important relations with the conscience, by the exercise and aid of which, it may be so regulated and enlightened, and otherwise cultivated, as to be qualified to perform its high office of deciding on the moral feelings, sentiments, and conduct. I proceed to review the chief sources by the aid of which the conscience may be regulated and enlightened.

*

I. The Scriptures fully recognise civil government as binding on the conscience; and, therefore, the enactments of the government under which we live, or, in other terms, the law of the land, is one of the rules by which the consciences of individuals are to be regulated.

The law of a country is the combined reason, sentiment, and wisdom of the citizens of such country, so far as relates to the subjects embraced by the law, and therefore, aside from its binding character as law, is entitled to the respect of the citi zens. It is chiefly occupied in devising the means of protecting the persons, liberties, reputation, and estates of the citizens; in settling the rules of evidence, and the forms of proceedings; in prescribing rules and ordinances in the numerous cases, in which natural equity only ordains that there shall be a rule, but does not prescribe what the rule shall be; in adjusting private rights in their endless and perplexing diversity, and in guarding against fraud in all its devious ways. The practical administration of the law consists, for the most part, in ascertaining the facts, which enter into controversies, and on which their rightful decision depends; in inquiring into the extent of injury inflicted, and the corresponding amount of damages which ought to be rendered; in settling the construction of statutes; in applying the law to various facts and unforeseen contingences, which daily happen in the affairs of men; and in looking beyond the present case, to see, on the one hand, how the decision of to-day agrees with preceding decisions, and, on the other hand, how it will

* Rom. xiii. 1-7; 1 Peter, ii. 13–16.

+ Thuanus (De Thou) says, "The life, and soul, and judgment, and understanding of the country, centre in the laws. A state without law, like a body deprived of its animating principle, is defunct and lifeless in its blood and members. Magistrates and judges are but ministers and interpreters of the laws, and in fine, we are all servants of the laws, that we may be free." - Præfatio Thuani ad Henricum IV.

affect the rights and happiness of the community in years to

come.

Still, viewed as a guide, the law of the land is far from being designed by the legislature itself to be full and complete. It is imperfect in various respects; the number of moral points, on which the most voluminous body of laws touches, being comparatively very few. Writers on jurisprudence consider only what the person, to whom the obligation is due, ought to think himself entitled to exact by force; what every impartial spectator would approve of him for exacting, or what a judge or arbiter, to whom he had submitted his case, and who had undertaken to do him justice, ought to oblige the other person to suffer or to perform. Moralists, on the other hand, do not so much examine what it is that might properly be exacted by force, as what it is that the person who owes the obligation ought to think himself bound to perform, from the most sacred and scrupulous regard to the general rules of justice, and from the most conscientious dread, either of wronging his neighbour, or of violating the integrity of his own character. It is the end of jurisprudence to prescribe rules for the decisions of judges and arbiters. It is the end of morals to prescribe rules for the conduct of a good man. By observing all the rules of jurisprudence, supposing them ever so perfect, we should deserve nothing but to be free from external punishment. By observing moral rules, supposing them such as they ought to be, we should be entitled to considerable praise, by the exact and scrupulous correctness of our behaviour. It may frequently happen, that a good man will think himself bound, from a sacred and conscientious regard to the general rules of justice, to perform many things, which it would be the highest injustice to extort from him, or for any judge or arbiter to impose upon him by force. And the science of morality is to be considered as furnishing direction to persons who are conscious of their own thoughts, motives, and designs; rather than as a guide to the judge, or to any third person, whose arbitration must proceed upon rules of evidence and maxims of credibility with which the moralist has no concern.

* See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 361.-Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. II. p. 119.

"The object of a free civil government," says Chief Justice Parsons, "is the promotion and security of the happiness of the citizens. These effects cannot be produced, but by the knowledge and practice of our moral duties, which comprehend all the social and civil obligations of man to man, and of the citizen to the state. If the civil magistrate in any state, could procure, by his regulations, a uniform practice of these duties, the government of that state would be perfect. To obtain that perfection, it is not enough for the magistrate to define the rights. of the several citizens, as they are related to life, liberty, property, and reputation, and to punish those by whom they may be invaded. Wise laws, made to this end, and faithfully executed, may leave the people strangers to many of the enjoyments of civil and social life, without which their happiness will be extremely imperfect. Human laws cannot oblige to the performance of the duties of imperfect obligation; as the duties of charity and hospitality, benevolence and good neighbourhood; as the duties resulting from the relation of husband and wife, parent and child; of man to man, as children of a common parent; and of real patriotism, by influencing every citizen to love his country, and to obey all its laws. These are moral duties, flowing from the disposition of the heart, and not subject to the control of human legislation.

"Neither can the laws prevent, by temporal punishment, secret offences committed without witness, to gratify malice, revenge, or any other passion, by assailing the most important and most estimable rights of others. For human tribunals cannot proceed against any crimes unless ascertained by evidence; and they are destitute of all power to prevent the commission of offences, unless by the feeble examples exhibited in the punishment of those who may be detected. Civil government, therefore, availing itself only of its own powers, is extremely defective; and, unless it could derive assistance from some superior power, whose laws extend to the temper and disposition of the human. heart, and before whom no offence is secret, wretched indeed would be the state of man under a civil constitution of any form."*

* Massachusetts Reports, Vol. VI. p. 404.

As a guide to the conscience, therefore, the law of the land ist imperfect, inasmuch as, 1. It omits many 'moral duties which ought to be performed. 2. It gives permission to some things, of which no good man ought to avail himself. 3. It sometimes enjoins obedience, when it has no way of enforcing such obedience; and, also, it has sometimes commanded what is wrong, while it has prohibited what is right. Still, as the law of the land is, in general, binding on the conscience, the citizen is not justifiable in refusing compliance with its requisitions, unless the grievance which it inflicts is severely burdensome, and the wrong which it requires is palpable and unquestionable. In all doubtful cases, the doubt should be given in favor of the requirements of the law.

The law deserves our obedience, because it alone can reconcile the jarring interests of all, secure each against the rashness or malignity of others, and blend into one harmonious union the discordant materials of which society is composed. The law throws its broad shield over the rights and the interests of the humblest and the proudest, the poorest and the wealthiest, in the land. It fences around what every individual has already gained, and it insures to him the enjoyment of whatever his industry may acquire. It saves the merchant against ruinous hazards, provides security for the wages of the mechanic and the day-laborer, and enables the husbandman to reap his harvest without fear of plunder. The sanctity of the marriage tie, the purity of virgin modesty, the leisure of the student, the repose of the aged, the enterprise of the active, the support of indigence, and the decencies of divine worship, are all under its guardian care. It makes every man's house his castle, and keeps watch and ward over his life, his name, his family, and his property. It travels with him by land and by sea; watches while he sleeps; and arrays, in defence of him and his, the physical strength of the entire state. Surely, then, it is worthy of our reverence, our gratitude, and our affection. Surely, obedience to its mandates is among the highest of our duties.*

*

See Address by William Gaston, before the College of New Jersey, 29th September, 1835.

II. The consequences which may result from actions, is another test by which their moral character may be judged. Every man is bound by his duty to use forecast, and to look, as far as possible, into the consequences of his conduct. This test is subordinate and imperfect, and acts upon the conscience chiefly through the reason; still, in a large class of cases, it is highly effectual and valuable. If we habitually inquire, what would be the consequences to ourselves and to mankind, if every one were to act as we are acting, or as we propose to act, we shall not very often decide wrong in respect to our course of conduct. It is our duty at all times to act with prudence, discretion, and after full reflection; and there may, unquestionably, be a degree of rashness, recklessness, and disregard of consequences in our conduct, by which the conscience may be scarcely less violated, than by a positive willingness, not to say inclination, to do wrong.

This test supposes, that the welfare of ourselves and others is the great design of our existence, and that virtue consists in doing good to mankind. It makes usefulness and expediency the measure and standard of rectitude. Some of the ancient moralists used this standard, by which to determine the moral nature of an action; but they used it in a sense too unqualified, and perverted its just meaning and application. They taught, without just discrimination, that whatever was useful (utile) was right. Cicero combats this principle, which seems to have been very mischievously applied in his time, at great length and with great earnestness, and maintains, that an action, to be worthy of approbation, must unite the useful and the right. * He maintains, against the licentious writers of his time, that the usefulness of an action can never conflict with its rectitude, because no action can ever be truly useful which is not also right. f He makes the rectitude of an action the test of its usefulness, and not the usefulness the test of its rectitude. Reduced to practice, it is the question which continually presents itself to every man, when he is tempted by the allurements of pleasure,

"Utile atque honestum "; see his Offices, and particularly lib. iii. c. 3. + "Quidquid honestum est, idem utile; nec utile quidquam, quod non honestum." De Officiis, lib. iii. c. 4.