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it) that he should disregard the terms of his contract, which was really with the court, and become the instrument whereby Barse, receiver, should turn over the stock without payment therefor to Barse personally, selling the same to outsiders for money not turned in to the court's officer, seems immaterial. (1) The application of Roser and Haskell to be relieved from their contracts is denied. (2) The exceptions to master's report are overruled. (3) The master's report is confirmed. (4) The order filed March 12, 1902, is vacated and set aside, and a new order in same terms (except as to leave to move to be relieved) is made as of this date, so as to avoid any question as to time for appeal having expired. (5) Twenty days' time is given (after entry of order on this decision) to comply with the provisions of the new order as to payment. (6) And in the event of default execution will issue against the estate of Roser, and against any property of Haskell, and attachment for contempt against Haskell. (7) Should an appeal from this order be taken within said 20 days, execution of said order will be suspended until decision of Circuit Court of Appeals.
In re BATES. (District Court, D. Connecticut.) Specifications of Objections to Discharge.
TOWNSEND, District Judge. As to the first ground of objection, the bankrupt testified on his examination that he paid $100 to his attorney, while in his schedule he stated that no sums were paid to counsel. The referee finds that the $100 was really paid by bankrupt's father, by check made to the order of bankrupt's attorney, and delivered to the attorney either by the father personally or by the hand of the bankrupt. The referee finds that there was no intention to give false testimony in the case, and that the bankrupt was not under obligation to include said $100 in his schedule; and I concur with the referee, and hold that no criminal intent is to be inferred from the facts brought out. As to the other specification, the describing a private as a partnership indebtedness, I concur in the opinion of the referee that it was an erroneous statement, from which the bankrupt obtained no advantage, and which was purely due to oversight and mistake, and not due to criminal intent. The exceptions to the referee's report are overruled, and the report is accepted, and the discharge granted.
END OF CASES IN VOL 125.