de corps, had gradually found themselves surpassed in tactics by soldiers who were their equals in bravery and superior to them in discipline. It was impossible that, in the progress of civilization, the Osmanli should maintain their barbarous system of warfare, and the natural consequence was the re-organization of the army on the European model. The Janissaries refused obedience, and the choice was left between the downfal of the State or the extermination of the rebels. The latter succumbed, and the road was left free for the introduction of those measures which could alone secure the existence of the Empire.

Nothing could be more evident than the advantages this change brought about. In every instance when the Turks have been engaged since the Tanzimat, they have behaved most bravely. In the campaigns of Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia, they proved that they had not forgotten their old renown. During the campaigns of 1853 and 1854, they have shown that they are superior to the Russians in every respect, and the very fact that they have been able to cope successfully with such a tremendous force, speaks volumes for the advantages derived from the present system. Still there is much to be done, and we may confidently anticipate that the presence of the allied forces in Turkey will induce the Ottoman government to use every endeavour to render their forces worthy in every respect of their fellow-combatants.

Before concluding this survey of the Turkish army, we may be permitted to make reference to one of the arguments employed to prove that the Turkish army cannot possibly amount to the numbers we have given above. It is well known that the Turks only allow Mussulmans to serve in their armies, and even if the Porte has recently allowed Christians to assume commands, these are only exceptional cases, and need hardly be taken into consideration. We have already seen that, even according to Turkish statements, the number of Mussulmans in European Turkey does not amount to more than 4,000,000. In this calculation, old men, women, and children, are included. How many are left for conscription? The number of Muhammadans in Asiatic Turkey is certainly much larger, and is said to amount to 12,000,000. But even, assuming this to be the case, how would this amount allow a body of nearly 500,000 men to be raised? In a well-regulated State, containing 10,000,000 inhabitants, the greatest number of disciplined troops that can be collected is 250,000; how, then, could Turkey, which is notoriously not a well-disciplined State, raise double the number?

The answer appears to us very simple. In the calculation we have made, bringing the Turkish army up to 500,000 men, we have a large number of irregular troops, and, secondly, we do not for a moment attempt to assert that Turkey has such a body at its immediate disposal. The writer of the above

remarks goes upon a false principle, in assuming that the Turkish army is estimated at half a million regular and disciplined troops, such as the 250,000 to which he refers; we have taken every available resource into our calculation, and we believe that our estimate is not at all exaggerated. We know what

England was enabled to do during the threatened French invasion of the first empire-when every man was willing to shed his blood, pro aris et focis, and now, when the Osmanli are imbued with even a stronger feeling that of religion-we may feel confident that every man capable of bearing arms may be counted a soldier. Such being the case, there is no reason for believing that Turkey cannot furnish such an army as we have given above, which is in perfect accordance with the views of all impartial writers on the subject. It is an easy task for the 'Kreutz Zeitung' and other Russian organs to employ all their weapons of sarcasm and invective in depreciating the Turks. Fortunately, facts speak for themselves, and lead to the conviction that the Turks are also, for their part, prepared to expend their last man and their last piastre in defence of their faith and their country.

Believing as we do that the chief credit of the successful changes in the Turkish military system are pre-eminently due to OMAR PACHA and GUYON,

See the Russian reply to the Austrian summons, in the Times' of July 4, 1854.

the respective Commanders-in-Chief of Rumelia and Anatolia, we have ventured to conclude our resumé of the Turkish army with a short biography of these generals, which we feel sure will be perused with extreme interest, as the details have been collected from the most authentic sources.

VOL. II

Y

OMAR PACHA.

CONVERSIONS at the present day are not at all among the objects of general admiration. The very name does not sound pleasantly; and how harshly does the name of renegade strike upon the ear. We think, on hearing it, of the most odious things, of the mercenary motives of the adventurer, and the hopes of the sensualist, but never refer it to an honourable motive. How could it be possible, we are wont to say, that a man who has been attached to a purer faith, to a higher state of cultivation, can sacrifice both, if he has not unworthy objects in view?

And still it is possible that such motives are not felt. Is Omar Pacha, the valiant Murschid of the army of the Danube, one of these beings? Or is he an adventurous mercenary, who has bidden adieu to Christianity and to cultivation, in order to gain better fare, with the external dignities and advantages attached to it, under the crescent? We shall see. Perchance, he is something of both.

But for the