its way, killing great numbers, especially of cavalry. It is to be remarked that the Puerto de Baños is not a pass of such strength on the Estremaduran side as it is on the side of Castille, particularly without artillery for its defence, and considering the vast superiority of the enemy, which consisted of the whole of Marshal Ney's corps, the defence made by Sir Robert Wilson for nine hours, although defeated, cannot but be considered as highly honourable to that officer.* From the nature of mountain warfare, Sir Robert was unable to collect returns of his killed and wounded; many of the Legion, which were at first missing, a knowledge of the country enabled to retreat into Portugal: others escaped from the enemy and returned also.

Before I quit this subject, it may be necessary to mention, that a powerful diversion on Toledo was to have been made by a Spanish corps of from 16,000 to 20,000 men, under General Venages. This part of the plan of

To this the enemy bear sufficient testimony, for in a letter from Marshal Ney to Marshal Soult, he states, "Ge"neral Wilson however rallied his troops for the third time " and even endeavoured to act on the offensive."

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co-operation was not carried into effect with that promptitude which was expected, and this General still remained behind the Toledo mountains and the river Guadiana, at Damiel; consequently the French General Sebastiani was enabled to draw off the whole of his corps, except two thousand men, which he left as a garrison at Toledo, and to form a junction with Victor's corps before the battle of Talavera. To this, and the refusal of General Cuesta to occupy the Puerto de Baños, with a division of his army, although repeatedly urged so to do by the Commander in Chief of the British forces, may be ascribed the failure of the plan of operations laid down for the campaign of the combined armies in Spain.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Campaign of 1810.

THE Combined British and Portuguese army, which had taken up a line of positions on the eastern frontier of Portugal, towards the close of 1809, continued stationary in the early part of the following year. A division of this army under Major-General Hill occupied the frontier line to the south of the Tagus; whilst the main body extended from the right bank of that river to the Douro. The fortress of Almeida was garrisoned chiefly by the Portuguese militia under a British governor (Brigadier-General Cox); the light troops and some cavalry under BrigadierGeneral Crawfurd, were advanced in front of that fortress, and patroled as far as Ciudad Rodrigo in Spain. In the mean time the French army of Portugal, as it is denominated, consisting of three corps d'armée under

Marshals Ney, Junot, and Regnier, and commanded by Marshal Massena, one of the most celebrated of Buonaparte's generals, were assembling at Salamanca and on the frontiers of Portugal, in order to complete the conquest of that country, and to drive the English into the sea! This formidable army, according to the proclamations of their Commander in Chief, amounted to 110,000 men ; but its real effective force, according to the highest calculations we have been able to learn from official documents, never exceeded 80,000 men. The allied army, when concentrated, did not amount at the same period to more than 60,000, exclusive of the Portuguese militia and ordenença; the greater part of which were in the northern provinces with General Francisco de Silveira, and at Oporto and Coimbra with Colonels Trant and Millar.

The campaign of 1810 opened with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, by two corps of the French army, which invested the place on the 11th of June. On the night between the 15th and 16th, the trenches were opened, and on the 21st the second parallel was completed. On the 25th, at night, the besiegers opened

their fire, and on the 10th of July the place surrendered. Considering the miserable state of the fortification of Ciudad Rodrigo, which is merely a walled town, and has no outworks, the defence made by the garrison of this place must ever be considered as highly honourable to the Spanish arms. It is moreover evident, from the contumelious reproaches cast upon Lord Wellington in the Moniteur, where he is represented as ever ready to desert his allies in cases of great danger and necessity, that the French Commander in Chief, as well as Buonaparte himself, were in expectation of his advancing to the relief of the besieged. However valuable in some respects it might appear to retain possession of Ciudad Rodrigo, yet these advantages were far outbalanced by the possibility of defeat in this advanced situation; besides the Portuguese troops which composed one-half of Lord Wellington's army had not (with the exception of the Lusitanian Legion and one or two other regiments,) as yet been tried; and the nature of the country in the vicinity of Ciudad Rodrigo is such, as to offer a decided advantage to that army which can bring into the field the most numerous body