Should the amendatory veto power be curbed? Illinois issues, v. 3, Sept. 1977: 10-12. Illinois Representative Dwight Friedrich argues that the amendatory veto is an invasion of the separation of powers, while former gubernational legal assistant William Hanley urges its retention, but with legislative or court guidelines to prevent abuse.

Virginia. Constitutional Convention (1901-1902). Report of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Convention, State of Virginia. Held in the city of Richmond, June 12, 1901, to June 26, 1902. Richmond, Hermitage Press, 1906. 2v. Pages 1874-1881 address the item veto.

Walters, John Nelson. The Illinois amendatory veto. John Marshall journal of practice and procedure, v. 11, winter 1977-19: 415-440. "The amendatory or conditional veto enables a chief executive to 'condition' his approval of a bill upon the legislature's acceptance of an 'amendment' to the bill."

Washington (State). State Legislative Council. The item veto in the State of Washington. Olympia, 1962. 18 1.

Wells, Rogers H. The item veto and State budget reform. American political science review, v. 18, Nov. 1924: 782-791. Outlines the development of the item veto and indicates its present relation to the budgetary provisions of the States. Wisconsin. Legislative Reference Bureau. The use of the partial veto in Wisconsin. Prepared by Lawrence Barish. Madison, 1975.

Zimmerman, Joseph F. Rebirth of the item veto in the Empire State. State government, v. 54, no. 2, 1981: 51-52. "The decline in use of the item veto in New York in the early 1930s and its relative disuse, which gave the governor complete charge of budget administration and let him impound appropriated funds during the interim between legislative sessions."

Louis Fisher and Ronald Moe,

CONTRIBUTORS

Specialists in American National Government, wrote chapter I, "Item Veto as a State Reform: Its Origin and Evolution."

Gary Galemore,

Analyst in American National Government, prepared the three tables in chapter I showing contemporary state practices.

Louis Fisher,

wrote the section in chapter II entitled "The Legislative Role in Budget Decisions."

Staff of the Rules Committee,

wrote the section in chapter II entitled "The Structure of Federal and State Appropriation Bills."

Virginia McMurtry,

Specialist in American National Government, wrote the section in chapter II entitled "Alternatives to the Item Veto Already Available to the President." Morton Rosenberg and Jay Shampansky,

American Law Division, wrote the legal analysis in chapter III entitled "Vagaries and Varieties in Interpreting Governors' Item-Veto Authority."

Johnny Killian,

Senior Specialist, American Law Division, wrote the section in chapter III entitled "Constitutional Questions."

Staff of the Rules Committee,

wrote chapter IV, "Procedural Questions."

Louis Fisher and Ronald Moe,

wrote chapter V, "Impact of the Item Veto."

Louis Fisher,

prepared Appendix A entitled "Order in Which States Adopted the Item Veto" and "Original and Current Citations."

Stephen Stathis,

Government Division, prepared Appendix B, “The First Item Veto.” Morton Rosenberg, Jay Shampansky, Louis Fisher, and Gary Galemore,

prepared Appendix C which displays relevant texts from state constitutions. Richard A. Davis,

completed Appendix D which provides a list of proposed item-veto constitutional amendments.

Edward M. Davis III,

Government Division, wrote Appendix E which summarizes recent proposals to enact item-veto authority by statute.

Louis Fisher,

wrote Appendix F, “Annotated Citations of Item Cases."

Sherry Shapiro,

Senior Bibliographer, Library Services Division, prepared Appendix G, "Item Veto: Selected References."

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