is defined by St. Paul to be "the substance (oraris the realizing) of things hoped for; the evidence (the bringing conviction) of things not seen;" and this faith, we are told again, is the gift of God. Mr. Wills has laid down a general philosophical principle, and justly distinguishes assent into two species altogether different in kind. Every candid man will admit that he does not, that he cannot, repose the same practical confidence in the deductions of pure reason as he does in the suggestions of habitual belief. The instance which our author gives by no means conveys the full force of the principle when applied to the truths of religion; but it will serve to make the principle clear to every thinking mind.

"Thus there is a habitual sense of the

effect of a fall from some great height; while the theory of the earth's form and motion is, to the generality even of educated persons, an acknowledged but unconceived conclusion of reason. The one is seemingly opposed to our perceptions; the other overpowers them. We shudder over the precipice; but cannot help doubting that we are glancing on through space, with the most inconceivable velocity and on the most complicated path: how widely different will it be felt at once is the species of assent which the mind gives to these different facts; yet it may be as truly observed that, of these instances, the consequence involved in the first is at least as difficult to prove by reasoning as the last."

But, we repeat, this illustration conveys but a very imperfect idea of the force of the general principle when applied to the truths of religion. The wonders of astronomy are not so far removed from the sphere-so different from the nature of our ordinary conceptions, as are the truths which religion brings to light. There is, too, this danger in the example-that it may be said that nobody denies the truths of astronomy-perhaps we would not be going too far if we say that it

is because no one feels it worth while -these truths impose no irksome law; they set themselves against no darling inclinations of the mind: if they did, we feel little doubt that all the evidence that supports them would have been overlooked; and that men, blinded by their aversion to the requisitions which their reception would entail, would

have experienced the difficulty of believing what they could not or would not realize. They would have done that which our author well says has been done by the equally well supported truths of Christianity, have taken up a system of "scepticism founded not on any admissible question as to the truth of what it rejects, but on a strong antecedent difficulty, which is no objection to the facts, but a deficiency in the mind itself."

The reasonings on this second proposition are thus summed up:

"I now only demand the concession, that there is in the constitution of the human understanding, as well as in the moral constitution of man, a predisposition to unbelief in revealed religion. And that from the nature of this predisposition, there is a practical unbelief, quite consistent with that kind of speculative assent, which depends on proof.

"This principle affords the true answer of divine truth more plain to the underto the question, Why is not the evidence standing: for, first observing that it is full, clear, and conclusive enough for all who examine it honestly, it is to be added, that, according to the present constitution of our nature, no additional degree culty, as it consists, not in the degree of of inferential proof could meet the diffithe evidence, but in the nature of the assenting process of the mind. Before this correspondence ends, I will revert to this point, and make it, I trust, abundantly clear that there is no want of evidence. If one rose from the grave, to confirm the Scriptures to you, powerful as the impression might be, it would still have but a momentary effect. The recollection, uncorroborated by habitual impressions, and the daily experience of the senses, would fade away from your memory, like the recollection of a dream. I cannot too often remind you that, until Were your reason ever so fully convinced, the habits of daily action and thought are engaged in confirming such impressions, they cannot be either operative or per

manent.

“Thus, although the proof of revealed religion is unanswerably strong, and plain enough for the dullest who will seek it, yet, for the best understanding, something more than the mere assent to proof is necessary for one so constituted as man. The strongest understanding must for ever find its unaided faculties insufficient to quicken bare belief into the operative

principle of faith. In trusting to this effort consists the error of those who endeavour to realize the doctrines of Scripture into practical conceptions, without having recourse to those means which are actually appointed."

We cannot agree with our author that this principle will furnish an answer to the question "why the evidences of religion are not more plain:" his language is unguarded; but, with certain qualifications, there is much truth in his remarks. But the answer to the question, Why the evidences of Christianity are not plain enough to force conviction upon the most unwilling, (and this, and not "why they are not more plain," is the question of the infidel,) involves the solution of the more general problem, which human intellect will never solve-the existence of evil. He has, perhaps, shown, that according to the constitution of our own nature and that of all things, it would be difficult to conceive how proofs could be furnished more calculated to produce operative faith-we use the term as distinct from assent. But even admitting that he has thus far succeeded, he has but thrown the difficulty a little farther back, where it must rest, among those "secret things" which, in the language of Scripture, "belong unto the Lord our God, while the things that are revealed belong unto us and to our children to do them."

Upon the third of the propositions we have enumerated, it is not our intention to comment. All, perhaps, that may be said is contained in the words of our author.

"Whatever may be the constitution of the mind, no one can hold a reasonable doubt that the constitution of the social state is highly unfavourable to revealed religion. The beauty of its precepts, with their obviously beneficial tendency, together with the irrefragable force of its evidences, which are such as to be unassailable, without rejecting all the rules of right reason and common sense; these, with many other causes, operate to enforce from the world a formal assent, which may be considered as an involuntary tribute to truth, something analagous to that which vice is said to pay to virtue. The unbelief of the world is not speculative dissent, but practical indifference; and, were it an object worth while, might be deduced as a corollary from the prin

That these elements, if left to follow on their undisturbed course, must produce scepticism as their natural result, is an inference which, admitting the truth of the premises, it is impossible to deny. In the following letters Mr. Wills accordingly proceeds to exhibit the process by which the mind arrives at a state of self-avowed scepticism. That the process should always termi nate in this manner, it is not asserted; that it frequently does so, is only what we might expect. For the full and detailed application of these principles to the ordinary course of unbelief, we must refer our readers to the work itself, which will amply repay the labor of the study, without which it will be but imperfectly understood: but we will endeavour to give, in his own words, an abstract of the course which the author has pursued.

He prefaces this part of the enquiry by a remark very judicially corroborating his previous propositions.

"Before we proceed to the detailed application of the principles established in the former letter, it may be useful to corroborate this application, by reminding you of a fact, of which no thinking man can be ignorant—that these principles are not peculiar to the subject upon which we are now engaged. This is but a case of that great problem, upon which the human mind is fixed with universal and almost incessant study, namely, to reconcile prudence and right with inclination and desire. Whether it may be the still, small voice of conscience, or the sense of future ill, or the care for future interest, that interposes to resist a present purpose; still, if there should chance to be some impulse of awakened desire, kept

alive by present objects, you must be aware how little the suggestions of reason, prudence, or duty, avail to subdue this prevailing desire. Such is the universal progress of moral evil, in almost all its workings, and the secret history of the most fatal and prevalent ills of life." The first step is to ascertain the nature of the belief which the generality of mankind have in Christianity. "The Christian religion-though actually resting upon the very highest evidence that our understanding can receive, consistently with the nature of the factsis yet, for its general reception amongst men, quite independent of what is commonly meant by the term proof. The Gospel is received by the civilized world on that kind of moral evidence, which results from the fact that it is itself the real basis of the morals of civilized countries. I speak not here of that peculiar spiritual testimony, which it carries home to the Christian mind. It is also received on the understanding that it is supported by irrefragable proofs; which, though continually assailed, have still remained unshaken through so many ages: these proofs are supposed to subsist in the repositories of all solid truth that is known to mankind-ready to be produced when called for; and it is thus supposed by all persons of practical understanding, to rest on the consent of the united wisdom of past and present times; and finally, it is fixed by education amongst the earliest lessons of childhood. Thus, although the gospel of Christ is effectively established upon the first principles of all right reason, the belief of the world is the immediate result of habit and education, and not of reasoning. It is a state of mind, and not an inference."

We have, then, to enquire how this belief is acted on by the causes already

stated.

"We have seen, that religious sentiment, however acquired, is subject to a constant counteraction from sentiments of an opposite tendency; which, for the most part, act with much greater power. But to return: we have also established, that religious belief is unsupported, either by the habits of the understanding, or by the constitution of society. An observable consequence is, that in a great many instances, it becomes entirely inactive in the mind; and in the nature of a latent principle, which, though it can occasionally be excited into action,

yet has no effect under ordinary circumstances. This state, which is actually the unbelief of the world, is not necessarily subject to either increase or diminution; nor does it, in the multitude of cases, lead either to piety or scepticism.

"There are, at the same time, many, who, from the character of their minds, acquiesce in this neutral state: reflection (not to speak of accidental causes,) cannot will, though indistinctly, show, and human feeling shudder at, its fearful termination. And, whether they arise from circumstances or natural temper, those awful gleams of spiritual sanity will, according as they are more or less frequent and distinct, lead to varied consequences. In all cases, it is mental conflict; and tends to disturb the mind as to the future, and dissatisfy it with the present: and consequently, must tend to impel it to seek relief against such troubled reflections.

"This relief some will seek in prayer and sacred study, some from forgetfulness, some from reason, and some from sophistry. The case, when once agitated, is not one of indifference; it is a trial between conscience and all the passions between the world, which speaks with strong allurement to every outward sense, and an inbred but vague conviction, which appeals to none. If, instead

of taking refuge either in prayer and the ordinary means of divine grace, or in the serious study of the actual evidences of Christianity, (a course rarely followed,) the sceptically disposed person has recourse to those casual appeals to reason which often characterize the progress of unbelief, it is at first sight apparent that, in the case assumed, the true question cannot be said to be before the mind. The true question relates to the genuineness and authenticity of the Scriptures; the actual question in the unbeliever's and operation of their facts and doctrines. mind, to the possibility, reason, meaning,

This would, of itself, determine the result; for, whatever might be the conclusion of such speculations, no degree of fitness or efficiency, perceivable by the human understanding, can of itself convey to an unwilling mind the demonstrative evidence of divine original. The unbeliever is not, however, likely to come to such sane conclusions. Such speculations, even were they conducted by the profoundest genius, must, of course, tend to produce but error and uncertainty. In the repetition of these fruitless questions the sceptical sense must necessarily acquire the force of habit, and repeated

failure generate increasing doubt, while it also excites added reluctance and dislike. The question is, therefore, at each successive trial, more cursorily dismissed and less fairly stated. The very same processes, moral, mental, and social, which lead to the question, tend effectually to unfit the mind for its discussion. For, as the truth of God is opposed to the habitual tendencies of the unbeliever, the first principles of his reasonings are in themselves likely to be fallacious; and

this the more, as one of the most common

errors of men is a voluntary self-sophistication, for the purpose of suppressing conscience, and to promote a favourite tendency. Thus, by slow degrees perhaps, but at last, the unbeliever shall have entrenched his understanding in a set of principles, themselves the results of unbelief. Meanwhile, the primary causes still operate with incessant force to accelerate this course. The vicious affection alienates the mind; the treacherous reason misleads it; and the noiseless, yet vast force of the public mind, as it enforces discretion and sanctions indifference, still confirms it in each new stage."

These extracts will, perhaps, be sufficient to convey to our readers a notion, however imperfect, both of the line of enquiry which our author has marked out, and of the force with which he has pursued it. There is, however, another and a very important part of the enquiry which we are reluctantly compelled to dismiss with a a mere notice. Our readers have probably remarked the sentence in our last extract, in which it is stated, that "the sceptic entrenches his understanding in a set of principles, themselves the result of unbelief." Without the development of the principle contained in these lines, our author's enquiry would have been incomplete. It is not enough to exhibit the viciousness of the process by which the mind has arrived at a state of unbelief, unless it be also shown that, even in its full and complete stage, unbelief rests upon unsound foundations-that the reasons by which the infidel justifies his scepticism are as fallacious as the influences which originally created it were deceptive. This, it will be observed, involves no enquiry into the strength of the evidences of Christianity; the very object of the book being to prove that it is not by any reasoning upon those evidences, but by a mental process

altogether illusive, that scepticism is generated and confirmed. With the nature of the evidences this enquiry is intimately concerned, but not with their strength. This is a point upon which we must dwell for a few moof this depends the just appreciation ments, as upon the full comprehension of the merits of the volume.

The abstract truth of an opinion may be altogether independent of its reasonableness in any particular mind that holds it. The one has reference

The

to the reality of existence; the other to the evidences or the influences by which the opinion is formed. Roman Catholic, who believes the doctrines of Christianity simply because his priest tells him they are true, has a right but a very unreasonable opinion upon the subject. Had Copernicus dreamed the true system of the universe, and adopted it himself, and propounded it to the world upon no other authority than his dream, his belief in the theory would have been the most unreasonable; and yet this would not have affected its abstract truth. We need not, however, multiply examples to establish the distinction we have drawn. The imperfection of human faculties it is that creates the difference and makes the question very different, whether we believe or disbelieve aright, or do so upon right grounds.

Now, what our author has undertaken to accomplish in these letters is, to show the UNREASONABLENESS of scepticism; that is, be it remembered, to show that unbelief, in every particular mind, is produced not by a fair and candid consideration of the question, but created by influences and principles altogether illusive. He has not thus established the truth of Christianity, but he has shown cause for setting aside the verdict that the mind has pronounced against it. To pursue the legal illustration, the most appropriate one that suggests itself, he has simply moved for a new trial, a proceeding which does not meddle with the truth or falsehood of the former decision, but simply presumes that, whether right or wrong, that decision has been come to upon improper grounds.

It is evident that this line of reasoning must be greatly taken up by an appeal to the consciousness of those with whom he expostulates; and in

this view the epistolary form is admirably adapted for his design. He derives indeed some confirmation of his view from an examination of the popular arts of disputation on the subject, being, as he well observes,

"The only view of these operations

that is offered to the observation-save

what may be found by any one who will take the trouble to reflect diligently on what passes in the recess of consciousness, and with candid recollection survey the moral history of his own mind."

In this examination the concluding portions, and to us the least interesting of the volume, is taken up. Before entering upon this subsidiary branch of his subject, he follows out the principle already stated, that the sceptical principles behind which the understanding entrenches itself, are themselves the result of unbelief.

"The unbeliever is traced into some of those many varied positions in which he is impelled to stand on his defence, and endeavour to give reasons for his unbelief: and it is there attempted to be proved,

that the main causes of his unbelief will naturally assume the form of reasons for its justification."

if

This is a most important and a deeply interesting view of the subject; and no one who reads these letters no one, indeed, who candidly reflects upon the sceptical doubts that have passed through his own mind, can hesitate to acknowledge that it is the true one. Perhaps religion is not the only question with regard to which the suggestions of passion are obeyed as they were the dictates of reason, and even in the retrospect are mistaken for them. With respect to this, the most momentous of all questions, there is a fearful interest in contemplating the wayward aberrations of the human mind, in tracing the progress of selfdeception along its wilful path; to find the soul mistaking the phantom forms that are generated by the steam of the corruption that surrounds it, for the substantial realities of reason; and

plunging into all the quagmires of folly in pursuit of the flickering and uncertain light, whose only origin is in the very morasses through which it leads.

We have been more anxious to lay

fully before our readers the general outline of Mr. Wills's plan, than to transfer to our pages the minute and most valuable observations with which he has filled up the details. We are sure that we have said sufficient to enable them to comprehend and appreciate his design. And here we might it not that the author has added, as a close our remarks upon the work, were species of appendix, a chapter in which he discusses a question only incidentally connected with the main branch of his enquiry. After having summed up, in the conclusion of his fourth letter, the evidence of the second part, he enters on a new field of investigation, in which he is called on to discuss the nature and grounds of probability and proof. Upon his theory on these matters we must offer a few remarks. All proof can be but a reference "to those ascertained conditions and rela

tions of existing things, which are called the laws of nature." These relations he denominates relations of coexistence; among which he classes the relation of cause and effect.

By relations of coexistence we must understand our author to mean, that two things are so related, by the laws that regulate all nature, that from the existence of the one we are able to infer the existence of the other. evidently by the knowledge of these relations that we can proceed as we do in proof, from what is known to

It is

what is unknown-from what is ac

knowledged to what is ambiguous. It

will be observed that Mr. Wills does not consider every relation of coexistence to be in the sense in which we

have explained the term, necessarily

one of cause and effect; and this at once places him at issue with those eminent writers who have regarded the relation of cause and effect as nothing else than uniform and invariable sequence.

Mr. Wills has put forward a new theory upon the subject a theory which he somewhat indistinctly enunciates, and which we are not sure that he will find it possible to support. We must, however, permit him to speak in his own words :

"These relations are all indicated by the uniform and coordinate variation, which is ascertained by experience to