221 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Omitting the word "and," as was done in all the reports and debates in Congress, the grant is "one hundred and ten thousand acres of land, including all saline lands in said State" and means that the saline lands granted are a part of and to be included in the one hundred and ten thousand acres. If the salines were to be in addition to the 110,000 acres it would make the precise acreage of the total grant uncertain, as the number of acres of salines is unknown. The grant was treated as consisting of a definite number of acres. See Vol. 26, Cong. Rec., p. 209.

Where the language is ambiguous, the applicable rule of construction compels a construction favorable to the grantor.

The ordinary signification of the term, as defined by the dictionaries, both Webster and the Standard, is "to confine within; to hold; to contain; to shut up; embrace, and involve." For its definition, the Supreme Court of Utah relies on In re Goetz, 75 N. Y. Supp. 750; Hiller v. United States, 106 Fed. Rep. 63; and United States v. Pierce, 147 Fed. Rep. 199. For cases defining "including" see "Words and Phrases"; In re Goetz, 75 N. Y. Supp. 750; United States v. Pierce, 147 Fed. Rep. 199; S. C., 140 Fed. Rep. 962; Hiller v. United States, 106 Fed. Rep. 73.

"Include" or the participial form thereof, is defined "to comprise within"; "to hold"; "to contain"; "to shut up"; and synonyms are "contain"; "enclose"; "comprise"; "comprehend"; "embrace"; and "involve." And see for definition applicable to this case, Neher v. McCook Co., 11 S. Dak. 422; Brainard v. Darling, 132 Massachusetts, 218; Henry's Ex. v. Henry's Ex., 81 Kentucky, 342.

Under the language in the Enabling Act, Congress only meant to grant the State of Utah, for university purposes, one hundred and ten thousand acres of land, any part or the whole whereof could be saline lands.

To hold otherwise would render every title granted to

Argument for Defendant in Error.

221 U.S.

a homesteader or other claimant under the United States laws, of lands in this State, uncertain and of little value; for, under the broad claim made by the State, if a homesteader, after he secured his patent from the United States, should discover a bed of salt under his land, the State could eject him therefrom. Barden v. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co., supra; Shaw v. Kellogg, 170 U. S. 312; Deffenback v. Hawk, 115 U. S. 392; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660, and cases therein cited; Steele v. St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 106 U. S. 360; Davis v. Wiebold, 139 U. S. 507.

Mr. William D. Riter, with whom Mr. Albert R. Barnes, Attorney General of the State of Utah, Mr. Waldemar Van Cott and Mr. Edward M. Allison, Jr., were on the brief, for defendant in error:

In the Utah Enabling Act Congress used the word (1) in its true and proper sense, as defined by the lexicographers; or (2) in the sense of "also."

The word "include" is derived from the Latin verb includo, which means to shut up, to enclose. "Include" has two meanings, one of which is the same as that of the word "embrace." See Webster. Congress used the word "including" in the sense thus defined by the dictionaries. For similar use in some appropriation acts passed by the Fifty-eighth Congress, see 33 Stat. 834, 836, 838, 840, 876, 1092, 1114, 1173, 1174, 1187, 1188. For other illustrations, see 18 Stat. 274.

In none of these sentences is "including" used in strict accordance with its dictionary meaning, but in the sense of "also." Similar expressions are constantly heard; see United States v. Pierce, 147 Fed. Rep. 199; Hiller v. United States, 106 Fed. Rep. 73; In re Goetz's Will, 75 N. Y. Supp. 750.

If it was the intention of Congress to include the saline lands in the 110,000 acres, then the phrase "and including all saline lands in said State" is awkwardly and un

221 U. S.

Argument for Defendant in Error.

grammatically placed.

The lawmaker is presumed to know the rules of grammar. United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 103.

It is a significant fact that Congress used the word "all" in the phrase "and including all saline lands." Of still greater significance is the use of the conjunction "and" in the phrase "and including all saline lands." No ambiguity can ever arise from the use of "and." That word is always employed to express the relation of addition.

Upon the admission of other States to the Union, Congress made large grants of saline lands or salt springs. As to Minnesota, see 11 Stat. 166; as to Kansas, 12 Stat. 126. A similar grant was made to Colorado, 18 Stat. 474; to Iowa, 5 Stat. 789; to Wisconsin, 9 Stat. 56.

The failure to fix any limit in Utah's Enabling Act is proof that Congress intended to give to this State all saline lands within its boundaries. See 1 Lindley on Mines, §§ 513-515.

Effect must be given, if possible, to every word in a statute. Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 115; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80, 84; Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152; United States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, 145; Murphy v. Utter, 186 U. S. 95, 111.

Congress intended to give all saline lands then known or to be thereafter discovered. See Barden v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co., 154 U. S. 288.

The rule of construction invoked by the plaintiff in error, that a public grant is construed strictly against the grantee, can come into play only where there is a real and substantial doubt as to what Congress intends. Where the meaning of Congress is fairly and reasonably apparent, the grant cannot be defeated by invoking the rule that a legislative grant is construed strictly against the grantee. United States v. D. & R. G. R. Co., 150 U. S. 1, 14; Richmond &c. R. Co. v. Louisa R. Co., 13 How. 71, 86.

In the construction of an enabling act the land grants therein made are not to receive at the hands of this court the strict construction which is followed with respect to legislative grants to railroad companies or to States to aid in the construction of railroads.

In none of the following cases involving the construction of land grants as contained in the enabling acts of several of the States, did this court invoke the strict rule of construction. Ham v. Missouri, 18 How. 126; Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173; Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; Heydenfeldt v. Mining Co., 93 U. S. 634; Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U. S. 517; Mining Co. v. Mining Co., 102 U. S. 167; Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 271; Missouri &c. R. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U. S. 114; Hitchcock v. Minnesota, 185 U. S. 373; Johnson v. Washington, 190 U. S. 179; Mining Co. v. Mining Co., supra.

The Enabling Act being a compact between the United States and the State of Utah, it should receive the same construction as an ordinary contract. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129, 137. Where a State is the grantee a more liberal rule of construction prevails. Indiana v. Milk, 11 Fed. Rep. 389.

MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in the case is whether § 8 of the Enabling Act of the State of Utah granted to the State all of the saline lands within the State or only enabled them to be selected as part of other lands granted and not specifically located.

Section 8 reads as follows (act of July 16, 1894, c. 138, 28 Stat. 107, 109):

"That lands to the extent of two townships in quantity, authorized by the third section of the act of February twenty-one, eighteen hundred and fifty-five, to be re

served for the establishment of the University of Utah, are hereby granted to the State of Utah for university purposes, to be held and used in accordance with the provisions of this section; and any portion of said lands that may not have been selected by said Territory may be selected by said State. That in addition to the above, one hundred and ten thousand acres of land, to be selected and located as provided in the foregoing section of this act, and including all the saline lands in said State, are hereby granted to said State, for the use of said university, and two hundred thousand acres for the use of an agricultural college therein. That the proceeds of the sale of said lands, or any portion thereof, shall constitute permanent funds, to be safely held and invested by said State, and the income thereof to be used exclusively for the purposes of such university and agricultural college, respectively."

We have italicized the clause upon which the answer to the question turns. The special stress of it comes on the words "and including" and whether they carry a grant of all the saline lands or permit merely the selection of such lands as part of the 110,000 acres.

Construing the statute as granting all of the saline lands the State brought suit against the Montello Salt Company, herein called the Salt Company, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, alleging that the Salt Company was in possession of certain of the lands, specifically describing them, claiming title under certain placer mining locations, and was threatening to take up and remove valuable deposits of salt therefrom. It was prayed that the Salt Company be adjudged to have no right, title, or interest in the lands and that the State be decreed their owner. An injunction pending the trial was also prayed, and general relief.

A preliminary injunction was issued. The answer of the Salt Company admitted that the lands were saline and alleged that it was the equitable owner of them by