THE ANTI-GALLICAN. ..NUMBER III. BRITANNIA TO HER SONS, And not on conscious strength rely; To battle go, and crush the foe: Stern BONAPARTE, dark fiend of hell, On equal terms, he will not dare Encounter with a British foe. Or, lull'd in false security, E'en hoary age, and beardless youth, In vain he wishes to return. My sea-borne tlrunder rends the skies; From ev'ry hill and dale resound, Great Britain, GEORGE, and Victory. Full on the foe, with headlong rage, The haughty foe are laid full low, And, dying, curse the British shore. From ev'ry hill and dale resound, Morning Post CONSIDERATIONS FOR AND AGAINST SION. THE PROBABILITY OF INVASION. AT a time when the minds of men are generally agitated by the expectation of the hostile attempts of the enemy, it may not be improper to examine the probabilities on both sides, so as to enable our Readers to draw their own conclusions. FOR THE INVASION. It has always been the grand, object with France to atchieve the conquest of Great Britain. It was such under the old Monarchy. Encouragement and emoluments were held forth by Louis XIV. and even by his predeces sors, to those politicians who could propose the most efficacious means for. this object; and plans are now to be, found in the archives of France for its accomplishment. TO BONAPARTE (whose views obviously tend to universal domination) the object is increased in a tenfold proportion, since this Country AGAINST THE INVASION. THE Invasion of England is a most difficult and hazardous undertaking; it was so at all times, even when our naval force was much less than it is; and of the numerous plans presented to Louis XIV. by the Jacobites and others, not one was found practicable. What was difficult at that period is infinitely more so at present, when the nation is completely united, when no faction is to be found ready to assist the plans of the First Consul, when our naval force is ten times greater than it formerly was, when vessels of war of Country is the only one among the European Powers, which presents an obstacle to the full accomplishment of his wishes. Bonaparte has at present an immense army (not less than half a million of men) on foot; and he has an unlimited power of increasing it by arbitrary conscriptions. Bonaparte has no regard to the lives of men. He shewed this at the battle of Lodi, and when he poisoned his sick soldiers in Syria. Every true Frenchman that is killed, rids him of an enemy. He can spare men, and he will not consider the danger to which he exposes them. The present Military Establishment of France is more than the country can bear. He cannot support his army, and therefore he must endeavour to employ it. Bonaparte can hurt this Country in no other way than by invading it. His army is at present totally useless; and therefore there is the utmost probability that he will employ it in the only way in which he can injure that enemy whom he mortally detests, and who is the sole check upon his yast ambition, He has pledged himself to the invasion; end he will incur ridicule and contempt (which his spirit cannot brook) if he does not attempt to put his threats in execution. K 2 of every size and burthen are dispersed over the Channel, and the French and the Dutch harbours virtually in a state of blockade. It must be an immense army indeed that could effect any thing at present in England. An invading enemy has every disadvantage to encounter; they have the difficulty of the voyage, and of keeping together; they have the difficulty of landing, which may be always successfully opposed with a smaller force. Great Britain has at this time nearly two millions of men in arms, or ready to take arms, least half a million of these may be accounted good soldiers, and the mass of the people would contribute perhaps not less than the men in arms to impede the motions of the enemy. With less than 200,000 men, the cfore, it would be madness to make the attempt. At Considering that on the smallest computation, and supposing them to embark even in open boats, the armment to convey them would cover a surface of water of upwards of 60 square miles. It would be difficult to ̈ procure vessels; and still more difficult, to prevent them being burnt and destroyed in their very ports by our daring seamen; and when at sɔa, how is such an immense number of vessels to escape the vigilance of our cruizers? Bonaparte has a difficult card to play. He has pledged himself to come in person; and indeed what General can he trust with such an immense army; or would the soldiers be content to come without him? If then he does not come himself, he will have unnumbered evils to encounter; and if he does, let him look to what remains behind; let him look to plots there, and insurrections against his tyrannical government, which is detested in France. Though Though the conscripts and new levies may be adverse to the attempt, the old soldiers, who are really starving and in rags, will not be against any plan that promises to relieve them from their present distress; and such we find by the most authentic evidence, to be the sentiments of the French soldiery at present. The Liberty of the Press being entirely destroyed in France, the People and the Army are kept completely in the dark; they see neither the difficulty nor the danger, and therefore he has it in his power to persuade them to any thing, however desperate. OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY SPIRIT, ! MUCH at present is said about creating a military spirit in the people of this country. Not satisfied with taking measures for our present security, we carry our views to a distance, and propose to place the nation beyond the reach of all future danger, by creating for it an impregnable defence, in the disposition of its inhabitants. A country is indeed poorly secured which wants this defence; and we should have little confidence in the measures pursued to preserve us, if we thought that the spirit of courage and of manhood remained to be created, among us. It is undoubtedly true, that in no country, and at no time, ought effectual means be omitted to cherish and direct that spirit, not Though the other European Powers may at present stand in awe of his immense force, yet if that force was lessened by such an expedition as we have been describing, is it probable they would remain quie? Is it probable the EMPEROR can forget the injuries and insults he has received? Of the Northern Powers it would be premature at present to say any thing, The Liberty of the Press (which in France is annihilated) has effected wonders in exciting the spirit of this Country, and has made us an armed Nation. Satisfied with their good and venerable Sovereign, and with an honest Constitutional Ministry, there is no sacrifice which the People of England are not prepared to make; and if the enemy could possibly effect the landing even of the immese force we have mentioned, (200,000) they would still be unable to effect the CONQUEST. Times, merely against foreign aggression, but as one important part of the moral culture, which it is one of the first duties of the government to provide for the people. The man who is a coward, who wants the spirit to de-. fend himself, and the country which feeds him, and which contains all those who have benefited or who love him, is deficient in as essential a quality of a good man, as he who wants the essense of justice or of gratitude. And we may lay it down as a position, that in whatever country any considerable proportion of the inhabitants is thus depraved, a bad government, and a bad education, have produced their last and most fatal effects, the corruption of the moral sentiments of the people. As is usual on all occasions, we find crude ideas, notions taken up with scarce any considerations of the subject, by by far the most frequent, even among those presented to the public in the present case. The necessity of the military spirit is a fine popular topic, and people advance any thing under protection of its fascinating influence, without having ever put the question to themselves what the military spirit means. They of course propose many things for raising the military spirit which have nothing to do with that spirit. According to some speculators, a great part of the military spirit consists in the contempt of riches; and we have lost our military spirit, they say, from the love of stocks, and of manufactures. It would seem from these representations, that the first step toward obtaining that desired spirit would be to strip ourselves of our riches and manufactures. In that case we should think a French invasion by no means to be resisted; since we are fully persuaded that of all possible means to that end, this would be the most expeditious, and the most effectual. We should afterwards be nobly secure against any future invasion; since we would be sure to have all the heroism and all the spirit which poverty could bestow upon us. We are of opinion, on the other hand, that the more a man has to defend, the more eager will he be to defend it,' and the greater number of resources will he be able to find to assist him in the defence. We should be sorry to think, that, twenty years hence, our country should not be richer than it is at present; and we have no apprehension that courage will not, as it has hitherto done, keep pace with the knowledge and morality which shall be disseminated amongst the people. Most of those who talk about the military spirit confound two things, 1 which are very distinct, the spirit of manhood, of independence, of heroic defence, with the spirit of restless or needy adventure. The greater part of the military bands, who make a figure in history, are of the latter description. Of course their spirit and their habits come very naturally to be regarded by superficial observers, as exclusively the military spirit and habits. The object. of these bands has much more frequently been to harrass and molest. their neighbours from the desire of plunder, or from what they call the love of glory, than to defend themselves.. from unjust aggression. Undoubtedly men rich and happy at home, are not. the fittest for this occupation. And the story of Lucullus's soldier, who fought like a madman when he had lost his purse, but wished to be quiet when he had filled his pocket with rewards, applies to them accurately. But though Lucullus's soldier did not care for fighting to gain a purse when he had got one already, no doubt he would have fought as desperately as ever to preserve what he had. The spirit of manhood and inde pendence is much more naturally and much more necessarily the result of the habits of social life in a state of frees dom, than of the habits of military discipline, or military enterprize ; and ot no people, associating together under equal and generous laws, ever yete wanted the noblest spirit of courage á and magnanimity. Undoubtedly the feelings and ideas habitually suggested z from the first to the last period of man's life, by the nature of the society in which he is placed, are the most deeply rooted in his, mind, and have the most decisive influence on his con-a duct. But in a state of society, where ... the laws give no one any advantage› over |