entitled to certain services, but had the client in his power by means of debts, which he unavoidably contracted; for as Rome was neither a sea-port, nor in any respect a commercial or manufacturing city as the land was chiefly tilled by slaves; and the arts and trades, and even liberal professions were, in process of time, exercised by the same class-as every Roman was subject to military service by arbitrary conscription, and in the early times served without pay, leaving their families des titute on their farms or in the city, it is so far from being strange, that they were overwhelmed with debt, which by the insolvent laws subjected them to private imprisonment and corporal punishment in the houses of their creditors, that it was even inconceivable how the body of the people could subsist at all.

The strength of the government was in the Senate, a body very irregularly constituted, but composed of ancient and illustrious families, and of all the ablest and most experienced men both civil and military; but they were so tainted with the vices inherent in nobility, riches, and military command, that how well soever they administered foreign affairs, they were not only guilty of habitual oppression at home, but committed many flagrant and ruinous errors in domestic policy. The equestrian was an intermediate order of great influence, but no constitutional authority. In the second Punic war 190 knights were enrolled in the Senate, and a similar measure was in agitation on another occasion. In short the civil government of the Romans appears to have been, not only very crudely conceived at first, but subject to continual fluctuation in its essential parts, and its errors corrected only by short-sighted and temporizing expedients. Their Chief Magistrates were successively, Consuls, the Interrex, Dictators, Decemvirs, and Military Tribunes. For five years the Tribunes of the people obstructed the elections of the principal magistrates; and having no executive power themselves, an anarchy prevailed.

Thy judicatures and legislative authorities were intricate, and contradictory. Decrees of the senate-votes of the people-constitutional lawsComitia of Centuries, Curiæ and Tribes

privileges vested in Priests and Augurs-Prætors, Quaestors and Ediles; and, above all, the Tribunes of the Commons, and the extraor dinary prerogatives of the Censors.

But all this agitation and turmoil, resistance and oppression, political factions, and dangers from abroad combined to create the most public, spirited, energetic, and warlike people that ever existed, though I should think in every respect, except the pride of victory and national independence, the most unhappy.

One of the ancients observes, that the power and glory of republics resulted from the abilities and virtues of a few individuals. This was remarkably the case in the Grecian states in the times of Pisistratus, Pericles, and Epaminondas, but not so with the Romans. Their operations were more consistent and systematic, being conducted by the senate, a permanent body of men well versed in politics and war.

The Romans are classed not only among the first people, but also the most warlike; and yet their military discipline appears, in many respects, as defective as their civil government.

Their legion, indeed, was a most effective corps. It was a moveable column, varying in number from 3000 to 6000, composed of infantry of different orders, distributed into battalions and companies-of a body of cavalry divided into troops, and a train of battering engines, and attended by some cohorts of allies. It was possessed of great activity; a machine of great flexibility, consisting of many joints, very superior to the stiff and unwieldy phalanx. The discipline, too, exercised over the men was absolute and severely exercised even to the decimation of armies. Their Centurions, Tribunes, and Generals also, were, with very few exceptions, men of consummate military talents and experience.

But, notwithstanding this, their history is full of such misconduct and violations of discipline, as are altogether unknown in our days.

Dictators, appointed to supersede incapable or unpopular Consuls—-Generals disobedient to the constituted authorities-mutinous armies-general panics alternate commands---and jealousy among superior officers. In later times it was either a great error,

or an unavoidable misfortune that large armies were kept together in the provinces, which either dictated to the authorities at home, or became the instruments of ambitious men to overturn the state. Our mode of distributing and changing the quarters of regiments, with the small number of men in each, precludes such danger.

The Roman practice was eventually the cause of the ruin of the republic; but long before that time it was ready to fall, and hardly worth supporting. I shall conclude with offering some ideas on the cause of its downfal, and the measures by which it might have been retarded.

I do not mean to enlarge on the great and general cause of the decline of all states-luxury, but to advert to some minor and peculiar errors, which hastened the downfal of the Roman republic. I shall, in the mean time, briefly mention a cause of her greatness, which I remember to have seen noted in one of Cicero's fragments he

says, "We conquered the world by assisting our allies." On the conclusion of a war they gratified their allies with a share of their conquests. They made use of their allies to subdue their enemies, and then reduced their allies to subjection. They forbad kings to make war on their allies; and if they did, whatever might be the provocation, they took part with their allies, and made a conquest of the country that had quarrelled with them. And in general, even in their infant state, they augmented their territory by encouraging appeals: when two nations had a controversy, the Romans were always ready to act as arbiters, and generally gave their award in favour of the state that applied to them first. They were then bound to support their sentence, and assist their ally; and having with their assistance easily subdued the other party, they took a favourable opportunity to subjugate them both. A few examples of this kind made the disputants vie with each other in being the first to refer the cause to the Romans. Instances of such interference are innumerable. In the very commencement of the republic, the people of Ardea and Aricia referred a dispute to the Romans; and they adjudged the land in question to themselves; this was done by the popular assembly, contrary to

remonstrances of the Senators, who represented the impolicy, rather than the injustice of the transaction—“ nequicquam tantum agro intercipiendo acquiratur, quantum amittatur alienandis injuria sociorum animis." When these states resented such treatment, the Senate told them they could not rescind the vote of the people, and would not sow discord in the republic on their account, and advised them to be quiet till a convenient opportunity should offer. Thus, too, they took part with the Athenians against the King of Macedonia-with Eumenes against Perseus--with Massinissa against the Carthaginians-with Cleopatra and Ptolemy against Antiochus, and so on, and reduced them all to the level of subjects at last.

It is worthy of remark, that modern Rome extended her influence by the same policy, encouraging different religious parties to refer their controversies to her, and deciding against the party that refused to appeal.

It was the policy of ancient Rome to side with the weaker party, because after they had jointly conquered the stronger, the other would fall an easy prey. I suppose, in this respect, Chris. tian Rome would differ from pagan, and favour the stronger side.

I shall now state what appears to me to have been ruinous errors in domestic policy, which hastened the downfal of the commonwealth. The act of the Decemviri prohibiting the intermarriage of Patricians and Plebeians was a great error, but of short continuance; while it lasted it was a great obstruction to public business, and a pregnant source of animosity, dissension, and tumult. The ground taken by the Patricians was altogether untenable; their railing and the argument of Canuleius in Livy form a remarkable contrast: "patrem sequuntur liberi" was an answer to it all. The wife could not ennoble the children of the Plebeian, nor degrade the family of the Patrician. Another more permanent error was the opposition made to the election of Plebeians into the higher magistracies; and it was equally injudicious--(for every man of abilities, property, and influence taken out of one scat and removed to the other, was a double gain. When the Commons had at last obtained this privilege, they showed that they had no desire of obtruding

mean and unworthy persons on the state. On the contrary, their leaders were disgusted at their preferring the Patrician candidate. If Plebeians, of fortune and high military, or political character, saw the door of the Senate open to them, they would look upon that body, as one in which they had an interest; one, of whose privileges they might one time or other partake, and whose influence therefore they should not wish to impair. Cicero says, "That no man would prefer popularity to the honours of the Senate."

A third error, which had a worse effect than either of these, was the encouragement of slavery. Every thing in the city was done by slaves, and the poor were left destitute of employment. The great had each of them thousands of slaves employed in lucrative occupations, and even in the arts and professions. The cause of the seditions of the Gracchi was, that Tiberius, in travelling through Italy, saw that the conquered lands, and the estates of the nobles were cultivated by slaves, while the Romans were living on the sportulæ and largesses. This was a great abuse equally calculated to corrupt the rich and degrade the poor to encourage tyranny and oppression in the one, and meanness and servility in the other. Where there are slaves, there will be tyrants, and tyrants will not confine their insolence to their slaves. The conspiracies and insurrections of the slaves are too numerous to be recited here; and the formidable magnitude of the servile war is a striking instance of the alarming height to which this dangerous practice had arisen. After successfully defeating irregular armies, and the best disciplined legions, Spartans could be conquered only by Crassus and Pompey.

The greatest error of all was the admission of the states of Italy to the freedom of the city. After this innovation, it could not be known whether the assembly of the people was legally constituted or not; the citizens assembled to fight instead of voting. Every ambitious leader could bring a crowd of these spurious, adopted citizens into the forum to carry his projects, or to silence and put down his adversaries. Then followed, as a matter of course, the civil wars of Marius and Sylla, Cæsar and Pompey, Octavius and

Antony, and the extinction of the commonwealth. The political wisdom and address of the Senate was indeed finely exemplified on this occasion---but in vain.

This discussion would be incomplete without inquiring how these errors might have been prevented or remedied. The dissensions about marriage should never have taken place; and owed their origin to the despotic spirit of the Decemvirs. It was repressed by the repeal of the law. The admission of Plebeians to the Consulship should have been graciously conceded; and in that case certain regulations might have been established, that would have rendered it harmless, and even beneficial; a strength to the Patricians, and an encouragement to merit among the Commons.

The prevalence of slavery, and the tumults and confusion of the citizens consequent on granting the freedom of the city to the Latins, might have been prevented by the employment of free labourers and tenants, instead of slaves and the introduction of the representative principle.

Slavery was the natural result of the wars, in which the Romans were continually engaged; for the slaves were all prisoners of war or their descendants. How these could be otherwise disposed of I cannot say; but I am sure they ought not to have usurped the place of free citizens, and have left the populace without trade or agriculture; destitute of support, and immersed in debt. With this was connected the monopoly of the conquered lands by the nobles; the desperate contest about Agrarian laws; and the degradation of the people, who at length cared for nothing but panem et circenses. All this might have been remedied or alleviated; and great estates rendered harmless or beneficial by an independant tenantry, and the suppression of domestic slavery.

As the combination of small states to form a representative Council was a common practice among the ancients it may not be thought chimerical to expect that the representative system should have occurred to the Romans; and that the cities of Latium and other provinces might have been satisfied with the privilege of sending deputies to Rome, either especially, or to reside. Of the custom to which I allude,