Opinion of the Court-DUNBAR, J. [26 Wash. statute did not apply to domestic judgments (Murch v. Moore, 2 Ore. 189; Strong v. Barnhart, 5 Ore. 499), and in one or two other states the same doctrine has been announced. But these cases are the exception, and not the rule. In Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335 (60 Pac. 977), it was held that a domestic judgment was embraced within the language of a statute similar in all respects to ours. In Haupt v. Burton, 21 Mont. 572 (55 Pac. 110, 69 Am. St. Rep. 698), the supreme court of Montana, in discussing this question, says: "It is argued that section 41, division 1, Compiled Statutes of 1887, which provides that an action upon a judgment of any court of the United States or of any state or territory within the United States, shall be commenced within six years', is inapplicable to judgments rendered by the courts of this state; and we are cited to Pitzer v. Russel, 4 Ore. 129, and Burns v. Conner, 1 Wash. 6 (23 Pac. 836), which hold that way. The great weight of authority is against those decisions, and we believe that, in the absence of any exception from the statute of actions upon judgments of the courts of this state, they are within the letter of the Code,"-citing Hummer v. Lamphear, 32 Kan. 439 (4 Pac. 865, 49 Am. Rep. 491), approved in Schuyler County Bank v. Bradbury, 56 Kan. 355 (43 Pac. 254), and Mason v. Cronise, 20 Cal. 217. In Schuyler County Bank v. Bradbury, just referred to, it is squarely decided that a right of action upon a domestic judgment whereon no execution had issued is barred by the five-year statute of limitations. In Mason v. Cronise it was held that judgments recovered in the courts of California were barred by the lapse of five years from the time they were rendered, which was the statute in that state corresponding to the six-year statute in ours. The language of the court in that case is applicable, and we reproduce it here: Dec. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-DUNBAR, J. "The section does not, in terms, except judgments recovered within the state; but, on the contrary, its language embraces the judgments and decrees of any court of any state or territory within the United States. It would seem, according to the natural import of the words used, that there could be no question of the application of the section to domestic judgments." To the same effect is McDonald v. Dickson, 85 N. C. 248, and Rowe v. Blake, 99 Cal. 167 (33 Pac. 864, 37 Am. St. Rep. 45). In conclusion, we think that both reason and authority compel us to hold that domestic judgments are included within the statute. But it is contended by the appellant that the statute of limitations does not commence to run on a domestic judgment until the expiration of the time during which execution may issue; that is, after the lapse of five years from its recovery and entry. The statute provides (§ 4796, Bal. Code) that actions can only be commenced within the period herein prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued; and it is asserted that at common law an execution could issue upon a judgment at any time within a year and a day after its entry, and that the year and a day at common law correspond to our five years in which execution may issue. If this interpretation of the statute is correct, then the judgment in this case is not barred by the statute of limitations, for only seven years elapsed from the rendition of the judgment to the commencement of the action. But we think the contention that the judgment debtor cannot avail himself of the statute of limitations until after the time expires in which execution could issue cannot be maintained. It is true, there are a few cases which sustain this contention, viz., Lee v. Giles, 21 Am. Dec. 476, where a few of the old English cases are referred to, and Pitzer v. Russel, 4 Opinion of the Court-DUNBAR, J. [26 Wash. Ore. 130; also Parks v. Young, 75 Tex. 278 (12 S. W. 986), although the supreme court of Texas seemed afterwards, in Stevens v. Stone, 94 Tex. 415 (60 S. W. 959), to overrule the proposition announced in Parks v. Young, supra. The case of Solen v. Virginia, etc., R. R. Co., 15 Nev. 313, which announced the doctrine contended for by the appellant, has been overruled in the later case of Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 24 Nev. 154 (50 Pac. 849), and in the South Carolina case of Lee v. Giles, supra, it is stated in a note to the decision that the doctrine announced in that state could not be sustained by the authorities elsewhere, citing Freeman, Judgments, § 542. So that, outside of the states of Oregon, Nevada, Texas, and South Carolina, all of which, excepting Oregon, as we have seen, have to a certain extent receded from the proposition originally announced on this subject, the decisions are substantially uniform that at common law a party has a right of action upon his judgment as soon as it is recovered. It is true that in this state it has been decided that a party has a right to bring a common law action upon a judgment simply because the common law prevails in this state in the absence of statutory enactment; but there has been statutory enactment on the subject of limitations, and, whether the action is brought under the statute or under the common law right, the statute in relation to limitations equally prevails. It is urged by appellant, and is stated in some of the cases cited, that there is no necessity for an action upon the judgment as long as the right of execution exists; that the only effect would be to impose additional costs. and burdens upon the judgment debtor, and create a multiplicity of suits. But this objection is more fanciful than real, and the judgment debtor will be protected by Dec. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-DUNBAR, J. the ordinary prudence of the judgment creditor, who will not be likely to incur unnecessary expenses for the mere purpose of obtaining judgments against an insolvent debtor. But, however that may be, if the law gives to the judgment creditor the right to bring an action upon his judgment, that right cannot be taken away, in the absence of any express restriction upon the right by any concurrent remedy that may be given him. In Hansford v. Van Auken, 79 Ind. 157, the right of the judgment creditor to sue was sustained; the court saying: "He may enforce its collection by the process of the court in which he obtained his judgment, or he may, if he elect so to do, use his judgment as an original cause of action, and bring suit thereon in the same or some other court of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute such suit to final judgment. This procedure he may pursue as often as he elects, using the judgment last obtained as a cause of action on which to obtain the next succeeding judgment."-citing Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind. 529. See, also, Smith v. Mumford, 9 Cow. 26; Hale v. Angel, 20 Johns. 342; Mandlebaum v. Gregovich, 24 Nev. 154 (50 Pac. 849),—a case above referred to, where the court announced the rule that under the common law the right of action on an unsatisfied judgment was a matter of course, and that it was not necessary for the complaint to aver or the record to show that any other cause than nonpayment existed therefor. In 11 Enc. Pl. & Pr., commencing at page 1089, it is stated that: "At common law and by the overwhelming weight of authority in this country the right to maintain an action upon a domestic judgment is not at all dependent upon the right to issue an execution thereon. Thus an action. may be maintained upon a dormant judgment, and it may equally well be maintained upon a judgment which is not dormant, and upon which execution might issue." Opinion of the Court-DUNBAR, J. [26 Wash. In support of this text cases are cited from Alabama, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and the United States courts. In Greathouse v. Smith, 4 Ill. 541, the court, in delivering its opinion, said: "No rule of law is better settled than the one that an action of debt is maintainable on a judgment in a court of record. The judgment is a good cause of action, it being, as between the parties, the conclusive evidence of indebtedness. We know of no principle which inhibits the creditor, on a judgment which is in force and unsatisfied, from recovering in an action brought on it, although he may, at the time of bringing the suit, be entitled to an execution on his judgment. He is at liberty to proceed by execution to collect the judgment, or institute a new action on it. Notwithstanding the second suit may be unnecessary, he has the clear legal right to recover, and the courts have no power to prevent him, or impose terms on him for so doing." In Young v. Cooper, 59 Ill. 121, it was said that the propriety of the above position has never been questioned. In some of the states it is provided by statute that an action shall not be maintained upon a judgment within a limited time, but in the absence of a statute the right exists at any time after the rendition of the judgment. The subject is summed up by Mr. Freeman in his work on Judgments (volume 2 [4th ed.] c. 17, § 432), where it is said: "In Connecticut, at a very early date, an action on a judgment was not sustained, because it was deemed unnecessary and vexatious, unless plaintiff succeeded in showing that otherwise he could not have the full effect of his judgment. This position has since been abandoned in the same state, and in its place the true rule has been adopted, that 'no other reason' for bringing the action |