then occupied was so much exhausted as not to afford him the necessary supplies without detaching a considerable force, in order to bring them into his magazines. 3dly, That by moving to Santarem he secured the passage of the Zezere, and consequently a retreat into Spain, by the line of Castello Branco. 4thly, That by drawing nearer to Abrantes he might be better enabled to cover the attack of that place by a part of his force, and possibly obtain possession of the bridge over the Tagus at that point, which would further enable him to draw supplies from the province of Alemtejo. Lastly, It brought him nearer to his expected reinforcements, and the country in his rear, not yet exhausted, affords some corn, and forage for his cavalry; particularly in the vicinity of Golegao and the banks of the Tagus. Whatever his real motives may be, his retreat must be considered as a tacit acknowledgment of the unexpected resistance he has met with, and also of the abilities of Lord Wellington, in frustrating his original plans of operation.

But let us not be led away with the idea, that, although Massena has been foiled in his

first attempt, he will evacuate the country without making a second trial. The generals of Buonaparte know too well the disposition. of their master, to provoke his anger by a refusal to execute his commands, however inadequate their means. The result of future operations it is impossible to foresee; we have notwithstanding good grounds on which to build our hopes of ultimate success; the Por tuguese troops have been tried, and the Commander in Chief seems confident in them. Our army is well supplied with every thing necessary to their subsistance and equiqment; the port of Lisbon as well as those to the north are open to us, by which means we may either augment our force, or throw in provi sions. On the contrary, the French army, disappointed in their expectations of meeting nothing but an armed rabble to support the British troops, harassed on all sides by the militia and ordenença, and without magazines, are obliged to subsist on the precarious produce of their foraging expeditions and the country in their immediate vicinity. Portugal at the best of times does not produce sufficient corn for its own consumption; in the

present position of affairs, when a great portion of the population is drained for the army, agriculture cannot flourish in the same degree as in times of peace and tranquillity. Every succeeding year whilst the war lasts. must necessarily impoverish the country, to which the addition of at least 100,000 men to be fed, must, in a great measure, contribute. The longer the French army are held in check within certain limits, the more difficult it will be found to subsist them; yet with all these disadvantages on their side, it would be ridiculous to suppose that they are now in a state of actual starvation, and that they will in consequence be obliged to sur render. A line of retreat is open for them into Spain, whenever their resources fail to such a degree as to make it absolutely necessary for them to evacuate Portugal; and although they may be greatly harassed on their march, and their numbers greatly diminished by the militia and other irregular troops, yet there is not at present an efficient force in their rear to check them. It may also be remarked, that every day so large a force is occupied in Portugal, it adds

strength to the cause of Spain; and as long as the spirit of opposition to French rulers is manifest on the Peninsula, I trust we shall not withhold the means in our power of supporting it.

Of the political Opinions of the Portuguese of the present Day, compared with the Statements of General Dumouriez and the Duke de Châtelet on that head.

IN the travels of the Duke de Châtelet in Portugal, 1777, edited by Burgoing, he states, that "the Portuguese have a natural aver"sion and hatred to the Spaniards; that they have a dislike to the English, and a

partiality to the French, owing in a great "measure to the coincident vivacity in the dispositions of the two nations." Dumouriez on the same subject states, "The Portu

guese possess an innate enmity to the Eng"lish and Spaniards. The French nation is "that with which they sympathise the most." This he attributes to the gaiety, the vivacity, the inconstancy, and turn of mind common to these two people.