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abstract ideas Alciphron analogy angles appear argues Aristotle Atheism Berkeley Berkeley's blind bodies called cause ceived colour conceive conscious consider corporeal substance Descartes distance distinct Divine doctrine doth Essay Euph Euphranor evident existence experience explain extension external things faculty figure finite finite extension hath human Hume ideas of sight imagination infer infinite infinite divisibility intellectual intelligible J. S. Mill knowledge language laws Leibnitz Locke Locke's Lysicles magnitude Malebranche manner material world Matter meaning metaphysical mind moral motion natural laws nature necessary connexion Neoplatonist nexion objects of sight observed particular perceived by sense perceived by sight perception percipient pheno phenomena of sense philosophers Plato Plotinus principles rational reason relations sceptical sect seems sensations sensible things shew shewn signified signs Siris soul space spirit substance suggest supposed tangible theory thought truth understanding universe unperceived visible Vision visual visual perception wherein whereof words
Стр. xxxix - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Стр. 41 - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but the...
Стр. 63 - There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
Стр. 41 - For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense ? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived ? 5.
Стр. 15 - Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves — that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.
Стр. 40 - ... or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi; nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.
Стр. 59 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view...
Стр. 63 - I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance.
Стр. 60 - The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.
Стр. 214 - Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see; quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?