CHAPTER VI. OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE. 1. What is the opinion of the fatalist? 2. If this be correct, what question naturally suggests itself? 3. Is the question to be discussed, in this chapter, absolute or hypothetical? 4. Why need such a question to be discussed here? 5. Show that the doctrine of necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, &c. 6. Admitting the doctrine of necessity to be true, for argument's sake, what does it not, and what does it, account for? 7. What question is answered by this assertion? and what is not answered? 8. How is this illustrated? 9. Why do we ascribe to God a necessary existence ? 10. Is anything said to be necessary, in the same sense? 11. What two things follow from this admission? 12. The question now to be discussed? 13. What supposition is here made? 14. What would be the influence of such an education? 15. How would such a child need to be treated? 16. What conclusion would he draw from such treatment? 17. What would soon convince him of his error? 18. What are some of the absurdities into which his principles would lead the fatalist? 19. The inference from this? 20. If the constitution of the present world, and the condition in which we are placed, are the same as if we were free, can we be otherwise than free? 21. What is the thing here insisted upon? 22. If the opinion of necessity always misleads us here, when applied to life and practice, of what should the fatalist be afraid? 23. The conclusion from these things? 24. If the possession of will, temper, tastes, disposition, etc., in us, be reconcilable with the doctrine of fate, why not also, attribute will, character, &c. to the Supreme Governor ? 25. What other attributes then, (the foundation of religion) may belong to Him? 26. Show that the notion of justice cannot be eradicated from the mind. 27. Does the doctrine of necessity destroy the proof of religion? 28. Show why it does not ? 29. Why does the author propose to consider this subject more particularly? 30. What things already proved, are not affected by this doctrine ? 31. What is implied in the possession of a moral faculty? 32. How is it shown that the dictates of conscience are the laws of God? 33. What is necessarily included in a command? 34. For what purpose was the perception of good and ill desert given us? 35. The inference from this? 36. What obligations result from this? 37. Why can no objection from necessity lie against this general proof of religion? 38. How do we arrive at the conclusion that God will reward the righteous and punish the wicked? 39. How is it shown that He has told us so? 40. How is this reasoning from facts, confirmed? 41. State, in full, the nature of the external evidence which natural religion has, and which the doctrine of necessity, if it were true, would not affect? 42. What three things would be manifest to one, examining the history of religion? 43. What are shown by these facts? 44. Did religion come into the world by revelation, or was it the result of reasoning, etc.? 45. What deserves here to be carefully observed with respect to speculative reason; and of what should this admonish us? 46. What might be said in reply to these arguments? 47. Reply to this reasoning. 48. Where lies the fallacy? 49. Where, upon the supposition of necessity? 50. Show that there must, of necessity, be a fallacy somewhere. 51. If it be incredible that necessary agents should be rewarded and punished, what conclusion would follow with respect to man? 52. But if it be insisted on that men are not free, what conclusion would follow? 53. What then, does the Analogy of Nature teach us on this subject? 54. What else, may we learn from these things? CHAPTER VII. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME, OR CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED. 1. What objections may be brought against religion, to which analogy can be no direct answer? 2. What is all, analogy can do? 3. In what way may it be of service in answering such objections? 4. What general answer may be given to all objections against the justice and goodness of God's moral government? 5. What does analogy show us with respect to the scheme of moral government? 6. Can there be any action or event entirely unconnected with every other action or event? 7. Suppose it have not, so far as we can judge, any immediate connection with other actions; what conclusion may we yet draw? 8. What reason may we assign for such a conclusion? 9. By what agency is everything in nature brought about? 10. What is said of the agency of even the most insignificant ac tions? 11. What should lead us to infer that the moral world and government of God should be incomprehensible? 12. What is said of the connection between the natural and moral constitution and government of the world? 13. What is the particular thing to be observed here ? 14. Illustrate your meaning by examples? 15. Supposing this to be the case, why are we not competent judges of this scheme? 16. Are men willing to acknowledge their ignorance, when they come to argue against religion? 17. How, have some asserted, might the origin and continuance of evil have been prevented? 18. How may these objections be answered? 19. Were these assertions true, what is the most they would prove? 20. How is it shown that they are mere arbitrary assertions? 21. If a man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, should object, that he discerned in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness, how might he be answered? 22. Why should this be considered a satisfactory answer? 23. In what other way, may it be shown how little weight is to be laid upon such objections? 24. The first thing noticed, in illustration of this remark ? 25. What else does experience teach us? 26. What may we infer from these observations? 27. Suppose we cannot see any tendency in these means to produce such effects, is this any presumption against the fact? 28. What then, may be observed of those things which we call irregularities? 29. What absurd and wicked conclusion have some drawn from these observations? 30. What remark is made to obviate any such conclusion? 31. How is this remark illustrated? 32. How is the natural government of the world carried on? 33. What should lead us to conclude that there are wise and good reasons for this? 34. How is this illustrated? 35. Can irregularities possibly be prevented by general laws? 36. What are we apt to think in regard to them? 37. What would be the natural effects of such interpositions? 38. Are the visible and immediate effects all that would result from them? 39. What then, may we conclude from these things? 40. What objection may still be urged? 41. The first reply to it? 42. Illustrate this answer. 43. Why is it frivolous to assert that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it? 44. The second reply to the objection? 45. Whence do moral obligations arise ? 46. Show that they would be certain too, from considerations of interest? 47. The third reply to the objection? 48. The fourth and last reply? 49. What does analogy show us? 50. Show that, by taking into account our ignorance, we are judg ing from experience. CONCLUSION. 1. What may we learn, with respect to this little scene of human life, from the observations of the last chapter? 2. What is remarked of the course of things which comes within our view? 3. What, of the scheme of divine government, in which we are placed? 4. Why are we compelled to assume the existence of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world? 5. What is implied in the very notion of such a Being? 6. What leads us to conclude that this will and character must be moral, just, and good? 7. What led the Author of the world to form and govern it, as He does ? 8. What thoughts should this naturally excite in our minds ? 9. Why should we reflect on these things? 10. What reason have we for concluding that we shall continue to exist hereafter? 11. The only ground any one can have for supposing otherwise? 12. Show that this is contrary to experience. 13. The only supposition which we ought to go upon? 14. What will be our condition hereafter? 15. On what will it probably depend? 16. What reason have we for this opinion? 17. To what conduct has God annexed happiness; and to what, misery? 18. How is this confirmed from the constitution of the world? 19. What is the objection to the assertion that the tendency of virtue is to produce happiness; and how is it answered? 20. How then, is it shown that God exercises a moral government over the world? 21. What inference may we derive from this fact? 22. How would you show that our happiness hereafter will probably depend on our conduct here? 23. And how, also, that there may be difficulty and hazard in securing it? 24. Why were we placed in such a state of trial, here? 25. Mention four considerations that render this intention of nature highly credible. 26. On what are objections founded against the whole notion of moral government? and how have they been answered? 27. What effect should these things produce on the minds of men? 28. What should be their conduct, in view of these facts? 29. By what consideration is this enforced? 30. What has sometimes been alleged as an excuse for a vicious course of life? 31. Show that it is a miserable one. 32. What are the proper motives to religion? 33. By what are the dictates of reason confirmed? PART II. OF REVEALED RELIGION. CHAPTER I. OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY. 1. On what ground do some reject revelation? 2. What, of itself, shows the necessity of revelation? 3. Why is it a wild and random assertion, that revelation is a thing superfluous, and of no use? 4. On what ground do others overlook revelation? 5. What, do they assert, is the only design of it? 6. What is observed of this way of considering revelation? 7. On what supposition alone, can it be a matter of indifference whether to obey or disobey, the commands of Christianity? 8. Why is it impossible for us to be assured of this? |