likewise St. Austin*, who censures that relation of the Antipodes to be an incredible fable; and with him agrees the eloquent Lactantius +. Quid illi qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodes putant? num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quispiam tam ineptus, qui credat esse homines, quorum vestigia sunt superiora quam capita? aut ibi quæ apud nos jacent inversa pendere? fruges & arbores deorsum versus crescere, pluvias & nives, & grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? & miratur aliquis hortos pensiles inter septem mira narrari, quum philosophi, & agros, & maria, & urbes, & montes pensiles faciunt, &c. " What (saith he) are they "that think there are Antipodes, such as walk with their "feet against ours? do they speak any likelihood; or is "there any one so foolish as to believe that there are men "whose heels are higher than their heads? that things "which with us do lie on the ground, do hang there? "that the plants and trees grow downwards, that the hail, ❝and rain, and snow fall upwards to the earth? and do we "admire the hanging orchards amongst the seven wonders, "whereas here the philosophers have made the fields and "seas, the cities and mountains hanging?" What shall we think (saith he in Plut.) that men do cling to that place like worms, or hang by their claws as cats? or if we suppose a man a little beyond the centre, to be digging with a spade, is it likely (as it must be according to this opinion) that the earth which he loosened, should of itself ascend upwards? Or else suppose two men with their middles about the centre, the feet of the one being placed where the head of the other is, and so two other men cross them; yet all these men thus situated, according to this opinion should stand upright; and many other such gross consequences would follow (saith he) which a false imagination is not able to fancy as possible. Upon which considerations, Bede also denies the being of any Antipodes, Neque enim Antipodarum ullatenus est fabulis accommodandus

* De civit. Dei, l. 16. cap. 9.

+ Institut. 1. 3. cap. 24.

assensus. "Nor should we any longer assent to the fable "of Antipodes." So also Lucretius the poet speaking of the same subject, says,

Sed vanus stolidis hæc omnia finxerii error t.

That some idle fancy feigned these for fools to believe. Of this opinion was Procopius Gazæus ; but he was persuaded to it by another kind of reason; for he thought that all the earth under us was sunk in the water, according to the saying of the Psalmist, He hath founded the earth upon the seas§; and therefore he accounted it not inhabited by any. Nay, Tostatus, a man of later years and general learning, doth also confidently deny that there are any such Antipodes, though the reason which he urges for it be not so absurd as the former; for the apostles, saith he, travelled through the whole habitable world, but they never passed the equinoctial ||: and if you answer, that they are said to go through all the earth, because they went through all the known world; he replies, That this is not sufficient, since Christ would have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of his truth T, and therefore it is requisite that they should have travelled thither also, if there had been any inhabitants; especially since he did expressly command them to go and teach all nations, and preach the gospel through the whole world**: and therefore he thinks, that as there are no men, so neither are there seas, or rivers, or any other conveniency for habitation ++. It is commonly related of one Virgilius, that he was excommunicated and condemned for a heretic by Zachary bishop of Rome, because he was not of the same opinion. But Baronius says ‡‡, it was because he thought there was another habitable world within ours. However, you may well enough discern in these examples, how confident many of these great scholars were in so gross an error; how un

likely, what an incredible thing it seemed to them, that there should be any Antipodes; and yet now this truth is as certain and plain, as sense or demonstration can make it. This then which I now deliver, is not to be rejected, though it may seem to contradict the common opinion.

2. Gross absurdities have been entertained by general consent. I might instance in many remarkable examples, but I will only speak of the supposed labour of the moon in her eclipses, because this is nearest to the chief matter in hand, and was received as a common opinion amongst many of the ancients; insomuch, that from hence they stiled eclipses by the name of лa, passions, or in the phrase of the poets,

Solis lunæque labores.

And therefore Plutarch speaking of a lunary eclipse, relates, that at such times it was a custom amongst the Romans, (the most civil and learned people in the world) to sound brass instruments, and hold great torches toward the heaven *. Των δε Ρωμαίων (ωσπερ εςιν ενομισμένον) χαλκς τε παταγοις ανακαλεμένων το φως αυτής και πυρα πολλα δαλοις και δασσιν ανεχοντων προς τον ερανον. For by this means they supposed the moon was much eased in her labours; and therefore Ovid calls such loud instruments, the auxiliaries or helps of the moon,

Cum frustra resonant æra auxiliaria lunæ †.

And therefore the satyrist too, describing a loud scold, says, She was able to make noise enough to deliver the labouring

moon.

Una laboranti poterit succurrere lunæ ‡.

Now the reason of all this their ceremony, was, because they feared the world would fall asleep, when one of its eyes began to wink, and therefore they would do what they could by loud sounds to rouse it from its drowsiness, and keep it awake; by bright torches, to bestow that light upon it which it began to lose.

*In vita Paul Emil. † Metam. lib. 4.

Juven. Sat, 6.

Some of them thought hereby to keep the moon in her orb, whereas otherwise she would have fallen down upon the earth, and the world would have lost one of its lights; for the credulous people believed that inchanters and witches could bring the moon down; which made Virgil say,

Cantus & è cælo possunt deducere lunam.

And those wizards knowing the times of her eclipses, would then threaten to shew their skill, by pulling her out of her orb. So that when the silly multitude saw that she began to look red, they presently feared they should lose the benefit of her light, and therefore made a great noise that she might not hear the sound of those charms, which would otherwise bring her down; and this is rendered for a reason of this custom by Pliny and Propertius * :

Cantus & è curru lunam deducere tentant,

Et facerent, si non æra repulsa sonent.

Plutarch gives another reason of it; and he says, it is because they would hasten the moon out of the dark shade wherein she was involved, that so she might bring away the souls of those saints that inhabit within her, which cry out by reason they are then deprived of their wonted happiness, and cannot hear the music of the spheres; but are forced to behold the torments and wailings of those damned souls which are represented to them as they are tortured in the region of the air. But whether this, or whatever else was the meaning of this superstition, yet certainly it was a very ridiculous custom, and bewrayed a great ignorance of those ancient times; especially since it was not only received by the vulgar, such as were men of less note and learning, but believed also by the more famous and wiser sort; such as were those great poets, Stesichorus and Pindar and not only amongst the more sottish heathens, who might account that planet to be one of their gods, but the primitive christians also were in this kind guilty; which made St. Ambrose so tartly to rebuke those of his *Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 12.

time, when he said, Tum turbatur carminibus globus lune

quando calicibus turbantur & oculi. 66 are troubled with cups, then you "troubled with charms."

"When your heads think the moon to be

And for this reason also did Maximus *, a bishop, write a homily against it, wherein he shewed the absurdity of that foolish superstition. I remember that Ludovicus Vives relates a more ridiculous story of a people that imprisoned an ass for drinking up the moon, whose image appearing in the water, was covered with a cloud as the ass was drinking; for which the poor beast was afterward brought to the bar, to receive a sentence according to his deserts; where the grave senate being set to examine the matter, one of the counsel (perhaps wiser than the rest) rises up, and out of his deep judgment, thinks it not fit that their town should lose its moon, but that rather the ass should be cut up, and that taken out of him; which sentence being approved by the rest of those politicians, as the subtilest way for the conclusion of the matter, was accordingly performed. But whether this tale were true or no, I will not question; however, there is absurdity enough in that former custom of the ancients, that may confirm the truth to be proved, and plainly declare the insufficiency of common opinion to add true worth or estimation unto any thing. So that from that which I have said, may be gathered thus much.

1. That a new truth may seem absurd and impossible, not only to the vulgar, but to those also who are otherwise wise men and excellent scholars: and hence it will follow, that every new thing which seems to oppose common principles, is not presently to be rejected, but rather to be pryed into with a diligent enquiry, since there are many things which are yet hid from us, and reserved for future discovery.

2. That it is not the commonness of an opinion that can privilege it for a truth; the wrong way is sometimes a well beaten path, whereas the right way (especially to hidden truths) may be less trodden and more obscure.

*Turinens. Episc.