instance, which precedes and guides the sketch of a composition, or the actual draught upon paper of the first outlines of a figure. In like manner, below the sense, and oscillating between sense and the vital sensations, (which have their representative, and appear as a peculiar power in the perception of spontaneity and sentiment of existence generally)-I place an intermediate, namely the Passive Fancy. This is the great agent in dreams, in the indescribable phantoms of delirium: but is in fact carrying on its processes every moment of our lives, and supplying the unceasing links of Association, indispensable instruments in the mechanism of recollection and memory: and thus oscillating, as I have said, between sense and life, the passive fancy accounts for the wonderful connexion between sensations and the dim, indistinct and fleeting imagery of sleep. "This is that Mab," who very "gallops night by night These, according to my conviction, are the great constituent faculties, of which the human mind is the sum and unity:-the Will, the personal and conscious being; the Reason; the Imagination; the Understanding; the Active Fancy; the Sense, pure, and mixed as in the senses with sensation; the Passive Fancy; and the Life and Spontaneity. -Lecture by the Author on Beauty and Expression. APPENDIX B. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. IN any and every act of conscious reflection, I necessarily distinguish in the Self two relations, namely, Subject and Object, or Mind and Thought. In order to simple consciousness it is not indeed necessary that I should direct my attention to myself as the subject, as the Self, which is the supporter, and the one endlessly modifiable substance, of the flux of thoughts. I may have my attention so occupied by the thoughts that the Self thinking may cease to draw attention to itself, or at all events may be only dimly perceived. The child most commonly says: Fred or Johnny does this or that, or likes or thinks so and so:-he speaks of himself as of another person. He is conscious indeed, but he has no proper self-consciousness. But where I contemplate myself as thinking, when I reflect upon myself thinking, then I become aware of the double relation. I am not only conscious of the thoughts passing in my mind but also of the Self thinking. I distinguish the thoughts and the Subject in whom the thoughts are passing. It is true that when we further analyze the process, these thoughts turn out to be acts of my mind, and prove to be myself undergoing a series of changes; but it also appears that whenever I contemplate the subject thinking, I contemplate it in some act of thought-it becomes the Object, or assumes the objective relation. It is this which no doubt has led some philosophers to assert that we have no proper consciousness, or knowledge, or cognizance of a Selfseeing that we can never separate the self from the act of thinking in which it is engaged, and therefore never contemplate the self other than in the thoughts in which it presents itself. Is this however so?-Do we really know no more of our own self, substance or being, than the thoughts, acts, feelings and the like, which are its products or manifestations? Do we only know the soul in and by its conscious presentations or phænomena ? Now I apprehend the very reverse of this will be apparent, if we consider the nature of self-consciousness, and if it be true, as we have stated, that in every act of self-consciousness we necessarily distinguish in the self two relations, namely Subject and Object. If I think of any thing-say for instance that I am engaged mentally with the proposition that man is mortal;—or if I will any thing, say that I determine to visit a sick neighbour;—or if I am affected in any particular way, say that I am pleasurably affected by the sight of an old friend;-in all these instances the act of consciousness may be simply that of contemplating myself in the particular circumstance specified of thinking, willing, or feeling :-but in order to constitute it an act of self-consciousness I must also be distinctly conscious that it is I, who am the Subject, I must know that it is I thinking, G willing, feeling. It is true that the Subject and Object are the same; nevertheless the cognizance which I have of the same self is necessarily in two different relations-on the one hand as object or phænomenon, but on the other as Subject or noumenon. So true is this, that in certain cases of mental derangement the unfortunate patient believes that he is possessed by some other mind, spirit or agent, who is obtruding his thoughts into his (the patient's) mind, and that he is under the fatal necessity of becoming conscious of mental presentations, which are not his own but another's. He has thus a morbid separation of his self-consciousness, he not only distinguishes but divides his objective and subjective self. The apparent difficulty, which arises from the supposed impossibility of contemplating a subject other than as an Object, ceases so soon as we clearly apprehend that the cognizance here spoken of belongs to the unique instance of self-consciousness, which each man can test in himself. I am not only conscious of willing, thinking, feeling, but I am conscious in these acts that I am the agent or subject:-this is the very nature of selfconsciousness, and without this it would cease to be all that we mean by self-consciousness. The importance of the truth here asserted will be apparent if we consider that upon its admission rests the moral nature of man. Without the Will, any discussion of morals would be idle and useless, and hence it was that Kant, notwithstanding his speculative convictions, commences his ethical enquiries by assuming the human Will, as the ground of man's liberty and responsibility and as a necessary postulate of moral faith. It is easy to see that if we have no cognizance of a Self other than in the changes which the self undergoes, we can have no knowledge of the operative cause of those changes, and the Will ceases to be a fact for us: -if we only know that the self is changed, and contemplated in a series of modifications, we have no knowledge of the subject originant: — and this must necessarily be the case, if the facts of consciousness only disclose to us the myself in its objective relation. Taking our former instance, the determination to visit a sick neighbour :-I am conscious of the determination in myself, but I cannot know how that change was wrought in myself, except as the Subject willing it, and this I cannot be conscious of as Object, because the act of willing as causative cannot be a mental result; -so soon as it becomes contemplated objectively the originative act has already ceased, and has passed into the phoenomenal. In order to constitute a moral act I must be conscious of deliberating and resolving, that is, conscious of a causative act of Will antecedent to the manifestation as the precondition of the result;-in other words I must be cognizant of the Self as Will. The difficulty, with which this has been recognized, has doubtless in a great measure arisen from contemplating the Self as a soul or thing-viewing it by reflexion as a conceptual entity or phono |