THE AUXILIARY AND IRREGULAR TROOPS. 313

THE AUXILIARY AND IRREGULAR TROOPS.

WE have already seen that the Ottoman active army has an effective strength of about 150,000 men, which can be momentarily doubled by summoning the reserve under arms. To this body we must also add the irregular troops who could be collected within a given time, and the contingents furnished by the tributary provinces and certain territories not yet subjected to the law of recruiting, but bound to furnish the Porte assistance in the event of war.

The provinces bound to furnish contingents are Servia, Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Upper Albania, and Egypt. It is difficult to estimate their exact numbers, for it would depend greatly upon the political circumstances of the moment, and the enemy against whom the contingents would be called upon to act. At the present time we may, at the most moderate calculation, calculate their united forces at 105-110,000 men, in the following proportions:

In consequence of the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians at the very outset of the war, the Porte cannot expect much assistance from that quarter. However, it may be presumed that as the feelings of the inhabitants are generally in favour of the Turks, the guerilla bands which have been formed will prove of some value. These may be estimated at about 8,500 men.

Bosnia, the Herzegovina, and Upper Albania, almost exclusively inhabited by Mussulmans, would furnish from 53 to 60,000 men, and if Servia eventually gives up her neutral policy, she could send a detachment of at least 30,000 men to the aid of the Porte.

Egypt, according to the terms of the treaty of the 15th of July, 1840, is bound to furnish assistance to the Porte both by land and sea, and has hitherto most chivalrously held to her engagements. Her contingent has already fought most bravely, and has taken a great part in the victories over the Russians. The whole amount of the contingent she can furnish, after

deducting the troops she requires for her own defence, may be estimated at 24 or 25,000 men.

The IRREGULAR TROOPS are composed of: The kavass (gendarmerie on foot), seymens (mounted gendarmerie), and soubachis (rural police soldiers), forming an efficient strength

of The Tartars of the Dobrudja and Asia

Minor may be estimated at

Hungarian and Polish volunteers Mussulman volunteers, who may be calculated, at least, at .

The police force is a very valuable institution, for, in its present state of organisation, the regular troops may be taken away without danger from provinces in which they have been stationed on account of an appearance of disaffection. Although unfit to enter the ranks of the army, they will thus enable the Government to make use of the whole military force for the purpose of defence against foreign enemies, while the constabulary will suffice to restrain those at home, if any such there be.

The Police department has its agents divided into brigades; each eyalet having one, under the command of a superior officer, and Constantinople having three. In each brigade there are as many companies as there

are provinces in the respective eyalet, and they are commanded by Captains. Each company has a number of serjeants, equal to that of the departments in the province, and the serjeants have charge of detachments, varying from ten to thirty constables, according to the amount of the population. They are mounted, and well armed. Besides these, there are forty horsemen attached to every considerable town, for the general service of the surrounding country, amounting in all to 10,000 men. The regular constabulary is about 20,000 strong; and a body of 30,000 men, organised as a military force, is thus at the command of the Government, for the internal security of the country, when the army is concentrated by war on any one point.

RECAPITULATION.

The whole of the military forces of Turkey would, consequently, by these data, amount to:

* It need hardly be added that the above statements can only be regarded as assumed under the most favourable circumstances,

accord

Such is the condition of the Turkish army, ing to writers who appear to have examined carefully into the matter. Unfortunately, in this, as in other questions referring to Turkish reform, the greatest uncertainty prevails. Authors who, from their antecedents, are equally entitled to respect, give a very different account. In fact, so great is the margin in Turkey, between the official reports and the actual state of things, that it is almost impossible to form a correct opinion. So much, however, appears to be certain. The Turkish government does all in its power to place the army on an effective footing, and any short-comings are the fault of the Turks themselves, and not of the administration. It may be very true that the Turkish troops are slovenly, careless, and guilty of gross insubordination, but these are defects which time will gradually remove. Old prejudices have still to be eradicated-much that is faulty has to be improved-but, for all that, there is much deserving praise in the attempts already made at military reform.

The condition of the Turkish army, at the introduction of the reforms, was most exceptional. The Janissaries, who had been the terror of Europe during the middle ages, through their organization and esprit

and, more especially, that such a body could not be brought into the field at the commencement of the campaign. Nor would the condition of the finances allow the Turkish government to maintain such an army for any length of time.