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Neither house shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than two days.

"12. For any speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place.

"13. Any bill may originate in either house of the legislature, and all bills passed by one house may be amended by the other.

"14. The enacting clause of all bills shall be, 'The People of the state of New York, represented in senate and assembly, do enact as follows;' and no law shall be enacted except by bill.

"15. No bill shall be passed unless by the assent of a majority of all the members elected to each branch of the legislature, and the question upon the final passage shall be taken immediately upon its last reading, and the yeas and nays entered on the journal.

"16. No private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.

"17. The legislature may confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state, such farther powers, local, legislative, and administrative, as they shall from time to time prescribe."

This is plain. The seventeenth clause contains all the information in the constitution about the local, legislative, and administrative powers vested in the county officials. The names of the counties are also given; but why there are counties, where they are coming from, what difference there is between towns and counties, whether these most important political districts are of Dutch, or English, or American origin, and entirely depending upon the pleasure of the legislature or not, what rights they possess, the constitution does not show. If these political districts are mere accidental, why say a word in the constitution about the canals and canal officers, banks, etc, who, as such, have not the least connection with the state institution proper; or do we require canals or salt springs for the realization of justice? Is there a word in the federal constitution concerning forts, arsenals, and docks, although Congress have built several? The omission of the organic dispositions concerning the towns and counties is, no doubt, a cardinal oversight; for without these districts the state machinery could not work at all; and if they are not organized according to sound, firm, political principles, laid down in the constitution, it will work but badly, while without a line on canals, corporations, education, banks, and the like, this institution would answer to its real purpose very well. These districts are as it were, social breakwaters in regard to the powers of the governing

and governed. Without them the government would not take root or be firmly anchored, but drift about at the mercy of the populace, who on the other hand, without them, would be in eternal confusion and commotion. In a word, anarchy would be the rule, and tyranny take the place of civil liberty.

Before I leave this subject, I ask you to imagine what intolerable confusion there would be in a house without division walls and rooms, like a church, occupied by a large number of families to live in. The same confusion would happen in society if it were not divided into convenient business districts, in ancient times known as clans, tribes, etc. Even in absolute monarchies you will therefore find social divisions, answering to our townships and counties. Their importance is my excuse if I am too diffuse.

If you are attentive to the current legislation, you will notice instances of laws failing, because they are declared unconstitutional or repugnant to society. This happens invariably if by such laws the public business is dislocated. As an example, I avert to the state temperance laws. These have everywhere failed, because it is a part of the town government to abate, in conformity with the town (city, village) by-laws, instances of excessive drinking, causing a public nuisance. It is a logical and political necessity to leave the checking of this evil to the town governments, because it is only very relative or personal, and in its nature no subject for a general state-law.

This subject has been misunderstood at all times, otherwise we would not find in Plutarch the following sentence: "Those who carry every trifle (mere local affairs) to the highest magistrate, are the most dangerous enemies of their country."

Very true, especially in republics.

My partiality for this beautiful, natural, simple form of government, will excuse this long epistle.

LETTER VI.

Executive. Governor's Duties. — Legislative Committees. — LieutenantGovernor. Eligibility. - Commander-in-Chief. - Messages.- Salary. Navy. Army. - Execution of Laws. - President of the Senate. - Reprieves. Pardon. - Impeachment. - Veto.

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THE second department of the government will now occupy our

attention.

ARTICLE IV.
Executive.

"1. The executive power shall be vested in a governor, who shall hold his office for two years; a lieutenant-governor shall be chosen at the same time, and for the same term.

"2. No person, except a citizen of the United S'ates, shall be eligible to the office of governor; nor shall any person be eligible to that office, who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and who shall not have been five years next preceding his election, a resident within this state.

"3. The governor and lieutenant-governor shall be elected at the times and places of choosing members of the Assembly. The persons respectively having the highest number of votes for governor and lieutenant-governor, shall be elected ; but in case two or more shall have an equal and the highest number of votes for governor, or for lieutenant-governor, the two houses of the legislature at its next annual session, shall, forthwith, by joint ballot, choose one of the said persons so having an equal and the highest number of votes for governor, or lieutenant-governor.

"4. The governor shall be commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the state. He shall have power to convene the legislature (or the senate only) on extraordinary occasions. He shall communicate by message to the legislature at every session, the condition of the state, and recommend such matters to them as he shall judge expedient. He shall transact all necessary business with the officers of government, civil and military. He shall expedite all such measures as may be resolved upon by the legislature, and shall take care that the laws are faithfully executed. He shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation to be established by law, which shall neither be increased nor diminished after his election and during his continuance in office."

The first three sections are plain. The fourth seems to be entirely mistaken by the governors themselves, and those who com

plain that this constitution has stripped the governor of power to such an extent as to discredit the office, because it manifestly makes, in plain words, this officer, by enjoining upon him the duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, the responsible head of the whole state administration. Accordingly, the governor has the supreme control of all public offices, officers, and affairs, in the several political districts. This is all the constitution can do. The duty of the official, clad with such high power, is now to use it energetically. This requires, of course, courage, a thorough knowledge of the purpose of a state institution, of the proper nature of the political business, to what district it belongs, and of the laws in general. It follows that he has to transact personally, or by writing, all affairs with the officials, who become practical subjects of this control. By pointing out this expressly, the constitution evidently explains the magnitude of the trust.

This control is made with us exceedingly easy by the prevalent general publicity. The press keeps a constant record of all events. Suppose the governor has access to a reading-room containing, at least, one paper from each county, he will be posted of every fact of importance, enabling him to transact the necessary controlling business. Any deviation from official duty, especially if it should originate with the executives of counties and towns (cities, villages), he is obliged to examine and resent, in accordance with the laws. We often notice that state legislatures appoint committees to examine into the local affairs of towns and counties, as poor-houses, prisons, lodging-houses, catholic ladies' seminaries, police (metropolitan or not), etc. Supposing that

these affairs are requiring a special examination, is this not, in extraordinary instances, a duty incumbent upon the governor, for which he is paid, and, indeed, an encroachment upon his executive power, when done by legislatures? Legislatures, if they would not degrade purposely the governors to mere showmen, should carefully avoid such steps; and no governor, conscious of his constitutional duty, to see that the laws are faithfully executed, should consent to such erratic legislative measures. They unnecessarily increase the expenses of governing and betray a bad spirit to unsettle the constitution. It is the duty of the legislature to impeach the governor, if neglecting his control duty, but not to step in and to do it itself for extra pay. There is an English

circumlocution precedent at the bottom of this objectionable committee system.

I do not claim arbitrary Napoleonic powers for our governors. No, they should only be for the state institution what a seacaptain is for his ship, a husbandman for his farm, a manufacturer for his establishment. In one word, they should take good care that in all parts of the state the laws are faithfully executed, wherefore they are expressly enjoined to transact all necessary business with the officers of the government, and to expedite all measures that may be resolved upon by the legislature, and even convoke the legislature expressly for this purpose. Upon this he is sworn in; he is, therefore, responsible for the good administration of the laws or working of the state institution. Therefore, he is also commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the state, although there are some who have doubts about the correctness of this proviso, because, according to the federal constitution, the president shall be the sole commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service. There is, indeed, no case imaginable for a state governor to exercise such a function, unless the United States are at war. Moreover, there is no such thing as a navy of the state of New York, or any other state. The Congress is bound to protect the several states against invasion and internal commotions; the federal constitution expressly forbids the states to keep troops, that is, a standing army, or shipsof-war, in time of peace. With all these wise provisoes of the federal constitution, this clause of the state constitution seems to clash. Does not this smack of empire? and why not? this state district comprises at present as many inhabitants as the thirteen colonies when they declared themselves independent! There is something, not exactly curious, but ominous, in such provisoes. There is a tendency to puff our state governments up into the regions of empires and majesties, while we forget to make their organizations complete and perfect downward in regard to the political detail business of home and peaceable daily life. Our states have no military forces at all. State citizens, although drilled, are not troops, soldiers, or military forces, in the proper sense of the word, unless mustered into service by the Congress. Before that time they are mere gentleman train-bands.

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