to law as the former, though not so odious and improper. He therefore puts the King on desiring a benevolence of the people, without an act of parliament. And the Commissioners, who were the Cardinal's creatures, and employed by him, exacted this money, not as a free gift, but as if due by law. But in this he was exactly disappointed, though at the expense of his master's reputation; for the people pleaded a statute of Richard III., and obstinately refused to pay it.

'There is something yet very particularly remarkable in this affair, which discovers the ingratitude of the favourite. For to take off the imputation of doing this of his own head, he summoned the Lord Mayor and Aldermen before him, and solemnly protested that from a thorough conviction of their inability to bear so heavy a tax, and out of his sincere affection to them, he had in a most humble manner been a mediator with the King, to recall those commissions, and wholly throw himself on their free gifts and good inclinations to his Majesty; thus casting the odium of the attempt on the King, and challenging the merit of their revocation to himself. And this is the necessary consequence of the pride and ambition of such favourites, as would monopolise the ear of the prince, to whom they have no farther regard than as he is subservient to their aims and designs. For, if the honour and service of their prince and country was in their view, they would never be solicitous of excluding all others, whose judgement and zeal might be assistant to the success of that common

cause.

These sort of men are easily distinguished, by a judicious and wise prince, by their complaisance and

their fawning devices. They make it their endeavour to study, and find out, the most powerful inclination of the King; whether he be inclined by youth or temper to pleasures, to tenderness or pity, to cruelty or avarice: and having thoroughly gained a knowledge of this, they seldom want address enough to work and interweave it in all their designs, to promote and accomplish all their private ends. And there are few of mankind, who are not sooner won by an obsequious flattery of their darling inclinations, than with the rough, and often thought disagreeable, face of truth in contradiction of those inclinations. And, of all mankind, princes are the most apt to be thus imposed on; because use being a second nature, and they being bred from their infancy with a deference of all their attendants and a will uncontrolled, seem to have a sort of right to do what they please without contradiction: and this makes them think those most their friends, who have the most submissive complaisance for whatever they have a mind to. Now it is impossible, that the best-inclined prince should always be free from desires, often inconsistent with the good of their people, for which they were wholly made; and a faithful counsellor is obliged to oppose this, and humbly to remonstrate the inconvenience, that must ensue from an indulgence of it. Whereas the false favourite adds fire to the fuel, by persuading the justice and reasonableness of a prince's doing what he pleases, and that his will alone is the mark of right and wrong; that his subjects ought to suffer all things, rather than he want his pleasure; that being the vicegerent of heaven, he is unaccountable to his creatures for his actions.

These are topics too engaging to the corrupt na

ture of man, in which pride has so great a share, that he easily is induced to believe, that all is his due that he can obtain: especially a young prince, whose want of experience and warmth of blood deny him the calm considerations, necessary for a happy administration of government. This we find verified in Nero, whose first five years, by the admirable precepts of Seneca, excelled those of Augustus; but when he gave ear to such flatterers as I have described, [he] soon swallowed the gilded poison, till he perished in the obstinacy of his own will.

"And though there was a vast distinction betwixt your royal father and that prince, yet he would have made a more glorious figure in history, and in the world, had not Cardinal Wolsey's advice prevailed on him in his young and riper years to quit the administration to him, and indulge in all the pleasures his high station and vast exchequer enabled him to enjoy. Bribed by so sweet a bait, he pursued the counsel, and kept such a habit, that betrayed him to actions, that are not capable of being so far justified as I could wish they might. Yet it may easily be proved, that King Henry was guilty of no fault, but 'twas the natural consequence of this advice of Wolsey; and from which even Wolsey himself, by a particular instance of Providence, derived his own ruin.

"Tis true, that princes of a good and generous disposition are not so easily perverted by this way, because they afford the flatterer less matter to work on yet it is certain, that a man of nice judgement and address will easily turn the virtues of his prince to the public detriment, if he can once gain so far the ascendant over him, as to hear no other counsellor but him and his immediate creatures. And he is by

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so much the more dangerous, by how much he is master of a more eminent wisdom (or, rather, cunning) and some show of indifferent virtues, to which his prince is particularly inclined. For we are too apt to imagine those to have all manner of virtues, and the greatest capacity, who seem to enjoy those we have a particular esteem for. As this must be confessed a harder task for the favourite, so it must likewise be owned more difficult to remedy for a virtuous temper is much harder to be brought off from an esteem of a beloved virtue, or the possession of it, than a vicious man from his corrupt inclinations. For there is such a conviction in vice, that the most wicked by reason and thought may be worked from it; but all the sufferings, that proceed from mistaken virtue, serve only to harden the sufferer, while he thinks he undergoes them for right

eousness' sake.

'But I think there is one rule infallible in this case, by which a prince may easily discover the hypocrite, and avoid the evils of the hypocrisy; and that is, when the pretender aims at engrossing the ear and power of the prince: for that is a plain argument, that he stands not on a sound bottom, and fears that the cheat will be discovered to the prince by a communication of counsel, and his hearing the rest of his wise and honest subjects, on all causes that relate to the public good of the country or the service of the prince; because they have an equal share in the welfare of both, and will not by common consent betray their own interest, which is involved in the other. This made a wise prince say, that in the multitude of counsellors is safety. Whence, by a

natural consequence, it is plain, that in one there is danger; danger to the glory of the prince, and the happiness of the people: and often, very justly, ruin to the very person, who by such unjust measures hoped to gain power and felicity.

• The passions too much indulged, and not justly regulated and governed by the sacred rules of right reason, are and always have been the source of all miseries and misfortunes, both private and public. And it is impossible, that any one of mortal race can escape pain greater or less, who will hear no other advices. The highest and most aweful stations cannot secure the greatest monarchs from troubles and misfortunes, who will be led by them. And I think it is too plain to need any proof, that no prince can be guided by any one minister, but through a passionate fondness of him, either for his imaginary virtues or agreeable vices: and I think it is as plain, that such a prince, and the kingdom governed by him, must be miserable in the end. And for this reason, all wise statesmen agree, that a prince or state ought to have no passions, if they would prosper in glory and power.

It is very true, that valour and conduct in armies may shine in one subject above another; that frugality and good management may in another: but till we can find one man master of all knowledge and all virtues, it will never be safe nor honourable for any prince wholly to confide himself and his affairs to either, exclusive of all others. For that nation is in a lost and undone condition indeed, that can afford but one man among all it's nobility and gentry qualified to serve the public, and in whom the prince can