It is debated among authors, whether any words unless these, "This is the Chalice of my blood," though the remainder is laid down in the Missal, are essentially necessary for the consecration of the blood. In our Moral Theology (28) the reader will find the point discussed. Several hold the affirmative opinion, and quote St. Thomas in their favour, who says (29): "Et ideo illa quæ sequuntur sunt essentialia sanguini, prout in hoc Sacramento consecratur, et ideo oportet, quod sint de substantia Formæ:" the opposite opinion, however, is more generally followed, and those who hold it deny that it is opposed to the doctrine of St. Thomas, for he says that the subsequent words appertain to the substance but not to the essence of the form, and hence they conclude that these words do not belong to the essence, but only to the integrity of the form, so that the priest who would omit them would commit a grievous sin undoubtedly, but still would validly consecrate.

52. We should remark here that the Council of Trent (Sess. xxii.) condemned in nine Canons nine errors of the Reformers concerning the Sacrifice of the Mass, as follows: First.-that the Mass is not a true Sacrifice, and that it is only offered up to administer the Eucharist to the Faithful. Second.-That by these words, "Do this in commemoration of me," Christ did not institute the Apostles priests, or ordain that the priests should offer up his body and blood. Third. That the Mass is only a thanksgiving or remembrance of the Sacrifice of the Cross, but not a propitiatory Sacrifice, or that it is useful only to those who communicate at it. Fourth. That this Sacrifice is derogatory to the Sacrifice of the Cross. Fifth. That it is an imposture to celebrate Mass in honour of the Saints, and to obtain their intercession. Sixth.-That there are errors in the Canon. Seventh.-That the ceremonies, vestments, and signs used in the Catholic Church are incentives to impiety. Eighth.-That private Masses, in which the priest alone communicates, are unlawful. Ninth.-That the practice of saying part of the Canon in a low voice should be condemned; that it all ought to be said in the vulgar tongue, and that the mixture of water with the wine in the Chalice should also be condemned. All these errors I have refuted in my work against the Reformers.

(28) Liguor. Theol. Moral. t. 2, dub. 6, de Euch., &c. q. 2, ar. 2, q. 2.

(29) St. Thom. in 4 Dist. 8,

REFUTATION XI.

ERRORS OF LUTHER AND CALVIN.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS.

1. Free Will exists. 2. The Divine Law is not impossible. 3. Works are necessary 4. Faith alone does not justify us. 5. Of the Uncertainty of Justification, Perseverance, and eternal Salvation. 6. God is not the Author of Sin. 7. God predestines no one to Hell. 8. Infallibility of General Conncils.

SEC. I.-OF FREE WILL.

1. I HAVE already stated in this work (1), that the errors of Luther, Calvin, and their disciples, who have added error to error, are almost innumerable; and in particular, as Prateolus remarks, in the Calvinistic heresy alone two hundred and seven errors against Faith are enumerated, and another author brings them up even to fourteen hundred. I, however, refute only the principal errors of Luther, Calvin, and the other Reformers, for the refutation of their other erroneous opinions will be found in Bellarmin, Gotti, and several other authors. One of Calvin's chief heresies was, that Adam alone had free will, but that by his sin not alone he, but all his posterity, lost it, so that free will is only titulus sine

re.

This error was specially condemned by the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. c. 5): "Si quis hominis arbitrium post Adæ peccatum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, aut rem esse de solo titulo, imo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana invectum in Ecclesiam, anathema sit."

2. Free will consists of two sorts of liberty, Contradictionis, by which we can either do anything or let it alone, and Contrarietatis, by which we have the power of doing anything, and also doing the opposite, as of doing what is good and doing what is bad. Man has retained both species of free will, as the Scriptures prove. First. As to the liberty of Contradiction, to do or not to do what is right, we have several texts to prove it. For example, in Ecclesiasticus (xv. 14, 16): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hands of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts. If thou wilt keep the commandments.... for ever,..... they shall preserve thee;" It shall depend on the will of her husband whether she shall do it or do it not" (Numb. xxx. 14; "He could have transgressed, and hath not transgressed, and could do evil things and hath not done them" (Eccles. xxxi. 10); "Whilst it remained did it not remain to thee, and after it was sold was it not in thy power?" (Acts, v. 4); "The lust thereof shall be unto thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it" (Gen.

(1) Cap. xi. Cent. xvi. ar. 3.

iv. 7). Many texts, likewise, prove the liberty of Contrariety: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing" (Deut. xxx. 19); "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given unto him" (Eccl. xv. 18). And lest our adversaries should say that those texts apply to man only in a state of innocence, we will quote others, which speak of him without doubt after the fall: "But if it seem evil to you to serve the Lord, you have your choice; choose this day whom you would rather serve, whether the Gods," &c., (Jos. xxiv. 15); "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me" (Luke, ix. 23); "For he hath determined, being steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but having power of his own will" (1 Cor. vii. 37); " And I gave her a time, that she might do penance, and she will not repent" (Apoc. ii. 21); “If any man shall hear my voice, and open to me the door, I will come in to him" (Apoc. iii. 20). There are many other texts of a like nature, but these are sufficient to prove that man has preserved his free will after the fall. Luther objects that text of Isaias (xli. 23): "Do also good or evil, if you can," but he ought to remember that in the text the Prophet is speaking not of man, but of idols, which, as David said, could do nothing: "They have mouths and speak not, they have eyes and see not" (Psalms, cxiii. 5).

3. That being the case, it is not enough, as Luther, Calvin, and the Jansenists say, to have the liberty coactionis, that is, freedom from restraint, that our actions may be meritorious or otherwise. This is exactly the third proposition of Jansenius, condemned as heretical: "Ad merendum, et demerendum in statu naturæ lapsæ non requiritur in homine libertas a necessitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione." In this manner we might say that even the beasts have free will, since, without any violence, they are carried on spontaneously (after their way) to seek the pleasures of sense. It is necessary, however, for the true liberty of man, that he should have the liberty necessitatis, so that he may choose whatever he pleases, as St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. 37) says, "having no necessity, but having the power of his own will," and it is this will that is required both for merit and demerit. St. Augustin, speaking of sin (2), says: "Peccatum usque adeo voluntarium (that is free, as he afterwards explains it) malum est, ut nullo modo sit peccatum si non sit voluntarium." And the reason is, says the saint, that God judged that his servants would be better if they served him freely; "Servos suos meliores esse Deus judicavit, si ei servirent liberaliter, quod nullo modo fieri posset, si non voluntate, sed necessitate servirent." 4. They say that it is God who operates in us all the good which we perform, as the Scriptures teach (1 Cor. xii. 6): The same God who worketh all in all;" "Thou hast wrought all our works

(2) St. Aug. 1. de Ver. Rel. c. 14.

66

for us" (Isaias, xxvi. 12); “And I will cause you to walk in my commandments" (Ezechiel, xxxvi. 27). We answer, that there is no doubt but that free will after the fall was not, indeed, extinguished, but still was weakened, and inclined to evil, as the Council of Trent teaches: "Tametsi in eis liberum arbitrium minime extinctum esset, viribus licet attenuatum, et inclinatum" (Sess. vi. cap. 1). There is no doubt that God operates everything good in us; but, at the same time, he does along with us, as St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 10) says: "By the grace of God I am what I am.... but the grace of God with me.' Mark this" the grace of God with me.' God excites us to do what is good by his preventing grace, and helps us to bring it to perfection by his assisting grace; but he wishes that we should unite our endeavours to his grace, and, therefore, exhorts us to co-operate as much as we can: "Be converted to me" (Zach. i. 3); "Make unto yourselves a new heart" (Ezech. xviii. 31); "Mortify, therefore, your members.... stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds, and putting on the new" (Col. iii. 5, &c.) He also reproves those who refuse to obey his call: "I called, and you refused" (Prov. i. 24); "How often would I have gathered together thy children.... and thou wouldst not (Matt. xxiii. 37); "You always resist the Holy Ghost" (Acts, vii. 51). All these Divine calls and reprovals would be vain and unjust if God did everything regarding our eternal salvation, without any co-operation on our part; but such is not the case. does all, and whatever good we do, the greater part belongs to him; but still it is his will that we labour a little ourselves, as far as we can, and hence, St. Paul says: "I have laboured more abundantly than all they, yet not I, but the grace of God with me" (1 Cor. xv. 10). By this Divine grace, therefore, we are not to understand that habitual grace which sanctifies the soul, but the actual preventing and helping grace which enables us to perform what is right, and when this grace is efficacious, it not only gives us strength to do so, in the same manner as sufficient grace does, but more-it makes us actually do what is right. From this first error, then, that free will is extinguished in man by sin, the Innovators deduce other erroneous doctrines-that it is impossible for us to observe the laws of the Decalogue; that works are not necessary for salvation, but only faith alone; that our co-operation is not required for the justification of the sinner, for that is done by the merits of Christ alone, although man should still continue in sin. We shall treat of those errors immediately.

SECT. II.-THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBSERVE THE DIVINE LAW.

God

5. Man having lost his free will, the sectarians say that it is impossible for him to observe the precepts of the Decalogue, and especially the first and tenth commandments. Speaking of the tenth

commandment, "Thou shalt not covet," &c., non concupisces, they say it is quite impossible to observe it, and they found the impossibility on a fallacy. Concupiscence, they say, is itself a sin, and hence, they assert that not alone motions of concupiscence, in actu secundo, which precede consent, are sinful, but also movements in actu primo, which precede reason, or advertence itself. Catholics, however, teach, that movements of concupiscence, in actu primo, which precede advertence, are neither mortal nor venial sins, but only natural defects proceeding from our corrupt nature, and for which God will not blame us. The movements which precede consent are at most only venial sins, when we are careless about banishing them from our minds after we perceive them, as Gerson and the Salmanticenses, following St. Thomas, teach, for in that case the danger of consenting to the evil desired, by not positively resisting and banishing that motion of concupiscence, is only remote, and not proximate. Doctors, however, usually except movements of carnal delectation, for then it is not enough to remain passive, negative se habere, as theologians say, but we should make a positive resistance, for, otherwise, if they are any way violent, there is great danger of consenting to them. Speaking of other matters, however, the consenting alone (as we have said) to the desire of a grievous evil is a mortal sin. Now, taking the commandment in this sense, no one can deny that with the assistance of Divine grace, which never fails us, it is impossible to observe it. If one advertently consents to a wicked desire, or takes morose delectation in thinking on it, he is then guilty of a grievous, or, at all events, of a light fault, for our Lord himself says: Follow not in thy strength the desires of thy heart" (Eccl. v. 2); "Go not after thy lusts" (Eccl. xviii. 30); "Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body, so as to obey the lusts thereof" (Rom. vi. 12). I have used the expression a light fault, because the delectation of a bad object is one thing; the thought of a bad object another: this delectation of thought is not mortally sinful in itself, but only venially so; and even if there be a just cause, it is no sin at all. This, however, must be understood to be the case only when we abominate the evil object, and besides, that the consideration of it should be of some utility to us, and that the consideration of it should not lead us to take pleasure in the evil object, because if there was a proximate danger of this, the delectation would, in that case, be grievously sinful. When then, on the other hand, concupiscence assaults us against our will, then there is no sin, for God only obliges us to do what is in our power. Man is composed of the flesh and the spirit, which are always naturally at war with each other; and hence, it is not in our power not to feel many times movements opposed to reason. Would not that master be a tyrant who would command his servant not to feel thirst or cold? In the law of Moses punishment was imposed only on actual external crimes, and hence the

6.