INTRODUCTION.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.-MR. STEPHEN'S CHARACTER.MR. PERCEVAL'S DEATH.

THE Continental system of Napoleon, the idea and even the outline of which he took from the policy of the Republic, and especially the Executive Directory, formed during the latter part of his life, that is, after the termination of the peace of Amiens, the favourite object of all his attempts. The extension of his territorial possessions, and his direct power by the annexation of some provinces to France; the union of the kingdom of Italy with his imperial crown; and the foundation of dependent monarchies under members of his family in Naples and in Spain; were no doubt valued by him as in themselves tending to his own aggrandizement and that of his adopted country: yet as long as Great Britain remained unsubdued and with resources little exhausted even by the expences of protracted wars, he knew that his security was exceedingly imperfect, and that a rallying point always must remain for whatever continental

powers should make an effort to regain independence. The projects of invasion, if they were ever seriously entertained, he soon laid aside. It cannot be doubted that the chief benefit he expected from them, as far as they regarded England, was the shock which the attempt, however unsuccessful, must give to the stability of a singularly artificial political and commercial system. Nor could he ever reckon upon more than a temporary success in Ireland, to which the views of the Directory had been directed in vain while affairs rendered such a plan far less likely to fail. The unbroken and unprecedented triumph of the attempts at colonial warfare desperate, while the success of our cruizers in sweeping the seas made the combined maritime resources of France, Holland, and Spain alike ineffectual to embarrass our commerce or to protect their own. We had neither territory, nor dependencies, nor ships, nor trade, directly exposed to his power; and his whole supremacy, whether of direct power or indirect influence in Europe, seemed to arm him with no force which could be pointed immediately against the

British navy rendered all

Toto penitus divisos orbe Britannos.

Yet to injure us,-to reduce our resources,-to cripple our trade, to weaken our authority in the world,— seemed necessary for his reputation, and even for his own security. Accordingly this was the point to which all his views were directed; and he never subjugated an enemy, or overpowered a rival, or seized upon a place, without endeavouring in the very first instance to make the event conducive towards the great design of injuring British trade.

There was evidently but one way in which this could be effected, and that was to unite the continent in a general league against all commercial intercourse with our islands. If this could be rendered complete, our trade must be confined to our own dominions in Europe, the colonies, and India, and to those of our former subjects and kinsmen of America. A vast bulk of commerce would thus remain wholly beyond his reach; but a severe blow would also be struck by the entire loss of the European market.

In order, however, to render this scheme at all effectual, the European league must be complete. A single country having sea-ports, and communicating with other countries, raised the European blockade, because once our goods were introduced there, an entrepôt was obtained through which they might be sent all over the continent. Accordingly, wherever the French arms penetrated, although the sovereignty of the country might not be seized upon by France, she yet required the rigorous exclusion of all British ships and trade, as a condition of leaving the territory in possession of its former owners, even when these might be at peace or possibly in alliance with England, and whatever might have been the original title by which their dominions. were acquired. This was carried so far, that in 1806, when Hanover was occupied by Prussia, Napoleon required the exclusion of our commerce with that Electorate, as an execution, or at least a consequence, of the treaty by which Prussia had previously bound herself to exclude it from her other territories. Nevertheless, such is the elasticity of trade, so extremely prone

are men to run almost any pecuniary risks for the sake of having the chance of pecuniary gain, and so difficult is it to watch an extended line of sea-coast, that British produce found its way into all parts of the continent although at prices somewhat raised by the obstructions thrown in its way. Napoleon was therefore determined to try the effect of more severe measures of exclusion; and when the premature and ill-concerted resistance of Prussia, in the autumn of 1806 (principally occasioned by her refusing implicit submission to the commercial measures of France) had speedily terminated in the complete overthrow of her military power, and had placed her entirely at the conqueror's mercy, the first use he made of his victory was to issue his famous Berlin decree, by which he professed to interdict all commerce, and even all intercourse, direct or indirect, with the British dominions. This interdict, so important in its consequences, bore date the 20th November 1806, at Berlin, which he had then occupied with his troops, having driven the King from his capital, after the entire overthrow of his army at the battle of Auerstadt. It declared the British islands in a state of blockade-all British subjects, wheresoever found, prisoners of war-all British goods lawful prize. It interdicted all correspondence with our dominions; prohibited all commerce in our produce; and excluded from all the ports of France, and of the countries under French controul, every vessel, of what nation soever, that had touched at a British port. The alleged ground of this measure was the distinction made by England, but not by her alone, or by any maritime state now for the first time, between enemy's property taken on