make such decree as was proper, according to the practice in equity causes on appeal. And, if upon the examination of the record it should appear that the defendants were in fact and in law guilty of the contempt charged, there could be no more important duty than to render such a decree as would serve to vindicate the jurisdiction and authority of courts to enforce orders and to punish acts of disobedience. For while it is sparingly to be used, yet the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory.

If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are the courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the "judicial power of the United States" would be a mere mockery.

This power "has been uniformly held to be necessary to the protection of the court from insults and oppressions while in the ordinary exercise of its duties, and to enable it to enforce its judgments and orders necessary to the due administration of law and the protection of the rights of suitors." Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U. S. 324, 333.

There has been general recognition of the fact that the courts are clothed with this power and must be authorized to exercise it without referring the issues of fact or law to another tribunal or to a jury in the same tribunal. For if there was no such authority in the first instance there would be no power to enforce its orders if they were disregarded in such independent investigation. Without authority to act promptly and independently the courts could not administer public justice or enforce the rights of private litigants. Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U. S. 337.

Congress in recognition of the necessity of the case has

also declared (Rev. Stat., § 725) that the courts of the United States "shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment contempts of their authority

cluding "disobedience

in

by any party to any

lawful order of the said courts." But the very amplitude of the power is a warning to use it with discretion, and a command never to exert it where it is not necessary or proper. For that reason we can proceed no further in this case because it is both unnecessary and improper to make any decree in this contempt proceeding.

For on the hearing of the appeal and cross appeal in the original cause in which the injunction was issued, it appeared from the statement of counsel in open court that there had been a complete settlement of all matters involved in the case of Bucks Stove & Range Company v. The American Federation of Labor et al. This court therefore declined to further consider the case, which had become moot, and those two appeals were dismissed. 219 U. S. 581. When the main case was settled, every proceeding which was dependent on it, or a part of it, was also necessarily settled-of course without prejudice to the power and right of the court to punish for contempt by proper proceedings. Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 27. If this had been a separate and independent proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to vindicate the authority of the court, with the public on one side and the defendants on the other, it could not, in any way, have been affected by any settlement which the parties to the equity cause made in their private litigation.

But, as we have shown, this was a proceeding in equity for civil contempt where the only remedial relief possible was a fine payable to the complainant. The company prayed "for such relief as the nature of its case may require," and when the main cause was terminated by a settlement of all differences between the parties, the complainant did not require and was not entitled to any

compensation or relief of any other character. The present proceeding necessarily ended with the settlement of the main cause of which it is a part. Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U. S. 328, 333; Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 27; State v. Nathans, 49 S. Car. 207. The criminal sentences imposed in the civil case, therefore, should be set aside.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and remand the case to that court with direction that the contempt proceedings instituted by the Bucks Stove & Range Company be dismissed, but without prejudice to the power and right of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to punish by a proper proceeding, contempt, if any, committed against it.

Reversed.

MONTELLO SALT COMPANY v. STATE OF UTAH.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH. No. 136. Argued April 21, 1911.-Decided May 29, 1911.

The words "and including" following a description do not necessarily mean "in addition to," but may refer to a part of the thing described.

The words "110,000 acres of land

. and including all the saline lands in the State" as used in § 8 of the Utah Enabling Act are not to be construed as a grant of such salines in addition to the 110,000 acres, but simply as conferring on the State the right, which it would not otherwise have, of including saline lands within its selections for the 110,000 acres.

This construction is in harmony with the uniform policy of Congress in connection with grants to the States of saline lands.

34 Utah, 458, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of § 8 of the

221 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

Utah Enabling Act and the effect to be given to the words "and including all saline lands in the State" in connection with the grant of public lands for the University of Utah, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. S. T. Corn and Mr. Jesse R. Barton, with whom Mr. James N. Kimball was on the brief, for plaintiff in

error:

The State did not take title to the saline lands in question by virtue of the Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, without any act upon its part by way of selecting the same.

As unoccupied saline lands they were subject to location by defendant's grantors under the act of January 31, 1901, 31 Stat. 145.

The grant in § 8 of the Enabling Act did not by the words "and including" carry all saline lands in said State, besides the 110,000 acres originally granted.

Had that been the intention of Congress it was only necessary after the grant of the 110,000 acres to add the words, "and all saline lands in said State now known or hereafter to be discovered." To so construe the statute would be in direct violation of established rules of construction. Suth. Stat. Const., § 387; Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 740; Dubuque and Pacific R. R. Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66.

All grants of this description are strictly construed against the grantee; nothing passes but what is conveyed in clear and explicit language. Barden v. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co., 154 U. S. 288. To strike out the word "including" would be to extend the grant by implication and construe the act most strongly against the grantor.

The construction of the Enabling Act insisted on by defendant in error would be to create an endowment for the university many times greater than Congress ever conferred upon any other state university and also out of line with the legislation of Congress in regard to saline

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

221 U.S.

land. See statutes on the subject of saline lands. 1 Stat. 466; Ohio Enabling Act of April 30, 1802; 2 Stat. 175. As to Ohio see also 4 Stat. 79; in Missouri, 3 Stat. 547; in Michigan, 5 Stat. 60; in Iowa, 5 Stat. 790; in Arkansas, 1836, 5 Stat. 58; 4 Stat. 505; 4 Stat. 304; in Illinois, 4 Stat. 305, 496. See also special act as to Michigan, Illinois and Arkansas, 9 Stat. 181, 182. Congress has carefully guarded the saline lands in the Indian Territory. 2 Stat. 280. See as to Alabama, 3 Stat. 491; and as to Mississippi, 2 Stat. 5, 48.

Saline lands or salt springs have never been granted to any State by blanket provisions. In 30 Stat. 484, all saline lands in its territory were granted to New Mexico, but the language employed was entirely different, the wording being, "together with all saline lands."

In general grants, unless otherwise clearly stated, neither mineral nor saline nor salt springs are granted. Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660; United States v. N. P. Ry. Co., 170 Fed. Rep. 498; 176 Fed. Rep. 706; Garrard v. Silver Peak Mines, 82 Fed. Rep. 578; Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 271; Mining Co. v. Mining Co., 102 U. S. 167; Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761; L. L. & G. R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733.

The word "and" does not add to the word "including." It is a principle of construction that "and" and "or" are considered of less importance in construing statutes and their direct meaning is more readily departed from than other words; and, if necessary to give effect to the intention of the parties to an instrument, will be excluded or disregarded altogether. Railroad Co. v. Bartlett, 11 N. E. Rep. (Ill.) 867; Witherspoon v. Jarrigan, 76 S. W. Rep. (Texas), 445, 447; People v. Lyte, 40 N. Y. Supp. 153, 161; Boyle v. McMurphy, 55 Illinois, 236; Simpson v. Morris, 3 Yeates, 104.

In the connection in which it is used in the act it should be excluded or disregarded as meaningless.