Opinion of the Court-ANDERS, J. [26 Wash. The respondents move this court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the superior court for the reasons: (1) That appellant's brief has not been served or filed as required by law; (2) that the record has not been transmitted to this court within the time limited by law; (3) that the appeal has not been diligently prosecuted; and (4) that appellant's brief fails to clearly point out any error that appellant relies on for reversal. It is true that appellant's brief was not served or filed within the time prescribed by law, and it is also true that the record on appeal was not transmitted to this court by the clerk of the court below within the time designated by statute: But it does not necessarily follow from these facts that the appeal must be dismissed. At the time this motion was made the brief of appellant had been served and filed, and the record had been transmitted to this court, and it does not appear that the respondents were in any way prejudiced by the delay of which they here complain. Under such circumstances this court has always declined to dismiss an appeal on account of mere delay in serving or filing briefs or in the transmission of the record. The last alleged ground for dismissal-that appellant's brief fails to point out any error relied on for reversal-is also untenable. The motion to dismiss is denied. There is no controversy in regard to the facts of this case. It is admitted that on or about April 1, 1893, the city of New Whatcom issued, sold, and delivered its "Water Works Bonds," each for the principal sum of $1,000, aggregating $183,000, payable twenty years after date, and bearing interest at the rate of 52 per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, each of said bonds being accompanied by semi-annual interest coupons maturing severally on April 1st and October 1st in each year of the debt period; that all the bonds are still outstanding and Nov. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-ANDERS, J. unpaid, and that a portion of the interest accrued thereon since April 1, 1897, down to and including the interest falling due on October 1, 1898, is still unpaid; that appellant is the owner of twenty-seven of said bonds, as well as of the coupons for the matured and unpaid interest thereon, covering the entire eighteen months ending October 1, 1898; that presentation and demand of payment of all said coupons was made at the place of payment, and at or since the dates of their maturity, and all of them are unpaid and uncanceled; and that no funds have been or are provided or are on hand at the place where the bonds or coupons are payable, nor at the city treasurer's office, for the payment of appellant's said past-due coupons, or of those attached to the other bonds of said issue, except that there is now in the city treasurer's hands a sum less than $200 standing to the credit of the Water Bond Interest fund of said city. It is also admitted, as we have seen, that the city council had in fact each and every year since the issuance of the bonds levied and caused to be extended upon the tax rolls a tax upon the assessed valuation of all of the property within the city, sufficient, if fully paid, to meet the interest upon the bonds as the same accrued. The bonds in question were issued under and by virtue of the provisions of an act of the legislature approved March 26, 1890, entitled "An act authorizing cities and towns to construct internal improvements and to issue bonds to pay therefor, and declaring an emergency," and their validity is not questioned in this proceeding. Section 4 of this act provides that "there shall be levied each year a tax upon the taxable property of such city or town, as the case may be, sufficient to pay the interest on said bonds as the same accrues, and before seven years prior to the maturity thereof, an annual sink Opinion of the Court-ANDERS, J. [26 Wash. ing fund tax sufficient for the payment of said bonds at maturity, which taxes shall become due and collectible as other taxes." Laws 1889-90, p. 521. It is claimed on behalf of respondents that, inasmuch as the city council have each year made a tax levy upon the assessed value of all taxable property in the city, sufficient by computation to pay the accruing installments of interest on the bonds under consideration, they have not only performed their full duty under the statute, but have exhausted their power in that regard; and this seems to have been the view entertained by the learned trial court. Indeed, it is frankly conceded by the learned counsel for appellant that the language of § 4 is susceptible of the construction contended for by the respondents and given it by the court below. But at the same time they earnestly insist that the section may also be held to mean that there shall be levied each year a tax which shall be, in point of fact, sufficient to pay the interest on the bonds as the same accrues, and that the latter interpretation is the more rational one in view of the whole context and of the object of such a section in the act, and also of the well known fact that a large percentage of the annual tax levies of cities and towns in this state goes delinquent each year, and that, after its delinquency, is slowly and irregularly paid into the treasury during successive years. If the respondents in fact made a tax levy during the year 1898 and previous years sufficient to meet the interest on the bonds as the same accrued, it follows that they have performed the duty enjoined upon them by the statute, and, of course, can not be compelled by mandamus or otherwise to do more. In the absence of legislative authority, the city could levy no tax whatever. The power of taxation is an attribute of sovereignty, and belongs to the state alone; but the legislature may delegate the power to municipal Nov. 1901.] Opinion of the Court-Anders, J. corporations to be exercised for the maintenance of their local governments. As we have seen, the legislature authorized the city council to issue the bonds in question, and in the same act it prescribed the duties of the council in relation thereto, among which was the duty to levy each year a tax sufficient to meet the interest on the bonds as it accrued. This is a special tax for a special purpose, and it appears to us that the city council were not required to make more than one levy in any one year for the payment of these interest coupons, and that the court below was right in holding that, after the council had levied a tax in 1898, sufficient on its face to pay the accruing interest, they could not be compelled to levy another tax during that year for the purpose of paying interest then in arrear. It is said by counsel for appellant that the limitations on the taxing power of cities of the third class in this state are expressly declared in the statute providing for the organization and government of such cities to have no application to taxes levied for the payment of bonded indebtedness and interest thereon, and § 128, p. 190, of the Laws of 1889-90 (Bal. Code, § 946), is cited in support of this proposition. That section provides that "nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to prevent any city having a bonded indebtedness, contracted under laws heretofore passed, from levying and collecting such taxes for the payment of such indebtedness and the interest thereon as are provided for in such laws, in addition to taxes herein authorized to be levied and collected." section must be read in connection with § 117 of the same act, which latter section prescribes the purposes for which taxes may be levied; and, when so read, we think it will be apparent that it does not enlarge the power of taxation prescribed by the act under which the bonds in question This Opinion of the Court-ANDERS, J.. [26 Wash. were issued. In the act of which said § 128, cited by counsel, is a part, no provision whatever is made for levying a tax for the purpose of paying for water works or for issuing bonds therefor, and it would therefore appear that said section has no bearing upon the case at bar. It is further contended on behalf of appellant that, even if this court should feel constrained to hold, with the court below, that the obligation imposed by § 4, of the act in question, extends only to the levying in each year of a tax in an amount "theoretically" sufficient to meet the ensuing year's interest on the bonds, yet the appellant's action may reasonably be sustained upon the ground that the provision made by § 4 for the payment of bond interest is not exclusive, and that the act as a whole, by fair implication, imposes upon cities the duty of providing, by taxation or otherwise, for the discharge of obligations which they may have incurred under its authority. And several cases are cited from the federal courts in support of the doctrine that implied duties, as well as duties expressly imposed, will be enforced by mandamus. See City of Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705; Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; United States v. County of Clarke, 96 U. S. 211, affirmed in Knox County Court v. United States, 109 U. S. 229 (3 Sup. Ct. 131); Louisiana ex rel. Nelson v. Police Jury of St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (4 Sup. Ct. 648); East St. Louis v. Amy, 120 U. S. 600 (7 Sup. Ct. 739); Scotland County Court v. United States, 140 U. S. 41 (11 Sup. Ct. 697); Ex parte Parsons, 18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,774; Peterkin v. New Orleans, 19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,026; Sibley v. Mobile, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,829. While it is true that in some of these cases the implied. duty of municipal corporations to pay their debts evidenced by bonds was enforced, and the several municipal |