Argument for Appellant. 221 U.S. There is a distinction between the police power of the State to regulate the taking of a natural product, such as natural gas, and prohibiting that product from transportation in interstate commerce. The former is within, and the latter is beyond, the power of the State. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, distinguished. A State does not have the same ownership in natural gas and oil after the same have been reduced to possession as it does over the flowing waters of its rivers. Riparian owners have no title to the water itself as a commodity. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, distinguished. The right to engage in interstate commerce is not the gift of a State; nor can a State regulate or restrain such commerce, or exclude from its limits a corporation engaged therein. Inaction by Congress in regard to a subject of interstate commerce is a declaration of freedom from state interference. Where a State grants the use of its highways to domestic corporations engaged in intrastate commerce in a commodity it cannot deny the same use, under the same restrictions, to foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce in the same commodity; and so held that the statute of Oklahoma prohibiting foreign corporations from building pipe lines across highways and transporting natural gas therein to points outside the State is unconstitutional as an interference with, and restraint upon, interstate commerce, and as a deprivation of property without due process of law. 172 Fed. Rep. 545, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Oklahoma restricting interstate commerce in oil and natural gas, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Charles West, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, and Mr. Charles B. Ames for appellant: The act of 1907-1908, as well as the supplementary legislation of 1909, is within the proper police power of the State. The ruling principle is conservation, not commerce, and the due process clause is the single issue. Consumers' Gas Co. v. Harless, 29 N. E. Rep. 1062; N. W. Tel. Ex. Co. v. St. Charles, 154 Fed. Rep. 386; Western Union Tel. 221 U.S. Argument for Appellant. Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 195 U. S. 540; Wilson v. Hudson County W. Co., 76 Atl. Rep. 560. A justifiable taking of property overrules other principles. Peculiar mineralogical character of oil, gas and water, likewise also justify such taking. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361; Strickley v. Highland Boy Min. Co., 200 U. S. 527; Offield v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co., 203 U. S. 372; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311; Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190; Lindsley v. Nat. Carb. Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Katz v. Walkinshaw (Cal.), 64 L. R. A. 236; Hudson Co. W. Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 281; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125. Special climatic conditions justify taking for public use, as do also special topographical conditions. States may restrain the reckless use of natural resources. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 397. For instances of conservation upheld though other rights thereby limited, see McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U. S. 125; Manigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473; Georgia v. Tennessee Co., 206 U. S. 230; Hudson Co. W. Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349; N. Y. ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 31; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61; Mfgs. Co. v. Indiana Co., 50 L. R. A. 134; Consumers' Co. v. Harless, 29 N. E. Rep. 1062; Townsend v. State, 47 N. E. Rep. 19; Given v. State, 66 N. E. Rep. 750; State v. Ohio Co., 49 N. E. Rep. 809; Jamieson v. Indiana Co., 128 Indiana, 555; Wilson v. Hudson Co., 76 Atl. Rep. 560; Welch v' Swasey, 193 Massachusetts, 364; Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Maine, 403; Salem v. Maynes, 123 Massachusetts, 372; Am. Point. Wks. v. Laurence, 23 N. J. L. 9; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Korasek v. Peter, 50 L. R. A. 345; Smith v. Morse, 148 Massachusetts, 407; St. Louis v. Argument for Appellant. 221 U.S. Gault, 179 Missouri, 8; Summerville v. Presley, 33 S. Car. 56; Katz v. Walkinshaw, 64 L. R. A. 236; Ex parte Elam, 91 Pac. Rep. 811; Windsor v. State, 64 Atl. Rep. 288; Questions & Answers, 103 Maine, 506; Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Metc. 55. There is no right to unlimited use of oil, gas, or water under land except for use connected with land. Forbell v. New York, 164 N. Y. 522; Hathorn v. Nat. Carb. Co., 87 N. E. Rep. 504. The act is valid as an exercise of the State's police power in its control over the use of its highways for transportation purposes. The State's highways are its public property. St. Louis v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 148 U. S. 92, 101; Atty. Gen. v. Shrewsbury Bridge Co., 21 Chanc. Div. 752; Richmond v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 174 U. S. 746; Memphis v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 139 Fed. Rep. 707; 3 Elliott on Railroads, 2d ed., § 1076. The right to use the highways in maintaining a gas pipe line, a permanent plant,-is a franchise. Gas Light Co. v. Laclede Co., 115 U. S. 650; Foster Lbr. Co. v. A. V. & W. Ry. Co., 20 Oklahoma, 583; S. C., 100 Pac. Rep. 1110; State v. Cincinnati Gas Light Co., 18 Oh. St. 262; Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396; Jersey City Gas Co. v. Dwight, 29 N. J. Eq. 242, 248; Purnell v. McLane, 56 Atl. Rep. 830; Pittsburg &c. R. R. Co. v. Hood, 94 Fed. Rep. 618; Hardman v. Cabot, 55 S. E. Rep. 756; Ward v. Trifle St. Nat. Gas Co., 74 S. W. Rep. 709. This being true the right must either be acquired by grant or by condemnation. Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400; Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati, 76 Fed. Rep. 296, 308. The right has not been granted by the State, and the appellees do not assert any right by grant. The right of eminent domain is not granted to foreign corporations. This right may be lawfully granted to domestic corporations and withheld from foreign. Beale 221 U. S. Argument for Appellant. on Foreign Corporations, § 115; State v. Scott, 22 Nebraska, 628; Trestor v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 23 Nebraska, 242; State v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 25 Nebraska, 156; Keonig v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 27 Nebraska, 699; Holbert v. St. L. &c. R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 23; Evansville &c. Co. v. Hudson Bridge Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 51; Foltz v. St. L. & S. F. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 316. The right of eminent domain for purposes of interstate commerce might be granted by the United States. Beale on Foreign Corporations, § 115, note; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 106. But the United States have not granted it for the purpose here involved. The right claimed by appellees being a franchise and not having been granted either by the State or the United States cannot be exercised without condemnation and as the power of eminent domain has neither been granted by the State nor by the United States, the right cannot be acquired by condemnation. Therefore the appellees have not the right by the State's volition, nor have they the power to take it without the State's volition. The appellees claim the right by grant from the owners of the abutting land. For highway purpose, including all transportation, the State has control regardless of the fee, Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324, and the abutter cannot grant the right to appellees. State v. Kansas Nat. Gas Co. (Kan.), 80 Pac. Rep. 962; M. & E. R. Co. v. Mayor, 10 N. J. Eq. 352; Young v. Harrison, 6 Georgia, 130; Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Co., 2 Porter (Ala.), 296; Lewis on Eminent Domain, §§ 91c-911, 3d ed., §§ 117-128. The State's control of transportation is superior to the right of the abutter. Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536, 548; Cheney v. Barker, 84 N. E. Rep. 492; Snively v. Washington, 218 Pa. 249. The State having control of the public highways may grant privileges to its own citizens and refuse them to Argument for Appellees. 221 U.S. others, including foreign corporations, the same as it may do in regard to eminent domain. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Consumers' Gas Co. v. Harless (Ind.), 29 N. E. Rep. 1062. The act is valid as an exercise of the State's police power in creating and controlling its own corporations. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. If banking, which has always been regarded as a common right, can be confined to corporations, it seems clear that constructing a permanent plant in the highway, which has always been regarded as a franchise, can be confined to corporations. The appellees not being domestic corporations, therefore, have not the right to construct gas pipe lines in Oklahoma, and therefore are not affected by the provisions of the law restricting domestic corporations in the conduct of their business, and therefore have no right to complain of the law or any of its provisions. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 153; Lee v. State, 207 U. S. 67; Dolly v. Abilene Nat. Bank, 179 Fed. Rep. 461. The act does not regulate interstate commerce but only affects it indirectly, just as it might be affected by the denial of the right of eminent domain to foreign corporations or the refusal to grant a city franchise to an interstate pipe line company or an interstate telephone company. N. W. Tel. Exch. Co. v. St. Charles, 154 Fed. Rep. 386; Consumers' Gas Co. v. Harless (Ind.), 29 N. E. Rep. 1062; Wilson v. Hudson Co. Water Co. (N. J.), 76 Atl. Rep. 560, 566, 567. Mr. John G. Johnson and Mr. D. T. Watson, with whom Mr. E. L. Scarritt and Mr. John J. Jones were on the brief, for appellees: The police power of a State does not authorize conservation in the sense of prohibiting the sale of lawful articles of private property in the interest of the general |