EDINBURGH MAGAZINE. No. CXXII. FEBRUARY, 1827. VOL. XXI. Contents. SNODGRASS'S NARRATIVE OF THE BURMESE WAR, GALLERY OF THE GERMAN PROSE CLASSICS. BY THE ENGLISH OPIUM EATER. No. III. KANT, PERSIA, THE CORN LAWS, SELWYN IN SEARCH OF A Daughter. Chap. III. Chap. IV. WIZZERDE WYNKIN'S DETHE, ON MURDER, considered aS ONE OF THE FINE ARTS, 121 EDINBURGH : WILLIAM BLACKWOOD, no. 17, Prince's street, EDINBURGH; AND T. CADELL, STRAND, LONDON; To whom Communications (post paid) may be addressed. SOLD ALSO BY ALL THE BOOKSELLERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. PRINTED BY JAMES BALLANTYNE & CO. EDINBURGH. NOTHING can more fully evince the state of deplorable and unworthy ignorance in which the people of this country are content to remain respect ing the affairs of the Indian empire, than the many erroneous opinions which have gone abroad, as to the causes and origin of the Burmese war. It is but yesterday, so to speak, that the very existence of a Burmese Sovereignty was known to us. The Court of Directors and the Board of Control have, indeed, been long aware of the increasing power of that adventurous nation, whilst the hostile feelings of its rulers towards their European neighbours, a protracted series of recriminating negotiations has sufficed to prove. But among the people of England, in general,-nay, more, among the members of the legislature itself, at least, among such of them as are not intimately connected with the administration of the Indian government, we question whether ten individuals can be found, who, three years ago, could so much as point out upon the map, the situation either of Ava or Rangoon. The consequence was, that intelligence of the rupture no sooner reached this country, than a universal outcry arose, and Lord Amherst was condemned, by the united voice of the nation, as a rash, inconsiderate, and ambitious governor. The old ground of complaint against the local autho rities was assumed,-they were accused of seeking the war, for the sake of augmenting a territory, already too extensive, in order that their own private fortunes or expectations might be advanced,-and it was gravely asked, on all hands, whether the acqui sition of a desert island was an object, for the attainment of which, an ap peal to arms ought to be made? There was excessive folly in all this,-yet it arose naturally and unavoidably out of that indifference towards the condition of our most important dependency, with which we have taken so many occasions to reproach our fellowcountrymen. A new light begins at length to break in upon us. It is whispered in more than one coterie, that though the war might have been postponed, and ought to have been postponed, till more effective preparations for its prosecution had been made, any hope of avoiding it entirely, was groundless. Such, we believe, to be, to a certain extent at least, the real state of the case. The seeds of hostility between the Supreme Government and his Golden-footed Majesty had been sown for years, they could not but bring forth fruit sooner or later. Before we proceed to notice the contents of the interesting volume, whose title is prefixed to this paper, we shall endeavour, in as few words as possible, to satisfy our readers on this head, ⚫ A Narrative of the Burmese War. By Major Snodgrass, Military Secretary to the Commander of the Expedition, and Assistant Political Agent in Ava. L don: John Murray. VOL. XXI. Q by laying before them a sketch of the relative positions in which the belligerent powers stood towards each other, previous to the commencement of hostilities. It is rather more than thirty years ago, since the Burmese, having overrun the provinces, or, to speak more accurately, the independent principalities, of Arracan, Assam, and Cachar, established themselves upon the eastern frontier of our Asiatic possessions. By this arrangement we found ourselves suddenly brought into contact, -not with a few petty Rajahs, possessing neither the power nor the inclination to make encroachments, but with a people, flushed with conquest, ambitious to a degree, and too ignorant of our resources, as well as too confident in their own, to be at much pains, or to make any sacrifices, for the preservation of friendly rela tions. The first act of aggression, on the part of our new neighbours, occurred during the government of Sir John Shore. Three criminals having fled across the border, the Burmese hesitated not to violate our territory in pursuit of them; and open hostilities were then prevented, only because the officer who commanded the invading force chanced to be a man of moderation. But the act of invasion was not forgotten by us, whilst the promptitude displayed on our side to repel violence by violence, rankled like a poisoned wound, in the minds of our neighbours. No great while elapsed ere fresh causes of dispute arose; and they were of a more serious, as well as of a more permanent nature. The tyranny exercised by the Burmese governors of Arracan, drove great multitudes of the inhabitants of that province, belonging to the tribe of Mughs, to seek an asylum within our territory. Of these Mughs, a considerable colony had been established in Chittagong many years ago; and thither their countrymen not unnaturally betook themselves, as soon as they found that there was neither safety nor freedom for them at home. The English government was not blind to the mischievous results which were likely to follow this step-it did its best not only to hinder fresh colonists from arriving, but to send back such as had already sought safety within the bounds of the empire. But the refugees were so resolute,— declaring that they would rather perish on the spot than again throw themselves into the hands of their tyrants, that English humanity could not withstand the appeal. They were received, and, as early as the year 1799, two-thirds of the Mughs of Arracan are supposed to have deserted the habitations of their fathers. All these, that is to say, all who perished not of want,-were established upon the waste lands, of which there are large tracts in Chittagong; and they were provided with food, and with materials for the erection of huts, at the public expense. It was hardly to be expected that the Burmese would look with indifference upon proceedings such as these. Jealous of what they regarded as a slur upon their reputation, and anxious to recover their slaves, an army of four thousand men broke into the province, and stockading themselves in the woods, carried on, during several weeks, a desultory warfare with our troops. The commander of this force addressed, at the same time, a letter of expostulation to the civil magistrate of Chittagong, demanding, in the name of his sovereign, that the fugitives should be given up; whilst a threat was held out, that in case the demand were not complied with, other armies would speedily arrive to enforce it. To a message couched in such terms, Mr Stonehouse would only reply, by stating, that no negotiation would be listened to whilst a Burmese armed force occupied a position within the British territory; and the invaders refusing to withdraw, they were attacked. The attack, which took place on the 18th July 1799, failed; but the enemy soon afterwards fell back, of their own accord, across the frontier. At this juncture it was imprudently resolved to settle the refugees permanently in the district between the Ramoo River and the Naaf; that is to say, within sight of their ancient homes, and in the immediate presence of their conquerors. This was done, partly because the territory chanced to be without legal claimants, and partly under the mistaken notion, that the Mughs would form a useful barrier between us and the Burmese. It was urged likewise, by Captain Cox, at whose suggestion the arrangement was entered into, that "The vicinity of the sea, and the three navigable rivers, would prove an abundant resource in the article of provisions, as the natives of Arracan are very expert fisher men." But the danger of continual quarrels between men feeling towards each other as the settlers and the Burmese felt, was, if not overlooked, at all events treated as trifling. Matters turned out exactly as might have been anticipated. The Mughs, instead of sitting down like peaceable colonists, to clear away forests, and cultivate fields, formed themselves into bands of marauders; and, under different chiefs, made destructive inroads into the country which they still regarded as their own. In the meanwhile, the Burmese government continued to press its requisition for the removal of those, whom it termed its subjects, out of the British territory. The requisition was firmly, though temperately, rejected but the negotiations which, for a time, had been conducted as between friendly powers, ended at last in open recrimination and complaint. The Mughs were finally followed within the Company's territory, and a rup ture seemed at hand. In the year 1813, a mission reached Calcutta from the Viceroy of Pegu, one of the chief men of the Burmese empire. It was preceded by a person charged with a commission from the King to the city of Benares, to collect certain sacred books of the Hindoos. It was more than surmised that the true object of that mission was to stir up the hostile feelings of the Hindoo states against the English; yet the deputy was permitted to proceed; and he actually spent his time, not in searching for manuscripts, but in conducting political intrigues, and hatching extensive conspiracies. An attempt was likewise made to follow a similar course at Delhi; but the messenger dispatched thither was refused a passport; and the English government undertook, on his furnishing a list of the writings required, to procure them, or any others, and transmit them at once to the Court of Ava. Such, however, were not the only symptoms of animosity displayed towards us at this time by the Burmese. The dispatches of the Supreme Government speak of active preparations on the part of the Burmese govern ment, for the invasion of the Compa ny's territories. The immediate object of that invasion was represented to be the subjugation of Chittagong and Dacca; but no doubt was entertained, had that succeeded, an effort would have been made to expel the English from India altogether. It was in vain that our government offered explanation after explanation of the motives which actuated it in its behaviour towards the Mughs. With such explanations the Burmese were far from satisfied; and it must be confessed, that the behaviour of the refugees was not such as to induce men, who looked at things through the medium of oriental policy alone, to believe, that they were not encouraged in their hos tile proceedings by the power which sheltered and protected them, and which positively refused to deliver into their hands the most notorious and daring of the marauders. Among these there was one, by name King Verring, whose influence over his countrymen seems to have been unbounded. This man, inflamed by a spirit of relentless hatred, persisted, in defiance of checks and losses, to make incursions, year after year, into the Burmese country; and, strange to say, though several of his letters, in which his design of continuing this system as long as life remained to him, was avowed, fell into the hands of Lord Minto, that scrupulous regard to fine feelings which exists only in the imaginations of Englishmen, hindered him from being at once given over, as he ought to have been given over, to the vengeance of the people, whom he thus uselessly irritated. On the retirement of Lord Minto, the late Marquis of Hastings succeeded to the Supreme Government, and found an open breach with the Burmese all but effected. By an exercise of that sound judgment for which, above all the governors which India has had, his Lordship was distinguished, he managed to hinder its occurrence. The previous government had, however, so decidedly declared against delivering up any of the marauders, that Lord Hastings felt himself in some degree compelled to adhere to that system, though he so far humoured his neighbours as to permit a Burmese force to follow the depredators into the forests of Chittagong, with which the British troops were required |