"The distinguishing characteristic of the best tax is, not that it is most nearly proportioned to the means of individuals, but that it is easily assessed and collected, and is, at the same time, most conducive, all things considered, to the public interest."-p. 19.

In this assertion we do not see much to which any fair objection can be made; but it is one of those true propositions which are so abstract and general, that, notwithstanding their truth, they are of little use, from the difficulty of applying them rightly to any particular case. We learn very

little when we are informed that the best tax is that which is most conducive to the public interests; but we do learn something useful, when our attention is directed to any particular merit or demerit which ought to be sought for or avoided in any system of taxation; and it is certain that Adam Smith's maxims have been of great service to the kingdom, by directing public attention to the particular points of view in which each tax ought to be considered. His illustrations of these maxims, also, were in general just and important. But we must not carry our obedience to those maxims too far, nor decide that a tax ought to be rejected because it cannot be imposed in exact conformity with those maxims. When it is necessary to raise so large a sum by taxation, it becomes impossible to avoid some objectionable taxes. It is the duty of

the statesman to avoid all unnecessary mischief, and by judicious economy to supply the place of a large public revenue, having due regard to Mr. Say's apothegm, that the best system of finance is to spend little, and the lightest tax is the best.

It was at one time, indeed, thought that economy in the administration of public affairs was very little conducive to the general welfare, and that, apart from the accidental evils caused by any particular injudicious tax, there was very little evil in the increase of taxation caused by an extravagant government. It was argued that the expenses of the government brought back to the people, in wages and salaries, and in the purchase of commodities, the money that was taken from them by taxes. It is almost unnecessary to refute or expose such an argument at the present day. The labourer from whom one day's wages are taken by the taxgatherer, without adequate necessity, has not his just cause of complaint removed, by a promise that the person who ultimately receives the tax will procure him another day's employment. The issue would be, merely that he had to work two days for the wages of

one.

And even when the tax falls upon an idle consumer, it is to be remembered, that the power of this idle consumer to employ labour, or to purchase the produce of manufacturing industry, is just as much diminished by the payment, as that of the tax-receiver is increased by the receipt of the tax. In all discussions of subjects connected with political economy, we must attribute no weight to the fact that employment is provided for a certain number of labourers. Nothing but ignorance will ever keep labourers out of employment; what we desire for them is good wages, and these must, in most cases, be ultimately paid out of the fund which is produced by the labourer's exertions. An increase in the rate of wages can be produced only by increasing the productiveness of labour; an amelioration of the labourer's condition may be effected, either by increasing his income, or by reforming his habits, so as to enable him with the same income to lead a more happy life.

What the public really gain in return for the taxes which they are required to pay, are the services which are paid for

by the taxes. In exchange for that portion of his income which is taken from him by the tax-gatherer, the individual gains the assistance of the army and navy to defend him from foreign aggression, the administration of justice, and the protection of the laws at home a participation in the advantages derived from a number of public works, roads, canals, quays, docks, bridges, harbours, &c.—and a variety of benefits which it is unnecessary to mention. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the services performed by government are worth many times more than the price we pay for them; but this leaves untouched the questions whether those services could not be procured on more reasonable terms, and whether the price which we pay for them could not be levied in a more judicious manner. The former question depends upon the manner in which the government performs those services, and upon the salaries (generally too large) which are paid to the various persons in the employment of the government, and, perhaps, even more upon the particular nature of the services which can be most suitably performed by government, and which can be best left to the care of the individuals interested.

But it is with the manner in which the public income is to be raised that we are at present most concerned; and in the first place we ought to observe, that Adam Smith's first maxim cannot be properly applied to any particular tax, although it is a principle which ought not to be lost sight of when we are called upon to form a judgment on our entire system of taxa

tion.

Thus, it would be very unreasonable to try by this test the merit of a tax upon tobacco, by which many of the richest men in the kingdom are entirely unaffected, or even the tax upon income, by which a man with an income of £160 a year pays about £6, while his neighbour whose income is only £140 escapes it altogether. However, in the entire system of taxation, the statesman ought not to lose sight of the principle of equality, but endeavour, as far as possible, to make one tax correct the deficiencies of another, so that, on the whole, no person can avoid contributing his just share. It may be also not unreasonably required, that no

particular tax shall violate this rule without good cause.

"The great defect, for example, in the system of taxation in France, previously to the revolution, consisted not so much in its magnitude, or in the oppressive manner in which it was collected, as in its inequality. The principal taxes were direct, and should therefore have been proportioned to the abilities of the contributors. But, on the contrary, those who had the largest fortunes, and who consequently derived the greatest advantage from the protection afforded by government, were expressly relieved from the burthen of direct taxation. The nobility and clergy, while they engrossed every situation of power and emolument, were, as far as possible, exempted from the taille, and other heavy and vexatious imposts."M'Culloch, p. 22.

There can be little doubt that the unfairness and inequality of the direct taxation of France was one of the leading causes of the French Revolution. But the old French system of taxation had many other faults. It was carried to an excessive height, affecting many articles of constant and necessary consumption among the poor; it was unequal in the different provinces, and thus injuriously prevented a free commercial intercourse between different parts of the kingdom, and supplied irresistible temptations to smugglers; while all those evils, and the annoyance and irritation arising from them, were aggravated by the system then usual, of farming out the principal taxes the government receiving a fixed sum from the farmer of the tax, who was permitted to make as much of it as he could. Adam Smith's remarks on this system are forcible and just:

"The best and most frugal way of levying a tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is necessary for paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the officers, and the whole expense of administration, the farmer must always draw from the produce of the tax a certain profit, proportioned, at least, to the advance which he makes, to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at, and to the knowledge and skill which it requires to manage so very compli cated a concern. Government, by establishing an administration under their own immediate inspection, of the same

kind with that which the farmer establishes, might at least save this profit, which is almost always exorbitant. To farm any considerable branch of the public revenue, requires either a great capital or a great credit-circumstances which would alone restrain the competition for such an undertaking to a very small number of people. Of the few who have this capital or credit, a still smaller number have the necessary knowledge or experience, another circumstance which restrains the competition still farther. The very few who are in condition to become competitors, find it more for their interests to combine together to become co-partners instead of competitors; and when the farm is set up to auction, to offer no rent but what is much below the real value. In countries where the public revenues are in farm, the farmers are generally the most opulent people. Their wealth would alone excite the public indignation; and the vanity which almost always accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish ostentation with which they commonly display that wealth, excites that indignation still more.

"The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe, which punish any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for the contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy, if it should happen the day after their farm is expired, would not much affect their interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the anxiety of the sovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily the greatest, they seldom fail to complain, that without laws more rigorous than those which actually took place, it will be impossible for them to pay even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress, their commands cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more and more severe. most sanguinary are always to be found in countries where the greater part of the public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries where it is levied under the immediate inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than can ever be expected from the farmers of his re

venue.

The

To these observations we have nothing to add. There is no reason to apprehend that any considerable portion of the public revenue will ever be set to farm in this kingdom, not merely on account of the mischief and unpopularity of the system, but also on account of the loss of the patronage and

influence which the ministry would sustain by its introduction. The offices connected with the collection of the revenue form no inconsiderable portion of the government patronage.

In the early stages of society in every country it has been thought expedient to levy a tax, to be paid, not in money, but in the performance of particular services. By such a tax, the state receives a contribution from those who, having nothing but their labour to support them, may be supposed incapable of making any other contribution; and it is certain that a labourer will more readily give six days' labour than six days' wages to the public service. This contribution of compulsory labour was demanded for the repairs of roads, bridges, and other public works; but experience has demonstrated, that it is better to raise by taxes the funds required to pay the labourers employed in effecting the necessary improvements or repairs. Labour, not paid for, is worth very little, while it distracts the person giving it from his ordinary and more useful employments. If one thousand men in any district were compelled to contribute ten days' labour each to some public work, it is probable that not as much progress would be made in it, as if half the number were employed and paid, and certainly not so much as if one bundred men were paid for working at it fifty days. The instant any thing like a division of labour is introduced, men see the folly and injustice of compelling a man whose labour in his own trade is worth three or four shillings, to leave it to work on a road or bridge where his labour is not worth six pence. At the same time, the labourer by indirect taxation, by taxes imposed upon the articles which he consumes, is found able to contribute to the expenses of the state a sum far exceeding the value of the labour which was formerly extorted from him.

One species of personal service is still required from the subject in many countries:

"We allude to the obligation imposed in most states on all individuals, or on those belonging to certain classes, to serve for some fixed period in the army or navy, or both. This system, which has been partially acted upon for a lengthened period, has been vastly extended since the introduction of the con

scription into France; and the armies of that kingdom, with those of Prussia, Austria, Russia, and other continental states, are now recruited by draughts of recruits taken by lot from certain classes of the population. Napoleon said, in reference to the conscription, that it was 'le mode de recruitement le plus juste, le plus doux, le plus avantageux au peuple;' and authorities have not been wanting, who have recommended its introduction into this country, or, at least, an extension to the army of the principle on which the militia is recruited. But the plan of recruiting by voluntary enlistment is, notwithstanding the deference due to those who maintain the contrary, the only one consistent with justice, or with any regard to the rights of individuals, at the same time that it is in other respects decidedly the best. We do not mean to deny that the conscription, provided it be really equal and impartial, has some advantages on its side; but they are certainly very much overbalanced by the oppression and other disadvantages inseparable from it. Among the individuals subject to a conscription, there is the greatest discrepancy of tastes and tempers, some preferring the military profession to every one else, while others hold it in abhorrence. The system of voluntary enlistment avails itself of these differences: far from offering violence to any one, it gratifies all, by enabling those who prefer a military life, and those who prefer other pursuits, to indulge their tastes without let or hin. drance. The conscription, on the other hand, introduces a species of fatalism, where there should be choice and discrimination: the chances being equal that the lot will fall upon individuals most disinclined to enter the army. Who would think of forcing people to become miners, shoemakers, or weavers ? And why should the state attempt to enforce a system productive of still greater hardship and injustice?

Whenever the conscription is resorted to, the population is necessarily exposed to a two-fold grievance, that of being liable to be compelled to engage in a service to which they may entertain an unconquerable objection, and of being underpaid when so engaged.'

his substitute; and why should they be prevented from making a bargain agreeable to both parties, and injurious to nobody? Suppose, then, the price of procuring a substitute be one hundred pounds, the conscription becomes a capitation tax, by which men, without any regard to their means, are selected by lot to pay a certain sum of money, or to go into slavery in case of their inability. The conscription. presses with peculiar hardship on the middle classes, who cannot afford to pay for a substitute, but to whom the life of a common soldier is misery and degradation.

In

In this country, the system of impressment bears a strong similitude to the conscription, inasmuch as by it men are compelled to fight in the service of the state, and to forsake their other pursuits for that of war; but it is free from many of the oppressions which are inseparable from the conscription, and has a greater show of necessity to justify it. In the first place, the condition and habits of a sailor are not materially altered by being removed from a merchant vessel into a man-of-war. This is very different from the case of a young man educated for the profession of law or medicine, or some commercial or agricultural pursuit, who is torn from his family, and compelled to undergo the fatigues and perils of a common soldier. the next place, at the commencement of a war there is an immediate and pressing necessity for a number of sailors to man the fleet. For this purpose none will suffice but those who have been inured to the sea, and practised in the duties of a seaman. those who are thus qualified are scattered all over the world. There is no time nor competition to enable the government to make a bargain with those who are near at home, and to procure a sudden supply of seamen it appears necessary, at the commencement of a war, to have recourse to impressment. Every sailor, therefore, may be said to enter his profession under the implied condition that when his country wants his services, he will give them upon reasonable terms. If a sailor is disposed to complain that he is pressed on his return from a long voyage, he may reflect that but for the system of impressment, he would probably not be either at home or in the merchant

But