quorum constitutionem contra inimicos gratiæ Dei totus mundus amplexus est, veraci professione, quemadmodum ipsorum habet sermo, dicamus gratiam Dei per Jesum Christum Dominum, non solum ad cognoscendam, verum ad faciendam justitiam, nos per actus singulos adjuvari; ita sine illa nihil veræ sanctæque pietatis habere, cogitare, dicere, agere valeamus."

10. The Second Synod of Orange (cap. vii.) teaches, that it is heretical to say that, by the power of nature, we can do anything for eternal life: "Si quis per naturæ vigorem bonum aliquod, quod ad salutem pertinet vitæ æternæ, cogitare, aut eligere posse confirmet, absque illuminatione, et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti hæretico falliter spiritu." And again it defines: "Si quis sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium Fidei, ipsumque credulitatis affectum, quo in eum credimus, qui judicat impium, et ad generationem sacri Baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiæ donum, idest per inspirationem Spiritus Sancti corrigentem voluntatem nostram ab infidelitate ad Fidem, ab impietate ad pietatem, sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, Apostolicis documentis adversarius approbatur."

11. Besides the Councils, we have the authority of the Popes, who approved of several particular Synods celebrated to oppose the Pelagian errors. Innocent I., in his Epistle to the Council of Milevis, approving the Faith they professed, in opposition to Pelagius and Celestius, says that the whole Scriptures prove the necessity of grace: "Cum in omnibus Divinis paginis voluntati liberæ, non nisi adjutorium Dei legimus esse nectendum, eamque nihil posse Cœlestibus præsidiis destitutam, quonam modo huic soli possibilitatem hanc, pertinaciter defendentes, sibimet, imo plurimis Pelagius Celestiusque persuadent." Besides, Pope Zosimus, in his Encyclical Letter to all the bishops of the world, quoted by Celestine I., in his Epistle to the bishops of Paul, says much the same: "In omnibus causis, cogitationibus, motibus adjutor et protector orandus est. Superbum est enim ut quisquam sibi humana natura præsumat." In the end of the Epistle we have quoted of Celestine I., there are several chapters, taken from the definitions of other Popes, and from the Councils of Africa, concerning grace, all proving the same thing. The fifth chapter says: "Quod omnia studia, et omnia opera; ac merita sanctorum ad Dei gloriam, laudemque referenda sunt; quia non aliunde ei placet, nisi ex eo quod ipse donaverit." And in the sixth chapter it says: "Quod ita Deus in cordibus hominum, atque in ipso libero operatur, arbitrio ut sancta cogitatio, pium consilium, omnisque motus bona voluntatio ex Deo sit, quia per illum aliquid boni possumus, sine quo nihil possumus."

12. The Pelagians were formally condemned in the General Council of Ephesus, as Cardinal Orsi tells us (10). Nestorius received the Pelagian bishops, who came to Constantinople, most

(10) C. Orsi; Ir. Ecc. t. 13, l. 29, n. 52, cum. St. Prosp. l. con. Collat. c. 21.

graciously, for he agreed with Pelagius in this, that grace is given to us by God, not gratuitously, but according to our merits. This erroneous doctrine was agreeable to Nestorius, as it favoured his system, that the Word had chosen the Person of Christ as the temple of his habitation, on account of his virtues, and therefore the Fathers of the Council of Ephesus, knowing the obstinacy of those Pelagian bishops, condemned them as heretics. Finally, the Council of Trent (Sess. vi. de Justif.) defines the same doctrine in two Canons. The second Canon says: "Si quis dixerit Divinam gratiam ad hoc solum dari, ut facilius homo juste vivere, ac ad vitam æternam promoveri possit, quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrumque, sed ægre tamen et difficulter possit; anathema sit." And in the third Canon the Council says: "Si quis dixerit, sine præveniente Spiritus Sanctus inspiratione, atque ejus adjutoriis hominem credere, sperare, diligere, aut pœnitere posse sicut oportet, ut ei justificationis gratia conferatur; anathema sit."

SEC. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

13. THE Pelagians object, firstly, if you admit that grace is absolutely necessary to perform any act conducive to salvation, you must confess that man has no liberty, and free will is destroyed altogether. We answer, with St. Augustin, that man, after the fall, is undoubtedly no longer free without grace, either to begin or bring to perfection any act conducive to eternal life, but by the grace of God he recovers this liberty, for the strength which he is in need of to do what is good is subministered to him by grace, through the merits of Jesus Christ; this grace restores his liberty to him, and gives him strength to work out his eternal salvation, without, however, compelling him to do so: "Peccato Adæ arbitrium liberum de hominum natura perisse, non dicimus, sed ad peccandum valere in homine subdito diabolo. Ad bene autem, pieque vivendum non valere, nisi ipsa voluntas hominis Dei gratia fuerit liberata, et ad omne bonum actionis, sermonis cogitationis adjuta." Such are St. Augustin's sentiments (1).

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14. They object, secondly, that God said to Cyrus: "Who say to Cyrus, thou art my shepherd, and thou shalt perform all my pleasure" (Isaias, xliv. 28); and, in chap. xlvi. v. 11, he calls him, a man of his will." Now, say the Pelagians, Cyrus was an idolater, and, therefore, deprived of the grace which is given by Jesus Christ, and still, according to the text of the Prophet, he observed all the natural precepts; therefore without grace a man may observe all the precepts of the law of nature. We answer, that in order to understand this, we should distinguish, with theologians, between the will of Beneplacitum and the will called of Signum. The Bene

(1) St. Augus. l. 2, con. 2, Epis. Pelag. c. 5.

placitum is that established by God by an absolute decree, and which God wills should be infallibly followed by us. This is always fulfilled by the wicked. But the other will (voluntas signi) is that which regards the Divine commandments signified to us; but for the fulfilment of this Divine will our co-operation is required, and this we cannot apply of ourselves, but require the assistance of the Divine grace to do so; this will the wicked do not always fulfil. Now the Lord in Isaias does not speak of this will (Signum), in respect of Cyrus, but of the other will (Beneplacitum), that is, that Cyrus should free the Jews from captivity, and permit them to rebuild the city and temple; that was all that was required then from him, but, on the other hand, he was an idolater, and a sanguinary invader of the neighbouring kingdoms, and, therefore, he did not fulfil the precepts of the natural law.

15. They object, thirdly, that fact related by St. Mark, of the man who was exhorted by our Redeemer to observe the commandments, and he answered: "Master, all these things I have observed from my youth," and the Evangelist proves that he spoke the truth, for "Jesus, looking on him, loved him" (Mark, x. 20, 21). See here, say the Pelagians, is a man who, without grace, and who had not even as yet believed in Christ, observed all the natural precepts. We answer, first, this man was a Jew, and, as such, believed in God, and also implicitly in Christ, and there was, therefore, nothing to prevent him from having grace to observe the commandments of the Decalogue. Secondly-We answer, that when he said, "All these things I have observed from my youth," we are not to understand that he observed all the Commandments, but only those which Christ mentioned to him: "Do not commit adultery, do not kill, do not steal," &c. Even the Gospel itself proves that he was not ardent in the observance of the precept to love God above all things, for when Christ told him to leave his wealth and follow him, he refused to obey, and, therefore, our Lord tacitly reproved him, when he said: "How hardly shall they who have riches enter into the kingdom of God" (ver. 23).

16. They object, fourthly, that St. Paul, while still under the law, and not having yet received grace, observed all the law, as he himself attests: "According to the justice that is in the law, conversing without blame" (Phil. iii. 6). We answer, that the Apostle, at that time, observed the law externally, but not internally, by loving God above all things, as he himself says: "For we ourselves, also, were some time unwise, incredulous, erring, slaves to divers desires and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hating one another" (Tit. iii. 3).

17. They object, fifthly, all the precepts of the Decalogue are either possible or impossible; if they are possible, we can observe them by the strength of our free will alone, but if they are impossible, no one is bound to observe them, for no one is obliged to do im

possibilities. We answer, that all these precepts are impossible to us without grace, but are quite possible with the assistance of grace. This is the answer of St. Thomas (2): "Illud quod possumus cum auxilio Divino, non est nobis omnino impossibile...... Unde Hieronymus confitetur, sic nostrum esse liberum arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio." Therefore, as the observance of the Commandments is quite possible to us with the assistance of the Divine grace, we are bound to observe them. We will answer the other objections of the Pelagians in the next chapter, the Refutation of the Semi-Pelagian heresy.

REFUTATION VI.

OF THE SEMPELAGIAN HERESY.

1. THE Semipelagians admit that the strength of the will of man has been weakened by Original Sin, and, therefore, allow that grace is requisite to do what is right; but they deny that it is necessary for the beginning of Faith, or for the desire of eternal salvation; for they say that as the belief of sick people in the utility of medicine, and the wish to recover their health, are not works for which medicine is necessary, so the commencement of belief-or call it an affection for the Faith-and the desire of eternal salvation, are not works for which grace is necessary. But we are bound to believe with the Catholic Church, that every beginning of Faith, and every good desire we entertain, is a working of grace in us.

SEC. I. THE COMMENCEMENT OF FAITH AND EVERY GOOD DESIRE IS NOT FROM OURSELVES, BUT FROM GOD.

2. FIRST, that it is clearly proved from St. Paul: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God" (2 Cor. iii. 5). Thus the beginning of believing that is, not that beginning of Faith arising from the intellect, which naturally sees the truth of the Faith, but that pious desire of Faith, which is not yet formal faith, for it is no more than a thought, of wishing to believe, and which, as St. Augustin says, precedes belief-this good thought, according to St. Paul, comes from God alone. Such is the explanation St. Augustin gives of the text: "Attendant hic, et verba ista perpendant, qui putant ex nobis esse Fidei coeptum, et ex Deo esse Fidei supplementum Quis enim non videt, prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius crediderit esse credendum. Quamvis enim rapte, quamvis celerrime credendi voluntatem quædam

(2) St Thom. 1, 2, 9, 109, a. 4, ad. 2.

cogitationes antevolent, moxque illa ita sequatar, ut quasi conjunctissima comitetur; necesse est tamen, ut omnia quæ credentur, præveniente cogitatione credantur.......Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem et pietatem (de qua loquebatur Apostolus), si non sumus idonei cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, quod sine cogitatione non possumus, sed sufficientia nostra, ex Deo est; profecto non sumus idonei credere aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, quod sine cogitatione non possumus,sed sufficientia nostra,qua credere incipiamus,ex Deo est"(1).

3. It is proved, secondly, by another text of St. Paul, in which he shows the reason of our proposition. He says: "For who distinguisheth thee? or what hast thou that thou hast not received ?" (1 Cor. iv. 7). If the beginning of that good will, which disposes us to receive the Faith from God, or any other gift of grace, came from ourselves, that would distinguish us from others who had not this commencement of a wish for eternal life. But St. Paul says, that all that we have, in which is comprised every first desire of Faith or salvation, is received from God: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" St. Augustin was of opinion, for a time, that Faith in God was not from God, but from ourselves, and that by that we obtain afterwards from God, the grace to lead a good life; but this text of the Apostle chiefly induced him to retract this sentiment afterwards, as he himself confesses (2): "Quo præcipue testimonio etiam ipse convictus sum, cum similiter errarem: putans Fidem, qua in Deum credimus, non esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis, et per illam nos impetrare Dei dona, quibus temperanter et juste, et pie vivamus in hoc sæculo."

4. That is confirmed by what the Apostle says in another place: "For by grace you are saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God. Not of works that no man man may glory" (Ephes. ii. 8, 9). St. Augustin (3) says that Pelagius himself, to escape condemnation from the Synod of Palestine, condemned (though only apparently) the proposition that " grace is given to us according to our merits." Hence, the Saint says: Quis autem, dicat eum, qui jam cœpit credere, ab illo inquam credidit, nihil mereri? Unde sit, ut jam merenti cetera dicantur addi retributione Divina: ac per hoc gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari: quod objectum sibi Pelagius, ne damnaretur, ipse

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damnavit."

5. Our proposition is proved, thirdly, from the words of the Incarnate Wisdom himself: "No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him" (John, vi. 44). And in another place he says: "Without me you can do nothing" (John, xv. 5). From this it is manifest that we cannot, with our own strength, even dispose ourselves to receive from God the actual graces which conduce to life everlasting, for actual grace is of a

(1) St. Aug. 7. de Praed. S. S. c. 2.

(3) St. Aug. Ibid. c. 1. (2) Ibid. c. 3.