5. Northern Pacific Land Grant Act of 1864; lands passing by; priority
of right of homesteader.
Land within place limits of the Northern Pacific Land Grant Act of
July 2, 1864, c. 217, 13 Stat. 365, actually occupied by a home-
steader intending to acquire title, did not pass by the grant but
were excepted from its operation, and no right of the railroad
attached to such lands when its line was definitely located. (Nel-
son v. Northern Pacific Railway, 188 U. S. 108.) Northern Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Trodick, 208.
6. Northern Pacific Land Grant; lands exempted from; right of vendee
of prior homestead settler.
Where a bona fide settler was in actual occupation of unsurveyed lands
at the time of definite location of the line, the land occupied was
excepted from the grant; and if, before survey, he sold his improve-
ments to one who also settled on the land intending to apply for
title under the homestead laws of the United States, the claim
of the latter is superior to that of the railroad company notwith-
standing the original settler had no claim of record. Ib.
7. Northern Pacific Land Grant; right of settler in actual occupation
before location of definite line of railroad.
A settler in actual occupation before the location of the definite line
of the railroad can stand upon his occupancy until the lands are
surveyed, and his claim cannot be defeated by the railroad assum-
ing without right at a date prior to his application to assert a
claim to the lands. Ib.
8. Northern Pacific Land Grant; effect, under act of May 14, 1880, of
delay on part of homesteader in making application after survey.
Under the act of May 14, 1880, c. 89, 21 Stat. 140, delay on the part of
a homesteader in making application after survey cannot be taken
advantage of by one who had acquired no rights prior to the filing;
and so held, that where the Northern Pacific land grant had not
attached on account of actual occupation, delay on the part of the
settler in filing after survey did not inure to the benefit of the
company. Ib.
9. Northern Pacific Land Grant; rights of homesteader; effect of prior
decisions.
Nelson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 188 U. S. 108, was not modi-
fied by United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway,
218 U. S. 233, as to the rights of bona fide settlers which attached
prior to definite location. Ib.
A State is without power to tax public lands which have been located
under warrant until the equitable title has passed from the United
States. Sargent v. Herrick, 404.
11. Warrants; location; effect to pass title.
The mere location of a land warrant does not operate as a payment
of the purchase price and does not operate to pass the equitable
title from the United States. Ib.
12. Warrants; location; effect to pass title. Right of State to tax.
Although if the locator had been the lawful owner of the warrant
location would have entitled him to patent, if the Land Office
found him not to be the lawful owner, location does not operate
to pass the title until he substitutes and pays the Government
price, and meanwhile the United States has such an interest in
the land as renders its taxation by the State invalid. Ib.
13. When held in trust by patentee; power of courts to declare trust.
Where, by error of law, the Land Office incorrectly holds a party is
entitled to patent and issues it, the courts can declare that the
patent is held by the patentee in trust for the party actually en-
titled to have his ownership in the lands recognized. Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Trodick, 208.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
See EXECUTIVE OFFICERS;
LAND GRANTS;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 6.
PUBLIC POLICY.
See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 5, 7.
PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT.
Misbranding; provisions of § 8 of act of June 30, 1906, not applicable to
statements as to curative effect of article.
The term "misbranded" and the phrase defining what amounts to
misbranding in § 8 of the Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906,
34 Stat. 768, c. 3915, are aimed at false statements as to indentity
of the article, possibly including strength, quality and purity,
dealt with in § 7 of the act, and not at statements as to curative
effect; and so held that a statement on the labels of bottles of medi-
cine that the contents are effective as a cure for cancer, even if
misleading, are not covered by the statute. United States v.
Johnson, 488.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 4, 9;
PUBLIC LANDS, 5-8.
See CUSTOMS Law, 1, 2, 5, 6.
REAL PROPERTY.
See INDIANS, 5–11.
RECEIVERS.
See BANKRUPTCY;
CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 20;
RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 38.
RECORD ON APPEAL.
See FEDERAL QUESTION, 1;
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 3, 4.
See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 32-38
TAXES AND TAXATION, 7, 8.
1. Origin and meaning of terms used in Anti-trust Act of 1890.
The terms "restraint of trade," and "attempts to monopolize," as
used in the Anti-trust Act, took their origin in the common law
and were familiar in the law of this country prior to and at the
time of the adoption of the act, and their meaning should be
sought from the conceptions of both English and American law
prior to the passage of the act. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 1.
2. Monopolies at common law; contracts within prohibitions.
At common law monopolies were unlawful because of their restriction
upon individual freedom of contract and their injury to the pub-
lic and at common law; and contracts creating the same evils
were brought within the prohibition as impeding the due course
of, or being in restraint of, trade. Ib.
3. Common law of United States against; doubt as to existence shown by
debates on Anti-trust Act.
The debates in Congress on the Anti-trust Act of 1890 show that one
of the influences leading to the enactment of the statute was
doubt as to whether there is a common law of the United States
governing the making of contracts in restraint of trade and the
creation and maintenance of monopolies in the absence of legis-
lation. Ib.
4. English rule as to freedom of contract.
At the time of the passage of the Anti-trust Act the English rule was
that the individual was free to contract and to abstain from con-
tracting and to exercise every reasonable right in regard thereto,
except only as he was restricted from voluntarily and unreasonably
or for wrongful purposes restraining his right to carry on his trade.
(Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, 1892, A. C. 25.) Ib.
5. Effect in this country of development of law of England as to.
This country has followed the line of development of the law of Eng-
land, and the public policy has been to prohibit, or treat as illegal,
contracts, or acts entered into with intent to wrong the public
and which unreasonably restrict competitive conditions, limit the
right of individuals, restrain the free flow of commerce, or bring
about public evils such as the enhancement of prices. Ib.
6. Monopolies incompatible with English constitution.
The early struggle in England against the power to create monopolies
resulted in establishing that those institutions were incompatible
with the English Constitution. Ib.
7. Public policy manifested by Anti-trust Act.
The public policy manifested by the Anti-trust Act is expressed in
such general language that it embraces every conceivable act
which can possibly come within the spirit of its prohibitions, and
that policy cannot be frustrated by resort to disguise or subter-
fuge of any kind. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 106.
8. Intent of Congress in enacting Anti-trust Act of 1890; contracts con-
templated.
The Anti-trust Act of 1890 was enacted in the light of the then exist-
ing practical conception of the law against restraint of trade, and
the intent of Congress was not to restrain the right to make and
enforce contracts, whether resulting from combinations or other-
wise, which do not unduly restrain interstate or foreign com-
merce, but to protect that commerce from contracts or combina-
tions by methods, whether old or new, which would constitute an
interference with, or an undue restraint upon, it. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 1.
9. Intent of Congress in enacting Anti-trust Act of 1890; contracts and
combinations contemplated.
The words "restraint of trade" at common law, and in the law of this
country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act, only
embraced acts, contracts, agreements or combinations which
operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly re-
stricting competition or by unduly obstructing due course of
trade, and Congress intended that those words as used in that
act should have a like significance; and the ruling in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, ante, p. 1, to this effect is reexpressed and
reaffirmed. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 106.
10. Duty of government to protect against unlawful organizations.
On appeal against unlawfully exercising power of organizations it is
the duty of government to protect the one against the many as
well as the many against the one. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 418.
11. Acts prohibited; sufficiency of enumeration by Anti-trust Act.
The Anti-trust Act generically enumerates the character of the acts
prohibited and the wrongs which it intends to prevent and is
susceptible of being enforced without any judicial exertion of
legislative power. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 1.
12. Devices to which court's protective powers extend.
The court's protective powers extend to every device whereby prop-
erty is irreparably damaged or interstate commerce restrained;
otherwise the Anti-trust Act would be rendered impotent. Gom-
pers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 418.
13. Contracts and combinations within prohibition of Anti-trust Act of
1890.
The Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, should be con-
strued in the light of reason; and, as so construed, it prohibits all
contracts and combinations which amount to an unreasonable or
undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce. Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 1.
14. Contracts and combinations within prohibition of Anti-trust Act of
The Anti-trust Act must have a reasonable construction as there can
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