Let us not be deceived by words, but inquire into their meaning. 1. A law implies a lawgiver. 2. A law is the prescribed method, in which something is done.

1. A law implies a lawgiver. The laws of a family are enacted by the heads of the family. The laws of a State are enacted either immediately by the collective body of individuals who compose the State, or else by those to whom they have delegated legislative power. The laws of nations are habits. established by the consent of nations. If those therefore are laws of matter, it is obviously proper to inquire, who framed them; which question cannot be answered, without the acknowledgment of something prior to these laws.

2. We said, that law is the prescribed method, in which something is done. The laws of a family are the prescribed way, in which its members are required to proceed. The laws of commerce are the prescribed way, in which that branch of business is to be managed. Criminal laws are those, which prohibit certain actions, and point out the manner, in which these criminal actions, when perpetrated, shall be punished. The laws of nature can, therefore, mean nothing more, than the manner, agreeably to which events proceed in the natural world. But surely these laws are perfectly distinct from the cause, from which these events originated. It is not the laws, which produce the effect; but some power acting agreeably to them. It is not the law, which puts the debtor into prison, but the officer acting as the law requires.

Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to attribute to the laws of matter any effect in the natural world, if by that be meant to exclude the agency of an intelligent being. By the laws, the tendencies, the appetences, or affections of matter, we can mean nothing but the manner, in which matter is governed. There can be no creation without change; there can be no change without motion; there can be no motion without a cause; and that cause must exist before the existence of motion. That cause, as self-creation is impossible, must have been eternal.

Perhaps there is no appearance in the natural world, which a philosopher, desirous of excluding divine agency, would think more favorable to his theory, than that of crystalization. In a fluid, composed of certain ingredients, particles are found to proceed in all directions, to a particular point, and there to unite in perfect order, forming a solid body, with sides and angles well defined. Here, we may be told exultingly, is a specimen of the power of matter; and in some such way was the universe produced. There are, saith the infidel philosopher, certain affections and appetences in matter, by which one part is attracted towards another. In reply, we observe, that these particles in motion are either self-moved, or else moved by some external cause. If by an external cause, that cause must be unoriginated, or subordinate to one which is so. The other opinion, viz. that the particles in motion are not influenced by an external cause, is that only, which we are concerned to refute.

This opinion, that matter has the power of self-motion, is contrary to all experience; and is, in itself, inconceivable. 1. It is contrary to all experience. Who ever saw a rock, or a piece of timber move itself to another place? Who ever saw a tower descend to the ocean, or a ship ascend to the top of a mountain? Yet, if one particle of fluid can move itself from the side of a glass vessel to the centre, it might move itself to one of the stars. If a particle of matter, no larger than the hundredth part of a barley-corn could do this, the same might be done by two particles, or twenty, or by a mass equal to this globe.

But the opinion, that matter has the power of self-motion, is not only contrary to experience, but is inconceivable. Our very idea of motion implies an agent and a patient ;—a thing moved, and a cause moving. Those who tell us of a selfmoving power in matter, must suppose, either that this power is always exerted, or that it is sometimes exerted, and at other times lies inactive. If it is always exerted, matter must be always in motion, which is contradicted by our senses.

If it is.

ever at rest, some cause must begin the motion. In that case there must have been some cause, external in regard to matter, or motion must arise from something internal; i. e. from volition, of which we know matter to be destitute.

When we are told, that particles rush together to form crystals, or vegetables, by a natural appetency, or affection, which these particles have for each other, we may be assured, that the language is wholly without meaning. These words, in common use, mean passion, or desire; but what passion or affection that is, which unites rocks of granite, and quarries of marble, we are yet to learn.

The fact is, when particles of matter combine to form a crystal or a plant, they are not so many independent agents, but are acted upon by some external force, as really, as a wheel is turned by the water, or a vessel impelled by the wind. So when we speak of one body, as attracted by another, we are not to imagine, that the two bodies are agents mutually drawing each other, but that there is some cause, perfectly distinct from these bodies themselves, by which they are pressed together or attracted; and that this attraction, pressure, or impulse is greater or less, in a well known proportion to their distances. But of this we may have occasion to speak in a subsequent lecture.

It is now made evident, we conceive, that some power must have existed from eternity; as that change which is implied in creation, must have been effected by something external, and this external something must itself have been without origin as the effect of something which was so.

It remains next to be proved, that this eternal cause by which the world was produced, is intelligent, which will be attempted in the next lecture, by noticing those marks of design and intention, which are visible in the works of nature. In the meantime, let a portion of your attention be directed to this object. Examine your own bodies, or almost any of those natural objects, which are presented to your view: Ask now the beasts, and they shall teach thee; and the fowls of the air, and VOL. I.

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they shall tell thee; or speak to the earth, and it shall teach ; and the fishes of the sea, and they shall declare unto thee. Who knoweth not in all these, that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this?

LECTURE II.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF GOD.

In our last lecture, it was proved that something existed from eternity. But whether that which thus existed, is intelligent or not, is a point to be determined by an examination of natural objects. If the effects produced bear no marks of design, we have no evidence of intelligence in the cause, which produced them. On the contrary, if those, which are denominated works of nature, bear the most obvious marks of design, the existence of an unintelligent cause, does, by no means, account for this origin.

Should you witness the building of a machine for the manufacture of cloth, or a mill for the expression of oil from linseed; and should you afterwards, even in a solitary place, find a similar object perfectly finished, and on which no person was at work, you would in both cases, be equally certain of design. You would have no more apprehension, that the latter created itself, or came into existence by chance, than that such was the origin of the former; and further, you would scarcely be more certain of either than you would of his insanity, who should doubt on the subject.

In judging of the divine existence, you are required to observe those rules only, and to proceed in that manner, the rectitude of which in common affairs, is universally acknowledged. If any rational account can be given of the existence of such a world as this, without an eternal, intelligent being, you cannot be required to believe that any such being was concerned in its creation.

We proceed to exhibit evidence.