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called in question. But it is necessary to re- ! we say that bodies are heavy, divisible, mark, that on the inmost nature of the thinking movable, we mean simply that, left to principle, as well as on the inmost nature of matter, we are, and with our faculties must al- | themselves, they will fall; when cut, ways remain, entirely in the dark. All which they will separate; or when pushed we are aware of, even in our own minds, is a they will move : that is, ander such certain thread of consciousness; '

and such circumstances they will profeelings, that is, of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and

volitions, more or less numerous ana duce such and such a sensation in oui complicated.”

muscles, or our sight. An attribute We have no clearer idea of mind than always designates a mode of our being of matter; we can say nothing more vain we disguise these modes by group:

or a series of our modes of being. In about it than about matter. So that substances, of whatever kind, bodies ing, concealing them under abstract or minds, within or without us, are

words, dividing and transforming them, never for us more than tissues, more

so that we are frequently puzzled to or less complex, more or less regular, recognize them: whenever we pierce of which our impressions and modes of to the basis of our words and ideas, being form all the threads.

we find them and nothing but them.

Mill This is still more evident in the says: case of attributes than of substances. “ Take the following example: A generous

Who would exWhen I say that snow is white, I mean person is worthy of honour. that, when snow is presented to my between phenomena? But so it is. The ato

pect to recognise here a case of co-existence sight, I have the sensation of whiteness. tribute which causes a person to be termed When I say that fire is hot, I mean generous is ascribed to him on the ground of that, when near the fire, I have the states of his mind, and particulars of his consensation of heat. We call a mind facts of internal consciousness, the latter, so

both are phenomena ; the former are devout, superstitious, meditative, or far as distinct from the former, are physical gay, simply meaning that the ideas, the facts, or perceptions of the senses. Worthy of emotions, the volitions, designated by as here used, means a state of approving and

honour, admits of a similar analysis. Honour, these words, recur frequently in the admiring emotion, followed on occasion by cor. series of its modes of being.t When responding outward acts. Worthy of honour! modes of being. Oui mind is to na- Take, say logicians, an animal, a ture what a thermometer is to a boiler : plant, a feeling, a geometrical figure we define the properties of nature by an object or group of objects of any the impressions of our mind, as we kind. Doubtless the object has jus indicate the conditions of the boiling properties, but it has also its essence.. water by the changes of the thermom- It is n:anifested to the outer world by eter. Of both we know but condi- an indefinite number of effects and tion and changes; both are made up qualities; but all these modes of being of isolated and transient facts; a thing are the results or products of its inner is for us but an aggregate of phenom- nature. There is within it a certain $nu. These are the sole elements of hidden substratum which alone is prim. our knowledge : consequently the whole itive and important, without which it effor: of science will be to link facts to can neither exist nor be conceived, and facts.

connotes all this, together with an approval of * Mill's Logic, i. 68.

the act of showing honour. All these are phe* " Every attribute of a mind consists either nomena; states of internal consciousness, acin being itself affected in a certain way, or af- companied or followed by physical facts. fecting other minds in a certain way; . Consid- When we say, A generous person is worthy of ered in itself, we can predicate nothing of it honour, we affirm coexistence between the two but the series of its own feelings. When we complicated phenomena connoted by the two say of any mind, that it is devout, or supersti- terms respectively. We affirm, that wherever tious, or meditative, or cheerful, we mean that and whenever the ic ward feelings and outward the ideas, emotions, or volitions implied in facts implied in the word generosity, have those words, form a frequently recurring part place, then and there the existence and maniof the series of feelings, or states of conscious. Iestation of an inward feeling, honour, would ness, which fill up the sentient existence of be followed in our minds by another inward that mind.

feeling, approval." * “In addition, however, to those attributes of ? mind which are grounded on its own states of In vain we turn about as we please, we feeling, attributes may also be ascribed to it, in remain still in the same circle. Whether the same manner as to a body, grounded on the the object be an atribute or a subfeelings which it excites in other minds. A mind does not, indeed, like a body, excite sen- stance, complex or abstract, compound gations, but it may excite thoughts or emo- or simple, its material is to us always tions. The most important example of attri- the same; it is made up only of our putes ascribed on this ground, is the employo ment of terms expressive of approbation or it. As when we say of any one that he is genblame. When, for example, we say of any erous. The word generosity expresses a cere character, or (in other words) of any mind, tain state of mind, but being a term of praise, that it is admirable, we mean that the contem- it also expresses that this state of mind excites plation of it excites the sentiment of admira- in us another mental state, called approbation, tion; and indeed somewhat more, for the word | The assertion made, therefore, is twofold, and implies that we not only feel admiration, but of the following purport:. Certain feelings approve that sentiment in ourselves. In some form habitually a part of this person's sentinn: cases, under the semblance of a single attri- existence; and the idea of those feelings of bute, two are really predicated: one of them, a his, excites the sentiment of approbatica in state of the mind itself ; the other, a state with ourselves or others."--Mill's Logic, i. So which other minds are affected by thinking of

Ibid. Ito

which constitutes its being and our no

tion of it. * They call the propositions III.

which denote this essence definitions, This brief phrase is the abstract of and assert that the best part of our the whole system. Let us master it

, knowledge consists of such proposifor it explains all Mill's theories. He

tions. has defined and restated every thing these kinds of propositions teach us

On the other hand, Mill says that from this starting-point. In all forms and all degrees of knowledge, he has nothing; they show the mere sense recognized only the knowledge of facts, What do í learn by being told that

of a word, and are purely verbal. | and of their relations. Now we know that logic has two

man is a rational animal, or that a corner-stones, the Theories of Defini- triangle is a space contained by three tion and of Proof. From the days of lines? The first part of such a phrase Aristotle logicians have spent their expresses by an abbreviative word time in polishing them. They have what the second part expresses in a only dared to touch them respectfully, developed phrase. You tell me the as if they were sacred. At most, from same thingtwice over; you put the time to time, some innovator ventured same fact into two different expresto turn them over cautiously, to put sions; you do not add one fact to anthem in a better light. Mill shapes, other, but you go from one fact to its cuts, turns them over, and replaces equivalent. Your proposition is not them both in a similar manner and by lion such, my mind would remain en

instructive. You might collect a milthe same means.

tirely void ; I should have read a dic. IV.

tionary, but not have acquired a single

piece of knowledge. Instead of saying I am quite aware that nowadays men laugh at those who reason on def- is arrived at by examining our notion of it; and

* According to idealist logicians, this being initions ; the laughers deserve to be the idea, on analysis, reveals the essence. Aclaughed at. There is no theory more cording to the classifying school, we arrive at fertile in universal and important re

the being by placing the object in its group

and the notion is defined by stating the genus sults; it is the root by which the whole and the difference. Both agree in beleving tree of human science grows and lives. that we are capable of grasping the essence. For to define things is to mark out “An essential proposition, then, is one their nature. To introduce a new idea thing under a particular name, only what is

which is purely verbal ; which asserts of a vi definition is to introduce a new idea asserted of it in the fact of calling it by that of the nature of things; it is to tel' us name ; and which therefore either gives no inwhat beings are, of what they are como formation, or gives it respecting the name, not posed, into what elements they are sitions, on the contrary, may be called Real

the thing. Non-essential or accidental propo capable of being resolved. In this Propositions, in opposition to Verbal. They lies the merit of these dry speculations; predicate of a thing, some fact not involved in the philososher seems occupied with the signification of the name by which the arranging iwere formulas ; the fact is proposition speaks of it;, some attribute ng

connoted by that name.'

"-MILL's Logic, i that in them he encloses the universe.

137.

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that essential propositions are import- | are definitions, they on y define names ant, and those relating to qualities mere- No phrase can tell me what a horse is ly accessory, you ought to say that the but there are phrases which will in Árst are accessory, and the second im- form me what is meant by these five portant. I learn nothing by being told letters. No phrase can exhaust the that a circle is a figure formed by the inexhaustihle sum of qualities which revolution of a straight line about one make up a being; but several phrases of its points as centre; I do learn some- may point out the facts correspond.ng thing when told that the chords which to a word. In this case definition is subtend equal arcs in the circle are possible, because we can a.ways make themselves equal, or that three given an analysis, which will enable us to pass What we call the nature of a being the attributes which it represents, and is the connected system of facts from these attributes to the inner or which constitutes that being. The concrete feelings which constitute their nature of a carnivorous mammal con foundation. From the term “dog ” it sists in the fact that the property of enables us to rise to the attributes giving milk, and all its implied pecu- “mammiferous," "carnivorous,” and iarities of structure, are combined with others which it represents; and from che possession of sharp teeth, instincts these attributes to the sensations of of prey, and the corresponding facul- sight, of touch, of the dissecting knife, ties. Such are the elements which on which they are founded. It reduces Co...pose its nature. They are facts the compound to the simple, the delinked together as mesh to mesh in a rived to the primitive. It brings back net. We perceive a few of them; and our knowledge to its origin. It transwe know that beyond our present forms words into facts. If some deknowledge and our future experience, finitions, such as those of geometry, the network extends to infinity its in- seem capable of giving rise to long terwoven and manifold threads. The sequences of new truths, * it is beessence or nature of a being is the in- cause, in addition to the explanation definite sum of its properties. Mill of a word, they contain the affirmation says :

of a thing. In the definition of a tri“ The definition, they say, unfolds the na

angle there are two distinct propositure of the thing: but no definition can unfold tions,-the one stating that “there may its whole nature; and every proposition in exist a figure bounded by three straight which any quality whatever is predicated of lines ; ” the other, that “such a figure the thing, unfolds some part of its nature. The true state of the case we take to be this may be termed a triangle.” The fist All definitions are of names, and of names is a postulate, the second a definition. only; but in some definitions it is clearly ap- The first is hidden, the second evi. parent, that nothing is intended except to es dent; the first may be true or false, plain the meaning of the word; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the the second can be neither. The first word, it is intended to be implied that there is the source of all possible theorems exists a thing, corresponding to the word." *

as to triangles, the second only resumes Abandon, then, the vain hope of elim- in a word the facts contained in the in iting from properties some primi- other. The first is a truth, the second tive and mysterious being, the source and atstract of the whole ; leave enti- obviously comprises not one, but two proposi

* “The definition above given of a triangle ties to Duns Scotus ; do not fancy that, tions, perfectly, distinguishable. The one is, by probing your ideas in the Gernan There may exist a figure bounded by three fashion, by classifying objects accord straight lines; the other, , ' And this figure

may be termed a triangle.' The former of ing to genera and species like the these propositions is not a definition at all", schoolmen, by reviving the nominalism the latter is a mere nominal definition, or exof the middle ages or the riddles of planation of the use and application of a term. Hegelian metaphysics, you will

ever and may therefore be made the foundation of a

The first is susceptible of truth or falsehood, supply the want of experience. There train of reasoning. The latter can neither be are no definitions of things ; if there true nor false; the only character it is suscepis a convention; the first is a part of general. The second is but an instance science, the second an expedient of of the first; its truth is contained be language. The first expresses a pos- forehand in that of the first, and this is sible relation between three straight why it is a truth. In fact, as soon as lines, the second gives a name to this the conclusion is no longer contained relation. The first alone is fruitful in the premisses, the reason ng is false, because it alone conforms to the nature and all the complicated rules of the of every fruitful proposition, and con- middle ages have been reduced by the nects two facts. Let us, then, under. Port-Royalists to this single rule, “The stand exactly the nature of our knowl. conclusion must be contained in the cdge: 1 relates either to words or to premisses.” Thus the entire process of things or to both at once. If it is a the human mind in its reasonings conmatter of words, as in the definition sists in recognizing in individuals what of names, it attempts to refer words to is known of a whole class; in affirming ou: primitive feelings, that is to say, to in detail what has been established for the facts which form their elements. the aggregate ; 'n laying down a second If it relates to beings, as in proposi- time, and piecemeal, what has been tions about things, its whole effort is laid down once for all at first. to link fact to fact, in order to connect By no means, replies Mill; for if it the finite number of known properties were so, our reasoning would be good with the infinite number to be known. for nothing. It would not be a progress If both are involved, as in the defini- but a repetition. When I have affirmed tions of names which conceal a propo- that all men are mortal, I have affirmed sition relating to things, it attempts to implicitly that Prince Albert is mortal. do both. Everywhere its operation is In speaking of the whole class, that is the same. The whole matter in any to say, of all the individuals of the case is to understand each other,-that class, I have spoken of each individual, is, to revert to facts, or to learn, that and therefore of Prince Albert, who is is, to add facts to facts.

tible of is that of conformity to the ordinary • Mill's Logic, i. 167.

| usage of language.”-MILL's Logic, i. some

one of them. I say nothing new, then,

when I now mention him expressly. V.

My conclusion teaches me nothing; it The first ra npart is destroyed; our adds nothing to my positive knowledge; adversaries take refuge behind the it only puts in another shape a knowl. second-the Theory of Proof. This edge which I already possessed. It is theory has passed for two thousand not fruitful, but purely verbal. If, then, years for a substantiated, definite, un reasoning be what logicians represent assailable truth. Many have deemed it, it is not instructive. I know as much it useless, but no one has dared to call of the subject at the beginning of my it false. On all sides it has been con- reasoning as at the end. I have transsidered as an established theorem. Let formed words into other words ; I have us examine it closely and attentively. been moving without gaining ground. What is a proof? According to logi. Now this cannot be the case ; for, in cians, it is a syllogism. And what is fact, reasoning does teach us a syllogism? A group of three prop- truths. I learn a new truth when I ositions of this kind: “All men are discover that Prince Albert is mortal, mortal ; Prince Albert is a man; there- and I discover it by dint of reasoning; fore Prince Albert is mortal.” Here for, since he is still alive, I cannot have we have the type of a proof, and every learnt it by direct observation. Thus somriete proof is conformable to this logicians are mistaken; and beyond the type. Now what is there, according to scholastic theory of syllogism, which logicians, in this proof? A general reduces reasoning to substitutions of proposition concerning all men, which words, we must look for a positive gives rise to a particular proposition theory of proof, which shall explain. concerning a certain man. From the how it is that, by the process of reason: first we pass to the second, because ing, we discover facts. the second is contained in the first; For this purpose, it is sufficient to ob from the general to the particular, be serve, that general propositions are not cause the particular is comprised 'n the the true proof of particular propo

new

sitions. They seem so, but are not. It short formulæ for making more: The major is not from the mortality of all men premiss of a syllogism, consequently, is a for that I conclude Prince Albert to be not an inference drawn from the formula, but

mula of this description : and the conclusion is mortal; the premisses are elsewhere, an inference drawn according tɔ the formula : and in the background. The general the real logical antecedent, or premisses, being proposition is but a memento, a sort of the particular facts from which the general abbreviative register, to which I have facts, and the individual instances which sup

proposition was collected by induction. Those consigned the fruit of my experience. plied them, may have been forgotten ; but a This memer.io may be regarded as a record remains, not indeed descriptive of the note-book to which we refer to refresh facts themselves, but showing how those cases

may be distinguished respecting which the our memory; but it is not from the facks, when known, were cons.dered to warrant book that we draw our knowledge, but a given inference. According to the indicafrom the objects which we have seen.

tions of this record we draw our conclusion;

which is to all intents and purposes, a conclu. My memento is valuable only for the sion from the forgotten facts. For this it is facts which it recalls. My general essential that we should read the record cor. proposition has no value except for the rectly: and the rules of the syllogism are a set particular facts which it sums up.

of precautions to ensure our doing so." *

'If we had sufficiently capacious memories, “The mortality of John, Thomas, and com

and a sufficient power of maintaining order pany, is, after all, the whole evidence we have among a huge mass of details, the reasoning to the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. could go on without any general propositions ; Not one iota is added to the proof by interpo- they are mere formulæ for inferring particulars lating a general proposition. Since the indi. from particulars." + vidual cases are all the evidence we can pos. Here, as before, logicians are missess, evidence which no logical form into which we choose to throw it can make greater than it taken: they gave the highest place to is ; and since that evidence is either sufficient verbal operations, and left the really in itself, or, if insufficient for the one purpose, fruitful operations in the background. cannot be sufficient for the other ; I am un- They gave the preference to words over able to see why we should be forbidden to take the shortest cut from these sufficient premisses facts. They perpetuated the nominal. to the conclusion, and constrained to travel the ism of the middle ages. They mistook

high priori road' by the arbitrary fiat of the explanation of names for the nature logicians." *

of things, and the transformation of “ The true reason which makes us be- ideas for the progress of the mind. It lieve that Prince Albert will die is, that is for us to overturn this order in logic, his ancestors, and our ancestors, and as we have overturned it in science, to all other persons who were their con- exalt particular and instructive facts, temporaries, are dead. These facts are and to give them in our theories thai the true premisses of our reasoning.” superiority and importance which ous It is from them that we have drawn the practice has conferred upon them for general proposition; they have taught three centuries past. us its scope and truth; it confines itself to mentioning them in a shorter form ;

VI. it receives its whole substance from them ; they act by it and through it, to ical fortress in which the Idealists

There remains a kind of philosoph lead us to the conclusion to which it have taken refuge. At the origin of all seems to give rise. It is only their proof are Axioms, from which all representative, and on occasion they proofs are derived.' Two straight lines do without it. Children, ignorant

cannot enclose a space; two things, people, animals know that the sun will rise, that water will drown them, that equal to a third, are equal to one anfire will burn them, without employing the wholes are equal. These are in

other; if equals be added to equals, this general proposition. They reason, structive propositions, for they express and we reason, too, not from the not the meanings of words, but the re general to the particular, but from par. lations of things. And, moreover, they ticular to particular :

are fertile propositions; for arithmetic, "All inference is from, particulars to par- algebra, and geometry are all the result ticulars; General propositions are merely reg; of their truth. On the other hand, they isters of such inferences already made, and

are not the work of experience, för w Mill's Logic, i. 311.

• Mill's Lopic, i. 318 ↑ Ibid. i. so.

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