SEA AND SHORE.
See SPAIN, 2.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38.
SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.
See STATES, 6, 7.
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.
SECRETARY OF WAR.
See NAVIGABLE WATERS, 1, 2.
SELF-INCRIMINATION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19-28;
CORPORATIONS, 4, 5, 8, 9.
SIXTH AMENDMENT.
See CORPORATIONS, 3;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 5.
1. Alienation of territory; Art. 46 of constitution as existing in 1859
applied.
Article 46 of the constitution of Spain as existing in 1859, providing
that in order to alienate, cede or exchange any part of Spanish
territory, the King required the authority of a special law, related
to transference of national sovereignty and not to disposal of pub-
lic land as property. Jover v. Insular Government, 623.
2. Common right to sea and its shore; laws of the Partida concerning,
construed.
The laws of the Partida which affirm that the sea and its shore are
among the things that are common to all men are not to be so
literally construed, as held by the Spanish courts prior to the
cession of the Philippine Islands, as prohibiting a grant of tide
lands to one desiring to reclaim and improve them. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
JUDGMENTS AND DECREES, 2;
TAXES AND TAxation, 11.
1. Abandoned property; power to legislate concerning.
The State has power to legislate in regard to the preservation and
disposition of abandoned property and to establish presumptions
of abandonment after lapse of reasonable period. (Cunnius v.
Reading, 198 U. S. 454.) Provident Savings Institution v. Malone,
660.
2. Admission into Union; conditions which Congress may impose in
enabling act.
Congress may embrace in an enabling act conditions relating to mat-
ters wholly within its sphere of powers, such as regulations of in-
terstate commerce, intercourse with Indian tribes and disposition
of public lands, but not conditions relating wholly to matters
under state control such as the location and change of the seat of
government of the State. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 559.
3. Admission into Union; power of Congress to impose conditions.
No prior decision of this court sanctions the claim that Congress in
admitting a new State can impose conditions in the enabling act,
the acceptance whereof will deprive the State when admitted of
any attribute of power essential to its equality with the other
States. Ib.
4. Power to regulate taking of natural product and to prohibit its trans-
portation in interstate commerce.
There is a distinction between the police power of the State to regulate
the taking of a natural product, such as natural gas, and prohibit-
ing that product from transportation in interstate commerce.
The former is within, and the latter is beyond, the power of the
State. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, dis-
tinguished. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 229.
5. Right to natural gas and oil not analogous to that to flowing waters.
A State does not have the same ownership in natural gas and oil after
the same have been reduced to possession as it does over the flow-
ing waters of its rivers. Riparian owners have no title to the
water itself as a commodity. Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter, 209 U. S. 349, distinguished. Ib.
6. Seat of government; power to locate beyond control of Congress.
The power to locate its own seat of government, to change the same,
and to appropriate its public money therefor, are essentially state
powers beyond the control of Congress. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 559.
VOL. CCXXI-46
7. Seat of government; powers in respect of; validity of provision in Okla-
homa Enabling Act in respect of.
The legislature of Oklahoma has power to locate its own seat of govern-
ment, to change the same and to appropriate money therefor,
notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in the Enabling
Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. 267, c. 3335, and the ordinance ir-
revocable of the convention of the people of Oklahoma accepting
the same. Ib.
See ACTIONS;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2, 3, 5,
PUBLIC LANDS, 3, 4, 10, 12;
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 18, 19;
RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 1-8, 10.
STATUTES.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF.
1. Subsequent legislation considered, when.
When several acts of Congress are passed touching the same subject-
matter, subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in
interpretation of the prior legislation. Tiger v. Western Invest-
ment Co., 286.
2. Debates of enacting body resorted to, when.
While debates of the body enacting it may not be used as means for
interpreting a statute, they may be resorted to as a means of as-
certaining the conditions under which it was enacted. Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
3. Departmental construction; persuasive effect of.
Where a statute is so ambiguous as to render its construction doubtful
the uniform practice of the officers of the Department whose duty
has been to construe and administer the statute since its enact-
ment and under whose constructions rights have been acquired is
determinatively persuasive on the courts. United States v. Ham-
mers, 220.
4. Uncertainty; exceptions affecting validity on ground of.
An exception in a statute of cases of emergency does not render a
statute void for uncertainty where Congress has appropriately
described the exceptional cases intended to be covered. Balti-
more & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm., 612.
5. Foreign statutes; duty of court to construe statute of another State in
absence of allegation or proof that highest court of such State has done
Where there is no allegation or proof that the highest court of a State
has construed a statute of that State, it becomes the duty of the
courts of another State, which do not take judicial knowledge of
decisions of other States, to construe the statute and its effect
upon prior statutes according to their independent judgment.
(Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36.) Texas
& New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Miller, 408; Texas & New Orleans
R. R. Co. v. Gross, 417.
6. Review by this court of decision of state court construing foreign statute.
The decision of a state court construing a statute of another State
under such circumstances is not subject to review by this court if
no Federal right is involved. (Eastern Building & Loan Assn. v.
Ebaugh, 185 U. S. 114.) Ib.
C. STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
See LOCAL LAW.
STOCKHOLDERS.
See NATIONAL BANKS.
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 28;
CORPORATIONS, 3, 4, 9;
WRIT AND PROCESS.
TAXES AND TAXATION.
1. Credits on open account as property subject to.
Credits on open account are incorporeal and have no actual situs, but
they constitute property and as such are taxable by the power
having jurisdiction. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans As-
sessors, 346.
2. Credits, intangible; power of sovereignty of debtor's domicile to tax.
The maxim of mobilia sequuntur personam yields to the fact of actual
control; and jurisdiction to tax intangible credits exists in the
sovereignty of the debtor's domicile, such credits being of value
to the creditor because of the power given by such sovereignty to
enforce the debt. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 205. Such taxa-
tion does not deny due process of law. Ib.
3. Credits taxable in place other than that of creditor's domicile and where
he does business and such credits accrue.
The jurisdiction of the State of the domicile over the creditor's person
does not exclude the power of another State in which he transacts
his business to tax credits there accruing to him from resident
debtors, and thus, without denying due process of law, to enforce
contribution to support the government under whose protection
his affairs are conducted.
4. Credits subject to taxation at place of debtor's domicile; overdue insur-
ance premiums as.
Premiums due by residents to a non-resident insurance company and
which have been extended, but for which no written obligations
have been given, are credits subject to taxation by the State
where the debtor is domiciled; and so held that the statute of
Louisiana to that effect is not unconstitutional as denying due
process of law. Ib.
5. Credits subject to taxation at place of debtor's domicile; overdue insur-
ance premiums as.
Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Assessors, ante, p. 346,
followed as to right of State to tax insurance premiums due and
extended by residents to non-resident companies although such
premiums were due from local agents and not from policy-hold-
ers. Orient Ins. Co. v. Assessors of Orleans, 358.
6. Credits, how evidenced, for purposes of.
Credits need not be evidenced in any particular manner in order to
render them subject to taxation. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v.
Orleans Assessors, 346.
7. Remedies against excessive valuation must be availed of as prescribed.
Where a state statute prescribes a method for review and reduction of
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