to know as soon as possible how many expect to attend the banquet on Friday night. The Committee asks that you get your ticket for the banquet if you expect to be present. Your prompt attention to this matter will be appreciated almost as much as if you pay your dues.

The President: I desire to make some brief announcements. There are a number of printed reports here which we ask the members to examine. I desire the Executive Council and the Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform to meet immediately after the adjournment at room 105.

The situation before the Association now, so far as business is concerned, is as follows: We have a postponed report of the Committee on Nominations; also a postponed report of the Committee on Grievances; a postponed amendment to Articles IV, X and XIII, of the Constitution.

Now these matters have no place particularly designated for them on the program and the Chair suggests that some one move that they be taken up in their order immediately after the close of Mr. Meldrim's address tomor

row.

William S. Bryan, Jr., of Baltimore City: In order to facilitate matters I will make that motion.

The motion was adopted.

On motion the Association adjourned until July 4th, at II o'clock A. M.

MORNING SESSION.

JULY 4, 1907.

The President: The first business in order is an address by Peter W. Meldrim, of Georgia, on "Respect for the Bar." I now have the pleasure of introducing to you Peter W. Meldrim, of Georgia.

RESPECT FOR THE BAR.

BY PETER W. MELDRIM, OF GEORGIA.

Mr. President:

When I accepted the very courteous invitation of the Maryland State Bar Association to speak on this occasion, I naturally sought for an appropriate subject upon which I might venture to address you.

I sought neither far nor long; for the high character and eminent ability of the Maryland bar was full of suggestions. I could not forget that the learned lawyer and accomplished orator, William Pinkney; the great brained Luther Martin; the ever graceful and persuasive William Wirt; the erudite Reverdy Johnson; and Roger B. Taney-that judge who, at least, is entitled to share with Marshall the lofty title of the great chief justice-were members of the bar of Maryland. Such a bar is entitled to respect, and, recalling recent utterances reflecting upon the American bar, I have selected for the subject of this paper:

"RESPECT FOR THE BAR."

I shall not, out of high regard for the office of the chief executive, criticise his utterances; except to say that, when the executive sees fit to condemn a judge, because a decision, rendered in due course and after full argument, is not grateful to governmental policy, he acts in disrespect of the law and in encouragement of a subservient judiciary, the most insidious and, at the same time, the greatest foe there can be to the good order, peace and dignity of the Republic. For over two hundred years, the English judges have been free from the control of interference of the crown or parliament; and evil indeed will be the day, when an American

judge shall be persuaded, influenced, directed, coerced or intimidated by the smiles or frowns of power. I commend the words of England's Queen at the opening of the Royal Courts of Justice: "The independence and learning of the judges, supported by the integrity and ability of the other members of the profession of the law, will prove in the future, as they have in times past, the chief security for the rights of my crown and the liberties of my subjects."

I shall not criticise the utterances of another gentleman prominent in public life, save to say that the opinion of one, who has abandoned wholly his profession of the law to dabble in the muddy waters of politics, is seldom worthy of serious consideration. Such sounding sentences as "I believe the day will come in this country when we will not have so many men who will sell their souls to make grand larceny possible," and, "Perhaps some time it will be less disgraceful for a lawyer to assist in a gigantic robbery than for a highwayman to go out and hold up the wayfarer,”— are highly creditable to a phrase-maker, but are not at all suggestive of either accuracy of observation or fairness of

statement.

There have, however, been certain dicta from Mr. Justice Brewer, which must give us pause. In a recent address before the Society for Ethical Culture, the learned justice is reported as saying: "The old idea that a lawyer must be all his client wishes is passing away. He has no right to barter his own integrity, to sell his honor or his conscience. A lie has no place in court. A verdict won by a falsehood is a disgrace."

The clear implication from this language is, that such an idea had prevailed generally at the bar, and that lawyers were accustomed to barter their integrity, sell their honor and conscience, lie in court, and win verdicts by falsehoods. The learned justice could not have meant this and, with the utmost respect, he should not have said this. There never was a time at the English-speaking bar, when the lawyer was all the client wished him; when he bartered his integ

rity, sold his honor and his conscience and lied that he might win a verdict. That there have been disreputable lawyers goes without saying; but as well might the learned justice have denounced as traitors our patriot sires who made this day possible, because Benedict Arnold was a traitor; or as corrupt and infamous the judges of his own high court, because Bacon was corrupt and Jeffreys infamous.

I take it that these utterances, and others of like character, indicate a disrespect for the bar. It is a duty which we owe to ourselves to resent these imputations, and by our walk and conduct to merit, demand and receive for the bar the respect due to it.

I apprehend that the criticism should be directed rather at the administration of justice than at the law itself, or at the practice of the law. The practice of the law is the embodiment of the soul of the law into the flesh and blood of humanity; for it is in the practice at the bar, that the law finds its expression; and the rules of administration bend or yield not, break or give not, prove useless or well adapted to their purpose, as may be determined by the actual practice in the courts. It is unthinkable that the law should be the subject of unfavorable criticism. The student of classical literature will recall the reverence of the Greeks for the law; how upon a lofty terrace, surrounded by a consecrated grove and overlooking the ancient Greek city of Rhamnus, there stood two temples of white Pentelic marble, erected to the worship of Themis and Nemesis.

To me, this picture has always been an interesting one; not because of the beautiful temples, or the consecrated grove, or the many-voiced sea; not because of the ships in the port, or the sailors who manned them, or the busy streets, or the city's turmoil; but because an active, intelligent and commercial people could turn from their affairs. of peace or war and do reverence to the law.

The Greeks united a complete subordination to established authority with a high sense of personal independence, and we can understand how this may have been true when we

reflect that Zeus, lord of all, clothed with supreme dignity and authority, was the guardian of the law and the protector of justice and virtue. It is a beautiful fable that Zeus had for his wife and truest counselor, Themis, the source of law:

"Let no man value at a little price

A virtuous woman's counsel."

It was this respect for law that filled the Greek soul and inspired the inscription on one of the monuments at Thermopylae: "Go stranger and declare to the Lacedaemonians that we died here in obedience to their divine laws."

Burke says of the law: "It is one of the first and noblest of human sciences, a science which does more to quicken and invigorate the understanding than all the other kinds of learning put together, a science which is the collected reason of ages, combining the principles of eternal justice with the infinite variety of human concerns."

Dr. Johnson says: "Law is a science in which the greatest powers of the understanding are applied to the greatest number of facts."

"The law is good, if a man use it lawfully."

At all times and under every system of law, there has been more or less dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. The causes of this dissatisfaction may be fairly ascertained, and to a great extent may be remedied, but neither these causes, nor their remedies, are germane to the precise issue which I am discussing. I take it for granted, that the dissatisfaction in the public mind is not with the abstract law, but it is with its practical administration, and for all practical maladministration the bar is being held responsible. I propose to demonstrate the proposition that the uncertainties and delays of the law and the miscarriages of justice are not fairly chargeable to the bar.

In the very nature of things, facts precede law, and new facts, as well as new combinations of facts, are constantly arising out of our modern complex conditions; conditions