not rightly be defined to be, a union between just and good men, in their joint interest and con. cernment, and for the advancement thereof: for it hath always been consented to, that there can be no friendship but between good men, because friendship can never be severed from justice; and consequently can never be applied to corrupt ends. It is the first law of friendship, if we believe Tully, who saw as far into it as any man since, Ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati ; which puts an end to all their endeavours, who would draw any corrupted liquor from so pure a fountain. Friendship neither requires nor consents to any thing that is not pure and sincere; they who introduce the least spot or crooked line into the draught and portraiture of friendship, destroy all its beauty, and render it so deformed, that it cannot be known. Let us then examine, from the integrity of this definition and institution, what the obligations of it are, and what friends are bound under that seal to do or suffer for one another.

1. The first and principal obligation is, to assist each other with their counsel and advice; and because the greatest cement that holds and keeps them together, is the opinion they have of each other's virtue, they are to watch as carefully as is possible that neither of them swerve from the strict

rules thereof; and if the least propensity towards it be discovered, to apply admonition and counsel and reprehension to prevent a lapse. He who sees his friend do amiss, commit a trespass upon his honour or upon his conscience, do that which he were better not do, or do that which he ought not to do, and doth not tell him of it, do all he can to reform him, hath broken the laws of friend. ship; since there is no one obligation to be named with it; so that it may be said to be so much the sole use of friendship, that where that fails, the performance of all other offices is to no purpose; and it may be observed, that few men have ever fallen into any signal misfortune, at least not been lost in it, who have ever been possessed of a true friend, except it be in a time when virtue is a crime. Counsel and reprehension was a duty of the text in the levitical law; "Thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbour, and not suffer sin upon him," (Lev. xix. 17.) and Mr Selden tells us of a Rabbi, that thought it one of the principal causes of the destruction of Jerusalem, because they had left off reproving one another, Non excisa fuisset Jerosolima, nisi quoniam alter alterum non coarguebat; and there is no doubt, the not exercising this essential part of friendship with that sincerity and plainness it ought to be, hath been, and is, the occasion of infinite mischief, and hath upon the

matter annihilated friendship, and brought it under the reproach of being a pandar, and prostituted to all the vile offices of compliance with the infirmities and vices of the person it regards. It is thought to be a necessary office of friendship, to conceal the faults of a friend, and make them be thought much less than they are; and it is so; every man ought to be very tender of the reputation of one he loves, and to labour that he may be well thought of; that is his duty with reference to others: but he is neither to lessen or conceal it to himself, who can best provide for his reputation, by giving no cause for aspersion; and he, who in such cases gives not good counsel to his friend, betrays him.

2. The second office of friendship is, to assist the interest and pretence of his friend with the utmost power he hath, and with more solicitude than if it were his own, as in truth it is; but then Tully's rule is excellent, Tantum cuique tribuendum est, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde quantum quem diligas atque adjuves possit sustinere ; men are not willing to have any limits put to their desires, but think their friends bound to help them to any thing they think themselves fit for. But friendship justly considers what in truth they are, not what they think themselves fit for; quantum possunt sustinere: friendship may be deceived, and

overvalue the strength and capacity of his friend, think that he can sustain more than indeed his parts are equal to; but friendship is not so blind, as not to discern a total unfitness, an absolute incapacity, and can never be engaged to promote such a subject. It can never prefer a man to be a judge, who knows nothing of the law; nor to be a general, who was never a soldier. Promotions, in which the public are concerned, must not be assigned by the excess of private affections; which, though possibly they may chuse the less fit, must never be so seduced as not to be sure there is a competent fitness in the person they make choice of: otherwise friendship, that is compounded of justice, would be unjust to the public, out of private kindness towards particular persons; which is the highest injustice imaginable, of which friendship is not capable.

3. The third duty of friendship is entire confidence and communication, without which faithful counsel the just tribute of friendship can never be given; and therefore reservation in friendship is like concealment in confession, which makes the absolution void, as the other doth the counsel of no effect. Seneca's advice is excellent, Diu cogita an tibi in amicitiam aliqui recipiendus sit: It is want of this deliberation, this long thinking whether such a man be capable of friendship, and

whether thou thyself art fit for it, that brings so much scandal upon it, makes friendships of a day, or rather miscalls every short acquaintance, any light conversation, by the title of friendship; of which very many of those are incapable, who are fit enough for acquaintance, and commendable enough in conversation. When thou hast considered this well, which thou canst do without considering it long; cum placuerit fieri, if thou resol vest that he is fit for thy friendship, toto illum pectore admitte, receive him into thy bosom; let him be possessed of all thy purposes, all thy thoughts; to conceal any thing from him now is an affront, and a disavowing him for thy friend. It is the reason the Roman church gives, why they define the reservation and concealment of any sin, or circumstance of it, in confession of it, to be sacrilege, because it defrauds God of somewhat that was due to him from the penitent; and by the same reason, the not entirely communicating all thou knowest and all thou thinkest is a lay sacrilege, a retaining somewhat that is his due by the dedication of friendship and without this sincere communication, the principal use of friendship is abated and with-held, and the true virtue thereof undiscovered, and the comfort that attends it.

The fourth obligation in friendship is constancy, and continuing firm to the laws and obligations of