221 U.S. Argument for the Imperial Tobacco Co. very cases which are cited by the Government as holding that all contracts in restraint of trade whether reasonable or unreasonable, are in violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association. 166 U. S. 290, 329. The same principle is recognized in United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 566; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, per Mr. Justice Brewer at p. 361; Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, per Mr. Justice Holmes at p. 184. Mr. Justice Peckham in the Joint Traffic Case held that the statute is to have a "reasonable construction." When he states that contracts in restraint of trade are invalid under the statute, whether reasonable or unreasonable, he refers not to contracts between mercantile or manufacturing concerns, but to contracts or combinations between competing railroad corporations, all of which contracts or combinations are illegal under the statute even though the rates and fares established are reasonable. See 171 U. S. 568, 570. The distinction between contracts affecting public service corporations, and contracts between private individuals or corporations, is well stated in Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, where it was held that a corporation cannot disable itself by contract from the performance of public duties which it has undertaken, and thereby make public accommodation or convenience subservient to its private interests, but where the public welfare is not involved, and where the restraint of one party is not greater than protection to the other party requires, the contract in restraint of trade may be sustained. The validity of covenants between vendor and vendee, for the purpose of protecting the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, have been upheld under the Sherman Act in the Addyston Pipe Case, 85 Fed. Rep. 291, modified and affirmed without approval of the opinion below in 175 U. S. 211; Brett v. Argument for the Imperial Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. Ebel, 29 N. Y. App. Div. 256; Lanyon v. Garden City Sand Co., 223 Illinois, 616; Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 454; Bancroft & Rich v. U. S. Embossing Co., 72 N. H. 402; Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Stanton, 227 Pa. St. 55. In view of the statement of Mr. Justice Brewer in his concurring opinion in the Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 361, that "Congress did not intend to reach and destroy those minor contracts in partial restraint of trade," and in view of the limitations placed upon the effect of the statute in Mr. Justice Peckham's opinion in the TransMissouri Case, we may fairly assume the statement made by Mr. Justice Brewer to represent the views of this court, especially as to contracts of a mercantile character not affecting railroads or other direct instruments of commerce. The subject of contracts not in restraint of trade at common law prior to the act of 1890 is discussed by this court in Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64; Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396, 409; Fowles v. Park, 131 U. S. 88-96. The lower Federal courts have decided numerous cases both before and since the Sherman Act, upholding contracts, the avowed object of which was to buy off competition of a business rival. Carter v. Alling, 43 Fed. Rep. 208; U. S. Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 946; Harrison v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 116 Fed. Rep. 304; National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Haberman, 120 Fed. Rep. 415; Praine v. Ferrell, 166 Fed. Rep. 702; Walker v. Lawrence, 177 Fed. Rep. 363. Contracts between parties which have for their object the removal of a rival competitor in a business are not to be regarded as contracts in restraint of trade. Contracts although in partial restraint of trade, if valid at common law, and if not a cover for a combination or conspiracy to raise prices, or to prevent general competition, are not invalid under the Sherman Act. This proposition 221 U. S. Argument for the Imperial Tobacco Co. is clearly held by the authorities above cited from the Federal reports. As to what contracts would not be illegal at common law as in restraint of trade, see Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351; Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsent, L. R. 9 Eq. 345; approved by this court in Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S. 396. In Nordenfelt v. Maxim, Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., L. R. 1894, App. Cases, 535, the House of Lords reviewed at great length and in elaborate opinions the whole subject of covenants in restraint of trade, and held unanimously that a covenant, though unrestricted as to space, was not invalid where it was shown to be no wider than was necessary for the protection of the company, nor injurious to the public interests. The case of Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473, establishes the proposition that in connection with the sale of a factory and the good will thereof, a covenant, practically unrestricted in time or space, not to engage in the manufacture or sale of competing articles, is not a covenant in restraint of trade. The same principle is laid down in the cases of Hodge v. Sloane, 107 N. Y. 244; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519; Tode v. Gross, 127 N. Y. 480; Matthews v. Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333; Oakes v. Cataragus Water Co., 143 N. Y. 430; Wood v. Whitehead Brothers Co., 165 N. Y. 545; New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co., 180 N. Y. 280; Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Massachusetts, 101; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball, 193 Massachusetts, 351; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Georgia, 188; Bullock v. Johnson, 110 Georgia, 486. The most recent decisions in the state courts in which covenants to refrain from competition have been held reasonable and lawful, are, Freudenthal v. Espey (Cal.), 102 Pac. Rep. 280; Louisville Board of Underwriters v. Johnson (Ky.), 119 S. W. Rep. 152; Wolf v. Duluth Board of Trade Argument for the Imperial Tobacco Co. 221 U.S. (Minn.), 121 N. W. Rep. 395; Seigal v. Marcus, (No. Dak.), 119 N. W. Rep. 358; Buckhout v. Witler (Mich.), 122 N. W. Rep. 184; Blume v. Home Ins. Agency (Ark.), 121 S. W. Rep. 293; Wooten v. Harris (No. Car.), 68 S. E. Rep. 989; Home Telephone Co. v. North Manchester Telephone Co. (Ind.), 92 N. E. Rep. 558; Artistic Porcelain Co. v. Boch (N. J.), 74 Atl. Rep. 680; Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Stanton (Pa.), 75 Atl. Rep. 988. As to the British-American agreement there is absolutely nothing in that agreement which prevents, or tends to prevent, any other company or companies from manufacturing and exporting tobacco to other countries than Great Britain and the United States. There is no agreement to restrict prices or to interfere in any way with free competition. The evidence shows that there has been no actual diminution in the business of exporting either leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco from the United States to foreign countries by reason of the British-American agreement. None of the decisions heretofore made by this court under the Sherman Act are applicable to the agreements here involved. The Joint Traffic, Trans-Missouri and Northern Securities cases dealt with agreements between railroad companies or holders of railroad stocks, the effect and intent of which were held to restrict competition between common carriers and public service corporations. They have no application to agreements between manufacturers, but are based upon the peculiar obligations of common carriers and public service corporations. The Addyston Pipe Case, 175 U. S. 211, involved an agreement between rival and competing manufacturers that there should be no competition between them in certain States or Territories, the direct, immediate and intended effect of which agreement was the enhancement of the price. Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, was an agreement, the effect of which was to raise prices in the California market. 221 U. S. Argument for the Imperial Tobacco Co. The case of Swift & Co. v. United States involved a combination of independent meat dealers who agreed not to bid against each other in the livestock markets, to fix selling prices and to restrict shipments of meat when necessary. The case of Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, was a sequel of the Addyston Pipe Case. The case of Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U. S. 423, was a case where the lessor company had agreed with the lessee company not only to go out of the field of competition, and not to enter that field again, but had further agreed to render every assistance to prevent others from entering it. The case of Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight Sons, 212 U. S. 227, was a case of an agreement between a number of manufacturers who organized a selling company through which their entire output was sold to such persons only as would enter into a purchasing agreement by which their sales were restricted. The agreement provided for selling by jobbers at particular specified prices. The company was a selling company organized to control all the selling business of the manufacturing wall paper corporations, partnerships and persons who owned the stock of the Continental Wall Paper Company, and made separate contracts with that corporation giving it entire control of the selling business of the manufacturers. None of the cases in this court apply to the agreements between the American and Imperial Companies, which are involved in this suit. They had no necessary effect to directly and substantially restrict free competition in any of the products of tobacco, and did not unlawfully restrain interstate commerce. Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. Rep. 461. The oral testimony shows that the agreements did not and could not, under the existing circumstances, operate to restrain trade or create a monopoly, and therefore could |