their own and other nations, as well as freedom from any strong interest in the points on which they are required to legislate; and such knowledge of the general circumstances of the nation and of the former state of the law, as may render them competent to judge with sufficient accuracy, of the effects likely to ensue from the law they are about to enact. Above all things, it is requisite that they should not consider their rank and power, as a body or as individuals, to depend on the number of laws which they make, in a given time, or on the adventitious circumstance of those laws pleasing or displeasing any particular district or party of the people. Now we challenge the effrontery of the most barefaced Radical, or the plausibility of the most sophistical Whig, to confute the assertion that in every one of these respects the House of Lords is, of all bodies of whom the nation is composed, the best qualified to make judicious laws for the benefit of the community. By their rank, wealth, and habits, they are, at least as far as theory can lead us to suppose, (and let it be remembered that in this part of our article it is with theory we are dealing,) accustomed to a wide range of elegant literature and philosophy; they are obliged by the society in which they intermix, to be acquainted to a considerable extent with the works and opinions of the wisest of all ages. They are almost always sent when young to travel in other countries, to learn the habits, institutions, and sentiments of their inhabitants. Their society beyond their own rank is chiefly composed of those most eminent for talents, and for the use made by them of those talents. They have less interest in the common objects of laws than most classes, as their property and rank is in general fixed, and not liable to the sudden fluctuations of that of the mercantile or professional departments of society, and they are consequently less liable to be influenced in their views by considerations of private advantage and profit, and more likely to view questions according to the principles of right and wrong, and public benefit and injury. Their connexions, acquaintances, and even their residences, being more extensively spread, they are less tempted to derive limited and

partial views from constant intercourse with any one confined social circle, while the decorum of their rank early instils a habit of command over themselves, and over the expression, at least, of temper and feeling.

In these countries the peerage is particularly fitted for this office, as while raised by rank above the rest of their fellow subjects, they are yet possessed of none of those privileges which tend to draw an absolute line of demarcation between them and others, and to prevent them from being interested in and acquainted with the welfare of the other classes. Their interest must always be the interest of the nation at large; and while the circumstances we have before mentioned render them more competent to judge of the general good, and less liable to be biassed in forming that judgment, yet these distinctions do not operate to such an extent as to render them unacquainted with the affairs on which that judgment is to be exercised. Lastly, let us consider the source from whence this body is supplied. Generally speaking, every member of it has either himself been, or is descended from a family who have been, eminent for talents, virtues, or heroic qualities.

Thus far we have dwelt on the theory of the constitution, and endeavoured to show, by a short sketch, that as far as this goes the House of Lords are of the whole kingdom the portion best qualified to legislate beneficially for the community. Much more might be said to this effect; but we shall pass on to the more practical part of the subject, and the rather because we do not think that this point, even if fully established, would satisfy the design we have in view, or answer the question to which we have undertaken to reply.

The next branch of our subject leads us to inquire what were the opinions of those who originated the power and authority of parliament; what they conceived to be its design, and how they supposed that design would be most effectually answered.

Certainly no people, from the Athenian to the Arab, ever were more truly free, were more tenacious of their liberty, or took wiser measures to secure it, than our Saxon ancestors: yet there never existed a body of men in whom

the classes of society were more steadily distinguished, or who paid more uniform respect to the distinctions of rank. We affect to trace to them our love of freedom. We glory in attributing to them several of our wisest laws and the noblest principles of our constitution; we ascribe, and justly ascribe, to their willenagemotes some of those institutions to which England at this hour owes her glory. Whom did these, our free, wise, and high-spirited ancestors, consider the best qualified to make laws for the welfare of the uation? Did they select the boxer, whose gambling adventures had gained him an equal portion of wealth and infamy? the manufacturing adventurer, whose sole eminence consisted in his successful attempts to make blacking for shoes? or the needy and reckless demagogue, who went about proclaiming to the rabble that all the existing order of things was one monstrous abuse? Were these the characters or rank of the men to whom our ancestors confided the great duty of legislation? They placed that power in the hands of their "wise men;" and those whom they designated by this honourable title were the then existing peers, spiritual and temporal, of the realm. True it is that many of that class whom we now denominate commoners were included in that assembly; but was it as an elected or representative class? Far from it: each man held his place there in his own right: he was not indebted to a faction for his rank, and compelled to consult the whim of that faction to retain that rank. Such men as this our ancestors deemed the objects of laws, not the makers of them.

the subject of our inquiry, their views and sentiments were precisely similar to those of their Saxon predecessors. It is an unquestioned fact of history that, for centuries after the Conquest, until the reign of Henry the Third, there is not the least trace of anything like a representative legislature. For the whole of this long period the entire legislative power was vested in the House of Lords and the sovereign, or perhaps we should more correctly say, in the aristocracy of the nation, as the lesser barons had much the rank of our present baronets and esquires of large fortune. The principle was, however, the same; and during the whole rise of the nation to power and eminence, during the formation and establishment of most of our wisest systems of jurisprudence, and during the many gallant and successful struggles in the field and in the councilchamber, by which our most important liberties were ascertained and rendered the birthright of the subject; the whole legislative and deliberative, as well as the supreme judicative power, was entrusted by our ancestors to the aristocracy and sovereign.

But it will be said that new principles were introduced at the Conquest, Perhaps so if they were, they were certainly not more favourable to liberty; but we are not here called on to show what is the nature of our constitution with regard to this great body, for that is sufficiently obvious; but to demonstrate that, in conferring on one portion of the community the powers and duties of the House of Lords, that constitution has acted wisely. But, in fact, the Conquest, as it is called, although it did ultimately, by the influx of Normans, bringing with them their national habits and institutions, materially alter our constitution, yet, with respect to

But," it may be answered, "the result proved that they were mistaken, as they found themselves at length obliged to resort to the creation of a representative legislature." That a representative body did at length obtain a great, and has every hour from that to the present period obtained a greater, share in the legislative power; and that that body, not content with its advances in that branch of authority, is at present, by interfering with the King's choice of his ministers, pretending to a share even in the executive department, is certain. But what was the origin of that body, and what were the first effects of its creation? Did the people, groaning under the tyrannical or absurd legislation of the aristocracy, make a grand effort, and compel them to share their power with the representatives of the nation? Or did the peers themselves, conscious of their own inability to make wise laws, seek the aid of this delegated wisdom? Or, rather, did not the monarch, smarting under the successful efforts of that great body in favour of liberty-mortified by their steady opposition to the senseless schemes of a

Lords, as the guardian of the people against the tyrannical ambition of the Commons, was remarkably exemplified in the case of the Aylesbury burgesses, in the reign of William III. The Lord Chief Justice Holt had decided that the subject, when refused his right of voting by a returning officer at an election, had right of action against that officer in a court of common law. The Commons, incensed at this, asserted that no one had power to decide in any such cases but themselves. This was an affair of obvious importance, involving the question whether the subject had a right, by the law, to the exercise of his franchise, or whether a majority in the lower house should be able to perpetuate their power by authorising the returning officer to admit only such votes as they approved. The importance of the question was duly estimated by the nation, as well as by the courts of law and both houses. The Commons, enraged that any one should attempt to limit their authority, or propose any other mode of decision than their will, seized all the electors who had brought the actions, resolved them guilty of contempt and breach of privilege, and committed them to Newgate. The latter sued out writs of Habeas Corpus, and Holt fearlessly said that they were entitled to their discharge. The house, incensed at such audacity, issued warrants to seize even the counsel who had been concerned. Throughout the whole affair Holt had stood alone. The terrors of the house had intimidated the other judges. He bravely said, "If the House of Commons declare themselves to have privileges which they have no legal claim to, the people of England will not be stopped by that declaration." Here, however, he was mistaken. The people of England would, because they could not help it, have submitted; for their only remedy would have been by a rebellion. Holt would have fallen a victim to his courage, and the usurpation so gained would have been but the stepping-stone to more. But the country was saved even from a struggle. The House of Lords interposed their power; decreed, in a most solemn decision, that Holt was right; published an able and full statement of their judgment; sent it to all the returning officers, with their mandate to

obey it, and enforced a sulky submission on the lower house.

But the peers have not confined their interposition to the defence of the subject, although that is either passively or actively the constant effect of their authority. They have as frequently exerted it in restraining the unconstitutional attempts of the lower house against the rights of the crown: for examplein the reign of Charles the Second, the Commons had contrived a mode of assuming to themselves the whole legislative power, by tacking whatever bills they wished to pass to the end of the money bills; so that the one could not be passed without the other. Here the Lords interposed, and remonstrated against the practice, and finally made it a standing order of the house not to entertain any bills annexed to money bills. Soon after, in the same reign, the Commons attempted to render the crown elective, and to exclude the right heir from it. This would have been effected with the approbation of the people, who merely looked to the particular instance. The Lords, however, though feeling the urgency of that instance as strongly as either, yet saw the consequences of such a usurpation of power, and positively rejected the measure. The result was, that instead of a complete destruction of the whole system and principles of our social constitution, by a proceeding which would have subverted the monarchy, the nation was relieved from all the evils apprehended, by the subsequent abdication of the individual in question, and the consequent settlement of the crown on the very principles advocated by the Commons to justify their proposal, but in a manner which left the whole structure of the constitution precisely as before that event, or rather, if anything, confirmed and secured thereby. The Lords could not, it is true, have foreseen this result, and were therefore actuated merely by a steady and patient conviction of duty in disregard to the shallow wavering and Will-o'-thewisp-like doctrine of expediency; the adoption of which was certainly never more plausibly urged, or its fearless rejection more gloriously rewarded.

It has also been a favourite attempt of the lower house to pass what are called place bills, restraining

the distribution of preferments by the crown. During the whole of the last century the Lords resisted this encroachment, and uniformly rejected all such bills. We are here far from wishing to imply that the lower house has not been repeatedly of the greatest service in restraining the upper. We think, that in this respect, the obligation, for such it really is, has been perfectly mutual. But if our readers will take the trouble of tracing the circumstances in which these occasions of contest originated, they will probably arrive at the same conclusion which has impressed itself on our mind, that in most instances the improper conduct of the House of Lords was rather the result of individual or accidental motives, while, on the other hand, the salutary interference of that body, and the usurpations of the Commons were part of a system originating in, and produced by the essential constitution of the two bodies. To ascertain this, history must, in this respect, be viewed as a connected whole; but we think that this is the fairest way to view it, and we are assured that the result of the examination will justify the position we have laid down.

We have endeavoured to show that the perfection of a legislative body consists in its being qualified to enact salutary laws for the benefit of the people, and that it is not of the least consequence whether such laws are agreeable to the people; that the House of Peers are in a high degree qualified for this purpose, not merely on account of their extensive acquirements and high honor, but from the fact of their not being, if we may so say, removeable from office at the pleasure of those whom the laws are made especially to govern and control, while they are also comparatively free from the temptations of individual interest, and that anxiety to make a name by introducing a measure, which is the natural result of temporary dignity. We have also noticed some of the practical illustrations afforded by history. We would briefly state our opinion thus. As far as results from their essential constitution, the House of Peers must be disposed to consider the introduction of a new law to be in itself, to a certain extent, an injury; the House of Commons to look upon it as a merit. It

is better for a state to have its laws too few than too many. A legislative body should be as much on its guard against activity as an executive against supineness.

It will not be necessary to enter at much length into the question of the utility of the House of Peers as a supreme court of judicature. It is obvious that some such court must exist-that it must be endowed as well with a legal as equitable jurisdiction--and that, since superiors may materially suffer from a trial by their inferiors, though the latter can seldom suffer from being judged by the former, that court should consist of the highest persons in the realm, who are competent for the office. But let us consider what are the component parts of that supreme court. Its acting members are chiefly of two classes, peers by descent, and peers elevated for legal learning and abilities. It derives, therefore, from the latter the greatest body perhaps of judicial information in the world, while the former act as a species of jury, selected from the very finest panel, if we may so express it, that was ever formed.

As the court of ultimate resort, they must be, to a certain extent, judges both of law and of fact, and for this office there exists no other body equally qualified; while, as the authority which is to lay down what is the law in cases wholly new and without precedent, they must be more or less cognizant of, and able to declare the intention of the legislature which framed the law. The right of deciding without appeal, in all manner of cases, must be lodged in some one body. To none can it be so safely entrusted as to that class which is supplied by the constant influx of all that is most eminent for wisdom, learning and virtue.

We cannot refrain from calling the attention of our readers to a powerful testimony which has lately appeared in favor of the utility of the House of Lords, and of the aristocracy in general.

This evidence is drawn from the infuriated hatred and malice displayed towards them in three little pamphlets, attributed, though perhaps without foundation, to the pen of a distinguished patron of, and voucher for, the present ministry. Were that house useless they would not have been honored with such deep and bitter