from the South than from the North Pole; the nearest approach to the South Pole being a distance of 1130 miles, whereas that to the North Pole is only 510 miles.

3. The extent of the Polar ices varies with the season, being greater in winter than in summer.

4. The southern or exterior limit of the North Polar ice breaks up on the approach of spring, and during the course of summer so much ice is broken and carried away, that ships have occasionally reached as high as latitude 81° N. A short way beyond that limit, the ice appears to be solid, and probably extends in this state onwards to the Pole.

5. The great body of fixed ice which surrounds the North Pole, and which extends to latitude 82° or 81° N. in the summer season, is a compound of salt and fresh water ice. The lower part of this vast body of ice is frozen sea water; over this are layers of fresh water ice, formed by the freezing of melted snow, rain, and hail.

6. The formation of this great body of ice does not appear to be dependent on the presence of land, for no land occurs in the Antarctic Ocean, where ice is even more abundant than in the Arctic O

cean.

7. The extent of the polar ice must depend on the temperature of the circumpolar atmosphere and ocean. We know that there is a determinate portion of heat appropriated to the circumpolar regions; in their long summer, the heat must be considerable, and during the melancholy and protracted winter, the cold must be intense; but these two periods of heat and cold ap

I

pear to be so balanced, that the heat of summer is never able to melt all the ice formed during the winter, and much of the ice which is melted in the summer, is frozen again in winter, and the deficit occasioned by the flowing away of part of the water of the melted ice, is made up by the freezing of the sleet, hail, and snow, of the succeeding winter. It is, indeed, highly probable, that, ever since the earth's axis received its present inclination, the polar ices have continued fixed, and within certain limits, in this arrangement, agreeing with the distribution of snow and ice above the snow line in all countries of the earth where the elevation is sufficiently great.Were there no limits set to the increase of this circumpolar ice, it would have long since accumulated to so great an extent, as to have destroyed the climate of the temperate regions of the earth.

8. Periods of maxima and minima of many atmospherical phenomena are mentioned by naturalists, and, corresponding with these also, periods of increase and decrease of the glaciers, and of the limits of the snow line. It is, therefore, not improbable that the polar ices exhibit similar phenomena, and may continue to increase for a long series of years, until they reach a period of maximum, or greatest increase, and after this gradually decrease until they reach a period of minimum, or greatest decrease, when the Greenland seas will be clearer than usual, and even to the 82d or 83d of north latitude; but it is very improbable that any extensive breaking up of the ice takes place much beyond these limits.

of

VOL. I.

the subject of my present lucubration.

When by contemplation of the object, or reflection on its agreeable qualities, our approbation of it is attended with a sensation of pleasure, and an inclination or propensity towards it as good, it is denominated LOVE. This may be extended into the succeeding rammifications:

When we are ourselves the ultimate objects of our love or regard, it is called self-love; which, when accompanied with certain inordinate propensities towards outward objects, takes the following dis

tinctions:

Self-love, when it is influenced by an anxious desire of equalling or excelling others, is called emulation.

Self-love, when engaged in the immoderate desire of any object possessed by another, is covetousness, or when wealth is its peculiar object, is avarice; and, according to the value that appears to be put upon outward possessions, our distribution of, or affection towards them, assumes the distinct names of penury, frugality, or profusion.

Self-love, exercised in the pursuit of power and authority, is called ambition; and insatiable ambition, when armed with absolute power, without goodness, is tyranny.

Self-love, tending to the sole gratification of the senses and appetites, acquires the name of voluptuousness or sensuality; which takes the different characters of gluttony, luxury, dissoluteness, &c.

Self-love, courting ease or rest, may be denominated indolence; which, when immoderately indulged, so as to induce a certain debility or vacuity of thought, is called sluggishness or sloth.

Love assumes the general name of benevolence when others are the ultimate objects of it, without re

gard to their moral qualities, but only as partaking the same common nature with us, and the capacity of receiving good from us.

If love arises from a natural or habitual disposition of pleasing, or communicating good to others, it is called universal good-will or goodnature: when displayed to inferiors or dependants, it becomes humanity; and when it is exercised without regard to their immediate wants, and looks not for any return, it is beneficence or liberality. Benevolence to our benefactors is gratitude, and the expressions of it form praise and thankfulness.

Benevolence to those who need our assistance, and to such as are disposed to do us injury, is mercy, or forgiveness, or clemency; and if it controls our power to return injuries, it becomes lenity, or forbearance, or meekness.

Benevolence to the afflicted is pity or compassion; and when joined to a fellow-feeling of their distress, arising either from similar experience or from natural humanity, it becomes sympathy; and the desire to relieve them, without any expectation of a return, is charity.

A natural or habitual complacency of disposition, engaging to a love of general society, is sociableness, or what may be called a disposition to good fellowship; while mutual complacency, intimate regard and equality, with a conformity of dispositions, principles, and pursuits, constitute that happy union of minds which forms true friendship.

Complacency, in a small degree, is expressed by satisfaction; in a higher degree, by delight; and when regard is had not so much to the qualities of the object, as its relation to ourselves, it is called kindness or tenderness.

When the objects of our love and complacence are such as stand in any natural relation to us, it be

comes natural affection; and when our native country and its interests are the objects of it, it then assumes the title of patriotism.

An attachment to particular sects, factions, or opinions, to the prejudice of true piety or patriotism, is narrowness of spirit or bigotry; but when this attachment is regulated by reason and benevolence, it becomes moderation.

When the SUPREME BEING is the object, an habitual desire of pleasing him, with a disengagement from whatever may lessen our regard and affection towards him, is known by the name of devotion n; which, blended with a filial and reverential fear of offending him, is godliness or piety.

An uncommon vehemence of temper in our attachment to the propagation of particular opinions is zeal; and zeal, accompanied with uncommon energy of spirit, and elevation of fancy and affection, is enthusiasm.

From love we proceed to its opposite.

A disinclination of the mind towards an object, occasioned by frequent reflection on its odious qualities is HATRED.

Evil received or dreaded excites malevolence; and a disposition to displease others, is ill-will or illnature; while such a feeling long continued and unmerited, is malignity or malice.

Any degree of ill-will to our benefactors, a neglect of them, or undue returns to their kindness, is ingratitude. A malevolent opposi tion to governours or superiours in the lawful exercise of their authority, is rebellion; while an open disobedience to the will of God, and a contempt of his commands, is impiety.

Malevolence to the wretched is inhumanity; an unwillingness to favour or relieve them is uncharitableness, and an absolute inatten

tion to their distress is hard-heartedness: to these add insolence, and they become barbarity and cruelty.

A wanton ill-treatment of others without benefit to ourselves, is petulance; which, when the characters, rather than the persons, of others are attacked, is called obloquy, reproach, and scurrility; and these, when softened or enlivened by some mixture of wit and humour, is raillery and invective.

Evil or injury received, but without any further apprehension, occasions displeasure, and a still smaller sensation of this kind is dislike.

When hatred is directed to any thing criminal, without manifesting any wish to extenuate, it becomes harshness or severity; and when it is levelled at what are called pleasures or amusements, without making allowances for their vivacity or occasional excesses, it must be named moroseness.

When displeasure is suddenly and actively exerted, from any occasional perturbation of the mind, it hurries through the different emotions of animosity and anger, and may terminate in outrage.

An injury from an inferiour may be termed an indignity, and the sense of it indignation.

The sense of any injury is resentment; which, with a propensity to injure the offender, without a desire of reclaiming him, is revenge: this, when settled into a habit, and without displaying a wish for reconciliation, is spite and rancour.

An habitual proneness to anger on every trifling occasion, is fretfulness or pevishness: this, when silent, is sullenness; when talkative, is snarling; and when accompanied with an impatience of contradiction, is perverseness.

Anger, rising to a very high de. gree and extinguishing humanity, becomes wrath, rage, and fury.

When our approbation and love of any object are accompanied with uneasiness in its absence, and pleasure from its approach or the promise of its attainment, our affection towards it is called DESIRE.

Desire, inflamed and continued, is called longing; when much excited, is greediness or avidity; and when unaccompanied with the deliberation of reason, is called propensity.

Desires after what merely administers to the support of the body, are denominated appetites; and in a proper restraint or moderation of them, consists in the cardinal virtue of temperance.

When regard is not had to the nature and qualities of the object, so much as to its relation or agreeableness to us, we are said to regard it partiality.

A weak motion or tendency of the mind towards the object desired, is called inclination; which, when violent, and such as cannot be rationally accounted for, is denominated impulse..

When our disapprobation and hatred of any object are accompanied with a painful sensation, on the apprehension of its presence and approach, the inclination to avoid it, is called AVERSION.

Aversion in its weakest degree, or rather the absence of desire, is considered as indifference.

Aversion to any object previous to examination, or without rational grounds for it, is prejudice; and when it arises from previous experience of its disagreeable qualities, it is disgust.

Aversion to any object when we are constrained to choose or comply with it, is reluctance; and a constitutional aversion, without regard to qualities or the impression on others, is a natural antipathy.

When displeasure and aversion rise very high, especially upon an apprehension of moral evil in the

object, it is called detestation or abhorrence; and when accompanied with alarm at an approach to it, is horrour.

A mixture of desire and joy agitating the mind, according to the probability there is of accomplishing the end, or obtaining the good desired, is defined to be HOPE.

Weak or distant hope, waiting the success of means, is called expectation: the steady maintenance of hope even in this state, when sufferings are in the way to it, is patience; and a devout acquiescence to sorrow, its resignation.

Hope, deliberating about the choice of means, is hesitation; and wavering or fluctuating about the use of means, is suspense.

Desire, especially when mingled with hope, disposes us to wish; but while we have more of desire than hope, and the assent of the mind is delayed and unsettled, we are said to doubt.

When doubting and suspense become habitual, especially in matters of faith, the consequent uncertainty or vibration of opinion is denominated scepticism.

When suspense is overcome, and the means fixed, we acquire resolution; which persisted in when the grounds of it are insufficient, is obstinacy or stubbornness; and stubbornness in matters of opinion is called dogmatism.

Contempt of danger, in the execution of a predetermined resolve, is intrepidity, boldness, or courage; and an impatient encountering of danger is rashness.

That strength or vigour of mind which appears in a display of courage, firmness, and resolution, when much opposition is to be resisted, distresses supported, and difficulties and dangers surmounted, for the attainment of great and valuable ends, constitutes the cardinal virtue of fortitude.

Hope, elated from security of

success in obtaining its object, is called confidence; but groundless confidence is presumption.

Confidence without modesty, or a justifiable security of obtaining the proposed object, is impudence.

A mixture of aversion and sorrow, discomposing and debilitating the mind, upon the approach or anticipation of evil, is FEAR.

An over-active fear of any event, mixed with minute alarms, &c. is solicitude or anxiety; which, when immoderately indulged, is impatience.

Fear of being circumvented in the attainment of any good, excites suspicion; which, when heightened to a certain degree, becomes jealousy.

On the approach of an object accompanied with an irresistible and increasing alarm and dread, the mind is disposed to yield to despondency; and when all hopes of averting it are extinguished, despair.

Fear, blended with humility and fluctuating in the choice of means, becomes irresolution; and when flying from danger, instead of encountering it, the feeling is cowardice: a sudden and unaccountable

fit of it is panick ; and when excessive, is terrour.

A pleasing elevation of mind, on the actual or assured attainment of good, or deliverance from evil, is denominated JOY.

Joy, on account of good obtained by others, is expressed by congratulation; and when it arises from ludicrous or fugitive amusements, in which others share with us, is called mirth or merriment.

Joy, arising from success against powerful opposition, is named triumph; and when accompanied with ostentation, becomes vainglory.

When joy is settled into a habit, or flows from a placid temper of mind, formed to please and to be pleased, it is called gaiety, goodhumour, or cheerfulness.

Joy, rising high on a sudden emotion, is exultation, and immoderate transports of it are considered under the character of raptures and ecstacies.

Habitual joy and serenity, arising from the perfection, rectitude, and due subordination of our faculties, and their lively exercise on objects agreeable to them, constitute mental or rational happi

ness.

CZERNY-GEORGES.

GEORGE PETROWICH, better known by the name of Czerny-Georges, that is to say Black George, was born of a noble Servian family, in the neighbourhood of Belgrade. Before he had attained the age of manhood, he was one day met by a Turk, who, with an imperious air, ordered him to stand out of his way, at the same time declaring that he would blow out his brains. Czerny-Georges, however, prevented him from putting his threat into execution, and by the

discharge of a pistol immediately

laid him dead on the ground. To

avoid the dangerous consequences of this affair, he took refuge in Transylvania, and entered the military service of Austria, in which he quickly obtained the rank of non-commissioned officer. His captain having ordered him to be punished, Czerny-Georges challenged and killed him. He then returned to Servia, where, at the age of twenty-five, he became the chief of one of those bands of malcontents which infest every part of the