assignment. Whether expressed in the instrument or left to implication, is immaterial. The assignee does not acquire the entire legal and equitable interest in the property conveyed, subject to the trust, but a specific lien upon it. The residuary interest of the assignor may, according to its nature, or that of the property, be reached by execution or by bill in equity.'"

The reservation which the law pronounces fraudulent is of some pecuniary benefit at the expense of creditors, especially when secretly secured-such benefit to the assignor being presumed a prime purpose of the conveyance. Lukins v. Aird, 6 Wall. 79. Other cases are considered and reviewed in Huntley v. Kingman, supra.

Section 1120 of the District of Columbia Code provides that in suits to set aside transfers or assignments as made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, "the question of fraudulent intent shall be deemed a question of fact and not of law."

Counsel have argued, as courts have ruled, that no amount of evidence will assign to an instrument an operation which the law does not assign to it. Thus a mere deed of gift which actually deprives existing creditors of property which was subject to their claims, or a transfer of property grossly disproportioned to a debt secured under a conveyance apparently absolute, but subject to a secret agreement that the surplus should be held for the assignor, could not be saved, for the necessary legal effect would be to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and the law could but assign to such conveyance the intent which must indubitably appear from the facts. Edgell v. Hart, 9 N. Y. 213, 217.

But the assignment here was of a mere chose in action, not subject to legal process, but to be reached through equity only. There was no requirement of law that such an assignment should be recorded and no legal way to give constructive notice. The debt secured was an honest

one, and the security was of uncertain value and character, involving great expense and delay in collection. The fact that the reservation of any surplus after paying the debt secured was not disclosed in the assignment itself was a circumstance of suspicious character, but not as matter of law inconsistent with an honest intent. Two courts have held that under all the circumstances the assignment was not made to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and as matter of law had no such result. We are content to affirm this judgment.

Affirmed.

LIVERPOOL & LONDON & GLOBE INSURANCE COMPANY v. BOARD OF ASSESSORS FOR THE PARISH OF ORLEANS.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA.

No. 92. Argued April 18, 19, 1911.-Decided May 15, 1911.

Credits on open account are incorporeal and have no actual situs, but they constitute property and as such are taxable by the power having jurisdiction.

The maxim of mobilia sequuntur personam yields to the fact of actual control; and jurisdiction to tax intangible credits exists in the sovereignty of the debtor's domicile, such credits being of value to the creditor because of the power given by such sovereignty to enforce the debt. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 205. Such taxation does not deny duc process of law.

The jurisdiction of the State of the domicile over the creditor's person does not exclude the power of another State in which he transacts his business to tax credits there accruing to him from resident debtors, and thus, without denying due process of law, to enforce contribution to support the government under whose protection his affairs are conducted.

221 U. S.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

Credits need not be evidenced in any particular manner in order to render them subject to taxation.

Premiums due by residents to a non-resident insurance company and which have been extended, but for which no written obligations have been given, are credits subject to taxation by the State where the debtor is domiciled; and so held that the statute of Louisiana to that effect is not unconstitutional as denying due process of law.

In a suit for cancellation of an entire assessment as unconstitutional the plaintiff cannot ask for a reduction of amount if there is a proceeding under the state statute for that purpose and which he has not availed of.

122 Louisiana, 98, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the power of a State to tax premiums of insurance due by residents to a non-resident insurance company which have been extended but not evidenced by written instrument, and the constitutionality of a statute of Louisiana to that effect, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Monte M. Lemann and Mr. Alexander C. King, with whom Mr. Harry H. Hall and Mr. J. Blanc Monroe were on the brief, for plaintiffs in error:

A State cannot legally impose an assessment and tax upon premiums due under open account by local policy holders to non-resident or foreign insurance companies. Such assessment and tax would be a taking of property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 429; Louisville &c. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 398; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; United States v. Erie, 106 U. S. 327; Hagan v. Reclamation, 111 U. S. 701; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Erie R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628; Savings Society v. Multnomah, 169 U. S. 421; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189; Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National, 191 U. S. 388; Metropoli

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

221 U.S.

tan Life v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 407; Barber Asphalt Co. v. City, 41 La. Ann. 1015; L. & L. & G. Insurance Co. v. Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 760; Railey v. Assessors, 44 La. Ann. 766; Clason v. City, 46 La. Ann. 1; State v. Assessors, 47 La. Ann. 1545; Bluefields Banana Co. v. Assessors, 49 La. Ann. 43; Parker v. Strouse, 49 La. Ann. 1173; L. & L. & G. Insurance Co. v. Assessors, 51 La. Ann. 1028; Comptoir National v. Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 1319; Williams v. Triche, 107 Louisiana, 92; Monongahela v. Assessors, 115 Louisiana, 566; Metropolitan Life v. Assessors, 115 Louisiana, 698.

A plain distinction can be drawn between a premium due on open account to a non-resident, or foreign, insurance corporation, by a local policy holder, on the one hand, and on the other, an open account resulting from the sale of merchandise to a local purchaser from a local stock of goods belonging to a non-resident owner. General Electric Co. v. Assessors, 121 Louisiana, 116.

Assessments admittedly the result of mere guesswork, and so excessive as to exceed from ten to one hundred times the admitted value of the thing assessed, are absolute nullities. 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 660; 26 La. Ann. 694; 30 La. Ann. 261; 40 La. Ann. 371; 42 La. Ann. 374; 130 U. S. 177; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 2; Merchants' Insurance Co. v. Assessors, 40 La. Ann. 372; Natalbany Lumber Co. v. Assessors, 123 Louisiana, 174; Union Oil Co. v. Campbell, 48 La. Ann. 1350; Waggoner v. Maumus, 112 Louisiana, 232; Swift v. Assessors, 115 Louisiana, 321.

The denial by the assessors of the statutory right of the owners to be heard, renders the assessment null, and would amount to a taking of petitioner's property without due process of law. Louisiana Acts, 1898, p. 360; 1906, p. 96; Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 361; 27 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 660, 704; 21 Fed. Rep. 99; 111 U. S. 708; 49 La. Ann. 1350; Johnson v. Tax Collector, 39 La. Ann. 538;

Shattuck v. New Orleans, 39 La. Ann. 209; 2 Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 362, 363.

Assessors have no right arbitrarily to refuse to believe the evidence of the taxpayers. 1 Desty on Taxation, 543. The statutory limitation does not apply to suits contesting the validity of the tax, Oteri v. Parker, 42 La. Ann. 374; Railroad Co. v. Sheriff, 50 La. Ann. 737; the decision that the failure to file these suits prior to the first of November, 1905-1907, barred averring the nullity or excessive character of the assessments amounts to a deprivation of plaintiff's property, without judicial action and without due process of law. Central of Georgia v. Wright, 207 U. S. 138; Travelers' v. Assessors, 122 Louisiana, 129, 136.

Mr. George H. Terriberry, Mr. H. Garland Dupré and Mr. Harry P. Sneed for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was brought by the Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company of New York, a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Louisiana, to cancel an assessment made by the Board of Assessors for the Parish of Orleans for the year 1906.

The assessment itself is not shown by the record, but from the testimony the Supreme Court of the State concluded "that the property intended to be assessed was the amount due plaintiff by its policy holders in this State for premiums on which credit of thirty and sixty days had been extended." Dealing with the case from this standpoint, that court affirmed a judgment dismissing the suit, giving as its reasons "that the said credits are due in this State and have arisen in the course of the business of the plaintiff company done in this State, and are therefore part and parcel of the said business in this State, and as a consequence are taxable here." 122 Louisiana, 98.