolution reverts to the original grantor or 219 his heirs, recognized by this court in Mott v. Danville Seminary, 129 Ill. 403, and other cases, cannot be availed of by appellee in this case. She does not claim title as heir of Henry I. Venable, or through any such heir. Her source of title is the devise to her grantor. For the reasons stated, she acquired no
AX. Sr. REP., VOL. L-1
title from that source, and hence failed to prove, as she alleged, that she was the owner of the premises.
The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed.
REAL PROPERTY-REVERTER.-Property reverts to the dedi. cators or their representatives, if the sole use to which it bas been dedicated becomes impossible of execution: Board of Education v. Edson, 18 Obio St. 221; 98 Am. Dec. 114.
HERTIG V. PEOPLE.
(159 ILLINOIS, 237.) AN AFFIDAVIT IS SIMPLY a declaration on oath, in writing, sworn to by a party before some person having authority under the law to administer oaths, and need not be entitled in any particular cause, or in any particular way, or be preceded by any caption.
NOTARIES PUBLIC.-COURTS WILL TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of the notaries public in the counties in which they are held.
AN AFFIDAVIT HAVING NO VENUE, but subscribed by a notary public of the county, is good, for the court will take judicial notice that he is a notary of the county, and will presume that he administered the oath only in the county in which he was authorized to act.
THE PRESIDENT OF A CORPORATION Owning and publishing a newspaper is a proper person to certify, under oath, to the publication of a notice therein. It is not necessary to afix the seal of the corporation to such verified certificate.
JURISDICTION-COLLATERAL ATTACK.-If, after a pro ceeding in court confirming an assessment-roll, an application is made to the court for an order authorizing the sale of delinquent property, evidence will not be received to prove that an affidavit of th publication of a notice required to authorize such confirms. tion was not true.
William T. Donlin and Taylor & McWilliams, for the appellant.
J. D. Adair, for the appellee.
289 BAKER, J. The city of Chicago ordered the laying of water service pipes in Hoyne avenue, in said city, from Archer avenue to Thirty-eighth street, to be paid for by special assessment. Proceedings were had in the county court of Cook county, upon application of the city, and judgment was rendered confirming the assessment-roll. Thereafter, the judgment against certain property of appellant included in the as
sessment-roll never having been paid, the county treasurer applied to the county court for a judgment of sale of said delinquent property to satisfy the above judgment. Upon this application, judgment was rendered by default. Subsequently, , however, the special appearance of appellant was entered, for the sole purpose of attacking the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment of sale was vacated and leave given to file objections instanter. The objections so filed were overruled, as were also motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, and judgment was rendered, to reverse which appellant brings this appeal.
Two reasons are assigned why the judgment below should be reversed: 1. It is contended that the certificate of publication of the delinquent list is insufficient; and 2. That the certificate of publication filed in the assessment proceedings, and upon which is based the judgment of confirmation, is also insufficient.
240 As to the first contention: The certificate of publication of the delinquent list begins: “I, Frank S. Weighley, president of the Mail, a corporation publishing a newspaper known as the Chicago Mail, do hereby certify," etc., and concludes:
"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this fifteenth (15th) day of June, A. D. 1895.
"FRANK S. WEIGHLEY,
"President of the Mail. "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June, A. D. 1895. (Seal)
"A. L. WOODWARD,
"Notary Public.” The objections made to it are, that the jurat fails to state the venue, that it does not appear that the affiant was a proper person to make the certificate, and that it should have been sealed with the corporate seal.
Section 186 of the revenue act provides that the printer, publisher, or financial officer or agent of the newspaper publishing the list of delinquent lands shall attach his certificate, under oath, to a copy thereof, and that the same shall be filed as a part of the records of the court. In Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307, it was said that "an affidavit is simply a declaration, on oath, in writing, sworn to by a party before some person who has authority, under the law, to administer oaths,” and it was held that it need not be entitled in any cause or in any particular way, and that " without any caption whatever, it is, nevertheless, an affidavit.” In Schaefer v. Kienzel, 123 Ill. 430, it was held that where an affidavit was made before a notary public in the county in which the court was held that entertained the proceeding, the jurat of the notary need not be authenticated by his notarial seal—that the court would take judicial notice of who the notaries public were in the county in which the court was beld. To the same effect were the earlier decisions in Stout v. Slattery, 12 Ill. 162, and Rowley v. Berrian, 12 Ill. 198. See, also, Jackson v. Cummings, 15 Ill. 449. Following the rule above laid down, we must hold that the county court of Cook county 241 will take judicial notice that “A. L. Woodward, Notary Public,” is a notary for that county. Being a public officer, it will be presumed he administered the oath in the county within which he was authorized to administer oaths, for the presumption is, that he has done his duty.
It is urged that it does not appear from the certificate that Frank S. Weighley was a proper person to make it, and that it should have been sealed with the corporate seal of the Mail. The case of Fox v. Turtle, 55 Ill. 377, relied upon by appellant, is not in point. There the certificate was signed, "John Wentworth, publisher, by Reed,” and it did not appear who Reed was, or that he was in any manner connected with the newspaper. It did not purport to be given by the publisher, but by another person who used his name, and his authority to do so did not appear, and for that reason the court held it to be defective. In the certificate under consideration, on the contrary, the person certifying describes himself as president of the corporation, and in that capacity signed his name. His official connection with the newspaper therefore appears. As president of the corporation, he was certainly its agent, within the meaning of tihe statute, and consequently a proper person to make the certificate: Smith v. Smith, 62 Ill. 493. The matters set forth in the certificate were certified to by an individual. The corporation could certify to nothing. To have sealed the certificate with the corporate seal would, therefore, have been an unneces sary, if not an absurd, proceeding.
As to the second contention: Appellant claims that the matters set forth in the certificate of publication filed in the confirmation proceedings are false, and the certificate, therefore, insufficient. At the hearing of this cause, he called one B. McWilliams, in order to prove by him that between the dates February 3 and February 9, 1893—the dates within which the certificate of publication alleged the notice to have been published -no notice appeared in the files of the Chicago Mail. court, on 242 appellee's objection, refused to hear such testimony. In this the court did not ert. The
time to have tendered such testimony was at the hearing of the confirmation proceeding. As it was, the offer came too late, for this is a collateral proceeding, in which it is sought to attack the jurisdiction of the court to render the judgment. In the record of the confirmation proceeding there appeared a certificate which was sufficient if true, and the judgment recited that the facts alleged in such certificate were true; consequently, it will be assumed that the court had sufficient evidence before it to warrant the rendering of judgment. Even were the certificate in fact insufficient, appellant could take no advantage of it in this, a collateral, proceeding, for in such a case the presumption would be that the court heard and acted upon other and sufficient evidence to sustain the findings: Barnett v. Wolf, 70 Ill. 76; Harris v. Lester, 80 Ill. 307.
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the county court will be affirmed.
AFFIDAVIT—WHAT IS.-An affidavit is a voluntary oath reduced to writing, taken before some authorized officer, and certified by him: Shelton v. Berry, 19 Tex. 151; 70 Am. Dec. 326, and note.
AN AFFIDAVIT CANNOT BE USED IN A CAUSE UNLESS IT IS PROPERLY ENTITLED, and the title should be of the cause in wbich it is to be used : Watson v. Roessig, 24 III. 281; 76 Am. Dec. 746. As a general rule, an affidavit must be entitled in the suit in which it is to be used. Still, if no suit is pending, at the time, it need not be entitled; but, if a suit is pending, and the affidavit is entitled in & suit not pending, it is a nullity: Beebe v. Morrell, 76 Mich. 114; 15 Am. St. Rep. 288.
JUDICIAL NOTICE-NOTARIES PUBLIC.-The circuit courts of Illinois take judicial notice of who are notaries within the county where the court sits: Extended note to Lanfear V. Mestier, 89 Am. Dec. 685.
PALMER 0. Cook,
(159 ILLINOIS, 300.) AN ESTATE CANNOT BY DEED BE LIMITED OVER TO another after a fee already granted.
THE TERM "REMAINDER," NECESSARILY IMPLIES what is left, and, if the entire estate is granted, there can be no remainder,
CONVEYANCE - REPUGNANCY.-IF THE TERMS USED IN A DEED VEST THE FEE IN THE FIRST TAKER, other parts of the instrument showing an intention to give a less estate must be disregarded. Therefore, if a deed purports to convey real property to two grantees, but contains a clause declaring that, in case either grantee dies without heirs, her interest shall vest in the survivor, such clause is not wholly inoperative.