Opinion of the Court-FULLERTON, J. [26 Wash. 1897, p. 93), which provides that "there shall be exempt from execution and attachment to every householder in the state of Washington personal property to the amount and value of one thousand dollars, in addition to the property exempt under § 486 of volume 2 of Hill's Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington," is unconstitutional on the ground that it amends an existing statute by ingrafting into it an additional provision which alters its scope and effect, and fails to set forth the statute in full as amended. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. ORANGE JACOBS, Judge. Reversed. S. D. King, for appellant. H. H. Herren and William B. Allison, for respondents. The opinion of the court was delivered by FULLERTON, J.-The sole question presented by this appeal is the constitutionality of the first section of the act of March 11, 1897, entitled "An act relating to exemptions of personal property." Session Laws 1897, p. 93. The section is as follows: "Section 1. There shall be exempt from execution and attachment to every householder in the state of Washington personal property to the amount and value of one thousand dollars ($1,000) in addition to the property exempt under § 486 of vol. 2 of Hill's Statutes and Codes of the State of Washington: provided, that no property shall be exempt from execution for clerks', laborers', or mechanics' wages, earned within this state, nor shall any property be exempt from execution issued upon a judg ment against an attorney on account of any liability incurred by such attorney to his client on account of any moneys, or other property coming into his hands, from or belonging to his client." It is contended that the act violates, among others, § 37, art. 2, of the state constitution, which provides that “no act shall ever be revised or amended by mere reference to Dec. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-FULLERTON, J. its title, but the act revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length." In construing similar constitutional provisions the courts seem generally to have held that this requirement does not apply to supplemental acts not in any way modifying or altering the original act, nor to those merely adding new sections to an existing act, nor to acts complete in themselves, not purporting to be amendatory, but which by implication amends other legislation on the same subject. On the other hand, the courts are equally emphatic that if the act is not complete in itself, and is clearly amendatory of a former statute, it falls within the constitutional inhibition, whether or not it purports on its face to be amendatory or an independent act. See cases collected in 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 282, 283. The section in question, it seems to us, is not complete in itself. It does not purport to add an additional section to the statute relating to exemptions of personal property, but purports to, and does, ingraft into the section of the existing statute providing for such exemptions an additional exemption which alters its scope and effect. As such it is clearly amendatory of that section, and, to comply with the constitutional requirement, it should have set forth the section amended at full length. Bierer v. Blurock, 9 Wash. 63, 65 (36 Pac. 975). This view of this act was taken by the learned judge of the district court of Washington in construing the exemption statutes of this state with relation to the national bankruptcy act. With reference to the question he said: "A statute which is complete in itself is not repugnant to the provision of the state constitution above quoted merely because it changes the existing laws of the state, and by implication repeals prior enactments relating to the same subject. Warren v. Crosby (Or.) 34 Pac. 661. But where, as in this case, the new act is not complete, Syllabus. [26 Wash. but refers to a prior statute, which is changed, but not repealed, by the new act, so that the full declaration of the legislative will on the subject can only be ascertained by reading both statutes, the very obscurity and the tendency to confusion will be found which constitute the vice prohibited by this section of the constitution." In re Buelow, 98 Fed. 86. The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. REAVIS, C. J., and DUNBAR and ANDERS, JJ., concur. 26 484 33 420 26 484 39 212 [No. 3863. Decided December 6, 1901.] LILLIAN M. ROBINSON et al., Appellants, v. BALTIMORE AND SEATTLE MINING & REDUCTION COMPANY, Respondent. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT -ACTION BY WIDOW AND CHILD LIMITA TIONS. Under Bal. Code, § 4828, which allows the heirs or personal representatives of one whose death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another to maintain an action for damages against the person causing death, and under Bal. Code, § 4800, which limits the commencement of actions for any injury to the person or rights of another to a period of three years after the cause of action shall have accrued, the widow and minor children of one whose death is caused by the wrongful act of another have a right of action therefor which may be commenced at any time within three years from the injury. Appeal from Superior Court, King County.-Hon. ORANGE JACOBS, Judge. Reversed. Richard Gowan and Preston, Carr & Gilman, for appellants. Piles, Donworth & Howe, for respondent. Dec. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. The opinion of the court was delivered by WHITE, J.—This is an appeal from a final judgment sustaining a demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint, dismissing the action, and awarding costs to defendant. The demurrer is on the following grounds: (1) That it appears upon the face of the complaint that the above entitled action has not been commenced within the time limited by law; (2) that it appears upon the face of the complaint that the above entitled action was not commenced within two years after the death of Ralph W. Robinson; (3) that it appears upon the face of the complaint that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The action was brought by Lillian M. Robinson as the surviving widow of Ralph W. Robinson, and as guardian ad litem of Clifford R. Robinson, infant child of said Lillian and Ralph W., to recover damages for the death of Ralph W. Robinson, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff Clifford Ralph Robinson is an infant of the age of four years. On the 9th day of August, 1900, by order of the superior court of King County, the plaintiff, Lillian M. Robinson, was appointed guardian ad litem of the said Clifford Ralph Robinson, for the purpose of prosecuting this action, which was commenced on the 9th day of August, 1900, as appears from the clerk's file mark on the complaint. It is alleged in the complaint that the death of said Ralph W. Robinson occurred on the 27th day of July, 1898, or two years and thirteen days prior to the commencement of this action. The sole ground urged against the complaint in the briefs is that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, the respondent contending that two years is the time limited in which the action might be brought, and the appellants contending Opinion of the Court-WHITE, J. [26 Wash. that three years is the time in which the action could be brought. It is conceded that the right of action for damages for injuries resulting in death is purely statutory, and that at common law no such action could be maintained. In 1854, the legislature of the territory of Washington, in an act entitled "An act to regulate the practice and proceedings in civil actions," declared: "No action for a personal injury to any person, occasioning his death, shall abate, nor shall such right of action determine by reason of such death, if he have a wife and child living; but such action may be prosecuted, or commenced and prosecuted, in favor of such wife, or in favor of the wife and children, or if no wife, in favor of such child or children." Session Laws 1854, p. 220, § 495. This act was re-enacted in 1863 (Session Laws 1863, p. 195, § 536); was re-enacted in 1869 (Session Laws 1869, p. 6, § 18); was re-enacted in 1873 (Session Laws 1873, p. 6, § 18); was codified in the Laws of 1881, § 18, p. 37, and is the same section as § 4838, Bal. Code. In 1854 the legislature of the territory of Washington, in an act entitled "An act regulating the time within which civil actions may be commenced," declared that actions could only be commenced within the following periods after the cause of action shall have accrued (§ 4): "Within three years; 2d. An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not hereinafter enumerated." Sec. 7: "An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued." Session Laws 1854, pp. 362-364, §§ 1, 4, 7. These various pro |