Courts, preclude the District Courts from taking the power granted by that section in all of its amplitude. Both are inferior to the Supreme Court, and established by laws enacted by Congress pursuant to authority given by the Constitution, and derive all of their powers and jurisdiction from the same source; and they are equally well equipped in their organization, with all the means requisite for exercising the functions of a court in taking into custody a person, and adjudicating all questions affecting that person's liberty, and all questions affecting the authority and rights of others with respect to the custody and control of infants. The facts that the litigants are citizens of different states, and that the case involves a controversy between citizens of different states, cannot be treated as a feature affecting the question as to the relative powers of the Circuit and District Courts, without conceding that the decision of the question must be controlled by the general statutes defining the jurisdiction of the different courts. Congress has conferred jurisdiction of civil actions at law and suits in equity arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and of actions and suits of a civil nature presenting controversies between citizens of different states, upon the Circuit Courts, and has not authorized the District Courts to entertain jurisdiction upon those grounds, but it may do so; and it is not unlikely that, in the near future, agitation of the subject, which has been going on for many years, will result in constituting the District Courts the sole repositories of the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. A concession that section 751 is to be construed, for the purpose of determining the respective powers of the Circuit and District Courts, with reference to the general statutes defining their jurisdictions, is an abandonment of the entire argument based upon the special grant of powers contained in the habeas corpus law, because it takes us back to the question whether, under the general law, the case is cognizable in the Circuit Court, and leaves us there. Section 753 contains no grant of power, but is a restriction upon the power of the federal courts, prohibiting the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner in jail, except under the prescribed conditions enumerated in that section. To meet the conditions existing at the time of South Carolina's attempt to nullify the laws of the United States, and deal with officers of the national government under its criminal laws for acts done in the performance of official duties, Congress enacted: "That either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any District Court of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner, or prisoners in jail, or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or confined on, or by any authority of law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States. Act March 2, 1833, c. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634. This law has been recast in the Revised Statutes, and the body of it, with changed phraseology, now constitutes section 753; and, as already indicated. there is in it no grant of power, so that it must now be construed with reference to its position, following sections 751 and 752, in order to give it any definite and clear meaning, unless we assume that by implication it confers power to grant writs of habeas corpus in the excepted cases enumerated. Thus construed, the section, by implication, would confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts generally, without discriminating between Circuit and District Courts, to issue writs of habeas corpus in behalf of persons held in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. It is the main contention of the petitioner in this case that, as the respondents have refused to surrender the child in compliance with the order of a court of the state of California, they have failed to give full faith and credit in the state of Washington to a judgment of a court of the state of California, and that such refusal constitutes detention of the child in custody, in violation of section 1 of article 4 of the Constitution, and that the habeas corpus law does, expressly or by implication, confer jurisdiction upon this court, as a Circuit Court of the United States, to grant the relief which he seeks by the writ of habeas corpus. If the law by necessary implication does confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus in the particular cases enumerated in section 753, such implied jurisdiction is necessarily limited by the conditions to which the law is applicable, and does not include this case, for the reason that the child is not imprisoned in jail, and imprisonment in jail appears to be the first condition recited in that section, and is the controlling condition governing all of the cases which, by reason of the exceptions, the federal courts are permitted to take cognizance of. There is another fatal objection to the petitioner's contention. That objection is grounded upon the difficulty of bringing the case within the purview of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. That section of the Constitution provides that Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every state "shall be proved, and the effect thereof"; and, pursuant to that authority, congress has, by section 905, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 677], prescribed the manner in which public acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof, as follows: "Sec. 905. * * The records, and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state or territory, or of any such country, shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form. And said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every other court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the court of the state from which they are taken." Under this law a judgment of a court of a state can only be made effective elsewhere within the United States through the instrumentality of a court having local jurisdiction. Section 905, and the provisions of the Constitution upon which it is based, establish a rule of evidence, rather than a ground of jurisdiction. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265-300, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239. See, especially, pages 291-293, 127 U. S., pages 1375, 1376, 8 Sup. Ct., 32 L. Ed. 239. Applying this rule to the case in hand, a duly authenticated transcript of the judgment awarding to the petitioner custody of his child is competent evidence in this state, and, when so proved in a court of this state, the judgment itself will have the same validity, force, and virtue in this state that it has by law or usage in the state of California. Unless it can be impeached for fraud or lack of jurisdiction in the court which rendered it, the parties and the court will be bound by it, so far that the controversy which it determined cannot be again litigated in this state. But until a court other than a court of the state of California refuses to give such faith and credit to that judgment, the refusal of the respondents to surrender the child will not constitute a violation of the Constitution. In this connection, it should be noted that the petition does not allege that, in the proceedings for legal adoption of the child by the respondents, the Washington court failed to give full faith and credit to the order of the California court awarding custody of the child to the petitioner, or acted with knowledge thereof. The duty of the respondents to obey the command which the judgment contains is not more imperative by reason of their presence in this state than if they had remained in California, and their custody of the child in this state is not in violation of the Constitution. It is not, because, according to the act of Congress, the judgment awarding the legal custody to the petitioner can have no other force or effect in this state than it has in California; and, until equal faith and credit has been refused by a court, there can be no ground for complaining of any violation of the Constitution, and no cause of action which will entitle the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of a national court for the preservation of a constitutional right. I regard chapter 13 of title 13, Rev. St., as one law, intended to govern the practice of the federal courts in habeas corpus cases; the several sections thereof having relation to each other to constitute a complete, harmonious system. In general terms, it authorizes the courts, and the justices and judges thereof, to issue writs of habeas corpus, and dispose of persons restrained of liberty, as law and justice. require; prohibiting, however, the use of the writ in behalf of prisoners in jail, except in the enumerated cases in which the national government, acting within its sphere, may properly interfere. And I am constrained by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, 10 Sup. Ct. 850, 34 L. Ed. 1500, to hold that the authority. which the law gives does not enlarge the jurisdiction of this court, to embrace this case. Motion to dismiss granted. O'CONNELL et al. v. PINNACLE GOLD MINES CO. (Circuit Court, D. Washington, N. D. June 13, 1904.) 1. MINING CLAIMS-LOCATION-LOCATOR'S ESTATE STATUTES. 11. See Executors and Administrators, vol. 22, Cent. Dig. § 289. ed States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, etc. Held, that since the mining laws of the United States did not restrict discoverers to a single claim, nor require them to apply for patents within any specified time or at all, and such laws authorized the assignment and taxation of such claims, on the death of the locator his unpatented claims passed under the statute to his administrator, as a part of his estate, and not to his heirs, as grantees of the government. Action at law to recover possession of unpatented mining claims from a defendant holding as owner by right of purchase from the administrator of the estate of the deceased locator of the claims; the plaintiffs being alleged heirs of the deceased, and claiming ownership as grantees of the government, under section 2322, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1425]. Heard on motion for judgment on the pleadings. Motion granted. Victor E. Palmer and G. Ward Kemp, for plaintiffs. HANFORD, District Judge. The property which is the subject of controversy in this case consists of several mining claims situated in Okanogan county, in this state. Said claims were discovered and located under the mining laws of the United States by James O'Connell, deceased, who thereby acquired the possessory rights defined by section 2322, Rev. St. U. S. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1425], and had possession at the time of his death, but made no application to the government for the issuance of patents, and the title to the property remains vested in the United States. O'Connell died intestate in the year 1899, and the plaintiffs claim to be lawful heirs of said deceased, and entitled by inheritance to five-sixths of his estate, and that a sister of the deceased, Alice O'Connell O'Neill, is the only other heir, her share of the estate being one-sixth. The superior court of the state of Washington for Okanogan county appointed an administrator of the estate, and in the course of proceedings made a decree and order of distribution, whereby it was adjudged that Alice O'Connell O'Neill is the sole heir of James O'Connell, and entitled to receive all the residue of his estate, after paying debts and expenses of administration. The mining claims were sold by the administrator under an order of the superior court, and the defendant claims ownership thereof, deraigning its title through conveyances from the administrator and from Alice O'Connell O'Neill. The plaintiffs claim ownership of fivesixths of the mining claims, not by inheritance from James O'Connell, but as donees of the United States government. Their claim is based upon the following proposition: Section 2322, Rev. St. U. S., is a congressional grant of portions of the public lands of the United States, including veins and lodes containing valuable mineral deposits, in the same sense that other acts of Congress have been construed as grants of portions of the public domain to settlers who establish homes thereon, and cultivate and improve their claims; the grant in each case being conditional, so that no title passes from the government until fulfillment of the conditions prescribed; that, upon the death of the locator of a mining claim before performance of the conditions essential to the acquisition of title, his possessory rights do not pass by inheritance, but in that event his heirs occupy the position of designated successors entitled to acquire the property as grantees of the government. The plaintiffs base their whole contention upon their construction of section 2322, Rev. St. U. S., the ma terial portion of which reads as follows: "Sec. 2322. The locators of all mining locations heretofore made or which shall hereafter be made, on any mineral vein, lode, or ledge, situated on the public domain, their heirs and assigns, where no adverse claim exists on the tenth day of May eighteen hundred and seventy-two, so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with state, territorial, and local regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possessory title, shall have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire depth, the top or apex of which lies inside of such surface-lines extended downward vertically, although such veins, lodes, or ledges may so far depart from a perpendicular in their course downward as to extend outside the vertical side-lines of such surface locations. * The rights claimed by the respective parties above outlined are set forth in the pleadings, and the case has been argued and submitted upon a motion filed by the defendant to strike parts of the reply to the defendant's answer, and for a judgment in favor of the defendant upon the pleadings. As the case hinges upon a question of law, and as the plaintiffs must prevail, if at all, upon the validity of the claim which they assert, this motion appears to the court to be in accordance with good practice, and presents the issue of law fairly for the court's consideration. It is certainly true that, if the mining claims in controversy were not part of the assets of the estate of James O'Connell, no rights with respect thereto were transferred by the administrator's sale, and the defendant has no interest therein greater than Mrs. O'Neill's share. Whether the defendant acquired by conveyance from her all or only an undivided share of the property involves an important question of fact put in issue by the pleadings-that is, whether the plaintiffs are lawful heirs of James O'Connell; but, for the purpose of deciding the question raised by the motion, it will be assumed that they are lawful heirs, as they have alleged. In support of their position, counsel for the plaintiffs have cited and rely upon decisions of the courts in cases arising under the Oregon donation law, and the several acts of Congress prescribing the manner of acquiring titles to public land by settlers thereon. Hall v. Russell, 101 U. S. 503, 25 L. Ed. 829; Hershberger v. Blewett (C. C.) 55 Fed. 170; McCune v. Essig (C. C.) 118 Fed. 273; Id., 122 Fed. 588, 59 C. C. A. 429. But it is the opinion of the court that those decisions are not authorities in point, for the reason that there is a radical difference in phraseology and intent between the laws under which those cases arose and the mining laws. I can find in the case of Black v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 163 U. S. 445, 16 Sup. Ct. 1101, 41 L. Ed. 221, cited by counsel for plaintiffs, no support whatever for their contention. In that case the Circuit Court for the District of |