REVIEW, WRIT OF-CONTINUED.
statutory provisions which confer jurisdiction on the
supreme court to issue such writs when necessary to the
complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdic-
tion, and for the purpose of correcting any erroneous
or void proceeding, when there is no appeal, nor in the
judgment of the court any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy at law.-State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court... 278
2. Same. The action of the trial court in dissolving an in-
junction against the erection of a high trestle for street
car purposes upon the street in front of one's premises,
on condition that the appropriator give bond to pay the
owner all damages, is reviewable by writ of review, even
though the court might on appeal order the destruction
of the trestle, since the damage would have been sus-
tained by the erection and maintenance of the structure
for a limited time, and the owner thereby delayed in re-
ceiving the compensation guaranteed to him by the con-
stitution in advance of any appropriation of his prop-
erty. Id......
Delivery-What Constitutes—Shipping Instructions. Where
a purchaser of goods directs their shipment via a certain
railway, and the goods are loaded on the cars of that rail-
Iway at the shipping station on a connecting line, to be
thence transported to the line over which the shipping
instructions required shipment, according to a prior and
continued course of dealing between the parties, the act
of the shipper in loading the cars and turning them over
to the common carrier, which received and took charge
of them, constituted a delivery and exonerated the ship-
per from liability for subsequent damage in the ship-
ment.-Roy v. Griffin.....
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.
Counterclaim for Damages. Where a contract for improv-
ing a street provided that waste material might be de-
posited on abutting property, as might be permitted by
owners thereof, a property owner may counterclaim for
damages when the waste was not deposited as directed
49-26 WASH.
SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM-CONTINUED.
by him, but was heaped up, together with stumps, in one
pile on his property.-Young v. Borzone.....
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2; PLEADING, 4;
TENDER, 1.
Sale on Execution—Indemnifying Bonds. Bal. Code, § 516,
which permits the sheriff to exact an indemnity bond as
a condition precedent to the execution by him of civil
process is not superseded by Bal. Code, §§ 5262-5266,
which authorize the sheriff to proceed with the sale of
property levied upon unless a claimant thereto shall
make affidavit of ownership and give bond to make good
his title, since the latter sections are not intended to
prescribe the sheriff's duties, but merely to give the
claimant of property levied upon an additional remedy
for its recovery.-Carpenter v. Barry....
See CHATTEL MORTGAGES; MANDAMUS, 2.
STATES AND STATE OFFICERS. See PUBLIC LANDS, 2, 3.
1. Repeal by Implication. The power conferred by the act
of March 14, 1893, on the regents of the state university
to sell a certain ten acre tract of land cannot be con-
strued as repealed by the acts of 1895 and 1897 vesting
control of state lands in the board of land commission-
ers, since the repealing clauses of those statutes (Laws
1895, p. 570, § 106; Laws 1897, p. 262, § 70) which ex-
pressly repeal various prior acts conferring on certain
boards control over the state lands, omit any reference to
the university act of 1893, and a repeal should not be
implied, inasmuch as there is not an irreconcilable re-
pugnancy between them, nor an evident intent to com-
prise in the later enactments a sole and complete system
of legislation on the subject, exclusive of boards not
therein expressly mentioned.-Callvert v. Winsor....... 368
2. Title of Act. The title of an act declaring that its object
is to provide "for the location, construction and main-
tenance of the university of Washington" is broad enough
to embrace an authorization of sale of a tract of land
and the devotion of its proceeds for the purpose ex-
pressed in the title.-Id....
3. Omission of Statute From Code-Effect. The omission
of the statute now known as § 2927, Bal. Code, from the
Code of 1881 did not effect its repeal, since § 3320 of the
Code of 1881 specially provided that "all acts or parts of
acts of a general nature, in force at the commencement of
the 8th biennial session of the legislative assembly, and
not repealed shall be, and the same are hereby continued,
in full force and effect, unless the same be repugnant
to the act upon the same subject matter, passed or re-
vised at the 8th biennial or present extra session of the
legislature," and the statute in controversy was in effect
at the time specified, was not repealed, and was not re-
pugnant to any act passed during the sessions mentioned.
-State ex rel. Christie v. Meek....
4. Repeal by Implication. Bal. Code, § 2927, was not re-
pealed by implication by the act (Laws 1899, p. 183) en-
titled "an act to provide against the adulteration of
food," § 2 of which provides that "the term "food' as
used herein shall include all articles used for food or
drink by man, whether simple, mixed or compound,"
since the legislative interpretation of the term "drink"
as used therein is defined by a later statute (Laws 1901,
p. 194) as not including liquors containing two per cent.
or more of alcohol.-Id... . .
5. Abrogation of Statute by Non-User. Non-user of a
statute will not effect its abrogation, unless its obsolete-
ness is in some way recognized by subsequent legisla
tion.-Id.
6. Amendment-Constitutional Law. Under art. 2, § 37, of
the state constitution, which provides that "no act shall
ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its
title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be
set forth at full length," § 1 of the act of March 11, 1897
(Laws 1897, p. 93), which provides that "there shall be
exempt from execution and attachment to every house-
holder in the state of Washington personal property to
the amount and value of one thousand dollars, in addi-
tion to the property exempt under § 486 of volume 2 of
Hill's Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington,"
is unconstitutional on the ground that it amends an ex-
isting statute by ingrafting into it an additional pro-
vision which alters its scope and effect, and fails to set
forth the statute in full as amended.-Copland v. Pirie.. 481
See EXEMPTIONS; INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 1, 2; NEW
TRIAL, 1; PUBLIC LANDS, 2.
1. Personal Injuries - Negligence-Question for Jury.
Whether a cable car company engaged in operating a
line upon a steep street is guilty of negligence or not,
where the cars could only be safely stopped upon the
level of cross streets and not upon the incline, and by rea-
son of that fact a pedestrian upon the cross street was
run into and injured because of the failure of the com-
pany's employees to stop the car until it had completely
ascended from the slope to the level of the cross street,
is a question for the jury, and it is not within the
province of the court to say as a matter of law that the
company was not negligent in operating such cars.-
Burian v. Seattle Electric Co....
2. Same-Non-Suit. In an action to recover for injuries
resulting from being run down by a cable car, where
there is some evidence that no gong was rung, it was
error to non-suit plaintiff, since it became the duty of the
jury to determine what the fact was as to sounding the
gong, and whether a failure to sound it constituted neg-
ligence under all the facts of the case.-Id.......
3. Same-Contributory Negligence. Whether a pedestrian
upon a street crossing waiting for a street car to pass is
guilty of contributory negligence in turning to cross a
double track on which cars run in the opposite direc-
tion, without looking or listening to learn whether a car
is approaching, is a question for the jury, where he is
injured by a car coming suddenly over the top of the
hill upon which he was walking, there being evidence
that its gong was not sounded, and that the car was not
stopped as quickly as it should have been.-Id.......... 606
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 6.
1. Assessment of Bank Stock--Increase by Board of Equal-
ization-Necessity of Notice to Stockholders. Notice
from the board of equalization to a shareholder of the
capital stock of a bank of a proposed raise in the value
of his assessment is not necessary, since notice to the
bank is sufficient for that purpose, under the provisions
of Bal. Code, §§ 1677-1680, which constitute the bank
the general agent of the shareholder.-Ladd v. Gilson.... 79
2. Same. Where a bank appears before the board of equal-
ization, pursuant to a notice requesting it to "show
cause, if any, why your personal assessment for the year
1900 should not be raised," and, without any objection
to the form of the notice, is fully heard upon the subject
of an increase in the valuation of the shares of its cap-
ital stock, none of its shareholders can complain that the
notice given was not notice of an intention to raise the
valuation upon the shares of stock of the bank.-Id..... 79
3. Foreclosure of Delinquency Certificate-Payment of Prior
Taxes-Local Assessments. Laws 1899, p. 302, § 20,
which requires the holder of a general tax delinquency
certificate to "pay all taxes that have accrued on the prop-
erty" before he shall be entitled to judgment foreclosing
his lien, does not require the payment of street assess-
ments but refers merely to the general taxes, and special
taxes assessed in the same manner as general taxes, in
the absence of express provisions in the general revenue
law clearly showing an intention to include local assess-
ments within its operation, inasmuch as the basis of the
forms of assessment is entirely distinct, and the legis-
lature itself has interpreted the revenue law by recog-
nizing general tax liens as paramount to local assess-
ments, by the provision in Laws 1899, p. 80, § 11, that a
deed upon foreclosure and sale for street assessment liens
in cities of the first class shall convey the entire title,
"stripped of all prior liens or claims, excepting unpaid
installments and general taxes."-McMillan v. Tacoma.. 358
4. Equalization-Notice-Service by Mail-Time.. Where
the notice required by Bal. Code, § 1714, to be given a
property owner of a proposed increase by the board of
equalization in his assessment is sent by mail, such
notice is governed by Id., § 4891, which provides that in
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