liberties were never so extensive as, nor did their commerce or manufactures ever flourish more than during the period of their subjection to the king of the Netherlands; and yet, all things considered, their revolution was one of those events upon which wise men might have calculated from the very first, and which there were not want ing those who confidently predicted. Belgium is interesting from ancient recollections. Cæsar's account of it is familiar to every classical reader, although the character which he gives of the people would scarcely be admitted to be a just one by the modern French; or, if just when he wrote, it would, perhaps, be asserted that the race has since become strangely altered; not, however, more than the Greeks and the Italians, whose ancient and modern national characteristics present in many respects a striking contrast.

A people, for many centuries superstitiously devoted to the religion of Rome, and ground down under the iron rule of a succession of foreign masters, suffering alternately under despotism and anarchy, the tyranny of the autocrat and the tyranny of the mob, could not be expected to maintain that erect position by which they were originally distinguished. But yet, the Belgians never lost that consciousness of national identity which served to combine them as a people, and to form a kind of ground-work for national independence. It is true, the facility with which they were transferred from one great power to another, from Austria to Spain, from Spain to France, and from France to Holland, gave them, in the eyes of the potentates of Europe, the appearance of counters upon the great chess-table of European politics, to be disposed of according to the exigencies of the game, as chance or skill alternately favoured the various royal gamblers. But although this might be a just view of their position, as long as kings were every thing and the people nothing, it could not be admitted when that was no longer the case, and when the progress of public opinion had compelled even the most despotic sovereigns

to pay a marked attention to popular predilections.

Now, it was just when the change in public feeling was becoming most perceptible, that the union took place, under the auspices of the allied sovereigns, between Belgium and Holland; and that a constitution was framed, in which it was contemplated that both portions of the union should enjoy equal political advantages. Possibly no people in Europe were less fitted than the Dutch to blend with such a people as of one heart and of one mind. There was the Belgians, so that both might become not only diversity of habit and opposition of character, but a variance in their religious creeds, amounting to positive moral antipathy; and although this might be subdued and kept under, by privileges of the Belgians, (to which, a system which restricted the political however, in the present circumstances of Europe, they could not very long be constrained to submit,) it was only quickened and brought more prominently into play by the working of that liberal system of government into a partnership of which they had been promoted.

The Dutch were tardy and methodi cal; the Belgians were versatile and vivacious. The one were slow to feel that as a grievance to others which they felt to be an advantage to themselves; the others were quick to resent, as a national indignity, whatever plainly made for the prosperity or the consideration of their neighbours. Thus there was, from the commencement, a principle of repulsion between the elements of this ill-omened union, which clearly indicated that it could not last, and which the expansive force of public opinion was every day ripening to its dissolution.

When the kingdom of the Netherlands was created, by the fiat of the conquerors at Waterloo, it was contemplated chiefly with a view to its utility as a barrier kingdom. Old experience had taught them the necessity of curbing the ambition of France; and if nothing but geographical position was to be considered, scarcely any arrangement could be better than that which was actually adopted. But

the moral causes which weakened the internal government of the Netherlands, more than counterbalanced its strength as a frontier; and while it thus continued divided, as it were, against itself, but little of formidable opposition need be apprehended by its powerful neighbour. These were not foreseen by the allies, who proceeded to negociate a union between these two countries, in just the same spirit that a state marriage might be contracted, and who relied upon the wisdom and the vigour of the king of Holland to consolidate his new dominions, which were given to him much more from general than from personal considerations, and which, if they served to increase his power, served in a still greater degree to increase his anxious responsibility.

For when Belgium became united to Holland, by an act of the confederated potentates in the spring of 1814,it was not for the purpose of aggrandizing the latter power that this extension of territory was conceded. To have united Belgium to Prussia, would have given, it was thought, too great a predominance to that power, and embittered the jealousies, while it approximated the frontiers of France and that kingdom. To divide the provinces between the neighbouring powers would have been inconsistent with the assurances of the allied sovereigns, and have given a dangerous extension to French territory, which it was a leading object with the conference to circumscribe within its legitimate limits. It but remained, therefore, to erect Belgium into an independent neutral state; and the Arch Duke Charles, as if presentient of coming evils, having declined the proffered sovereignty, it was resolved that Holland "should receive an augmentation of territory;"* and accordingly, the ill-assorted union, which has since been so productive of discontent and of disaster, was accomplished. Belgium became incorporated with Holland; and if treaties could have effected the reconcilement of differences, which were inseparable from the religion, the habits, and the

character of the respective people, their union would have been "ultimate and complete;" "so that the two countries should only form one state, to be governed by the constitution already established in Holland, to be modified by common accord."

But the will of potentates and legislators is not always the fiat of nature. They cannot, morally or politically, any more than physically, blend or amalgamate things that are essentially heterogeneous. Against the repulsive elements, which existed so obviously in the people of Holland and Belgium, which must for ever have prevented national cordiality, they made no provision. It was unwisely thought that a sense of interest would, on the part of the Belgians, overcome religious aversion and hereditary antipathy, while too little account was taken of the probable abuse of that large accession of popular liberty which was now, for the first time, conferred upon a suddenly emancipated and inflammable population. The lesson which might be learned from the story of Don Quixotte and the Galley-slaves was not sufficiently present to the minds of Lord Castlereagh and his associates, or they would have eschewed an arrangement which could only terminate in rendering the distrust and aversion between these countries wider and more irreconcilable than it was before.

When the arrangement was completed which subjected Belgium to Holland, or rather, we should have written, which shackled Holland with Belgium, the domestic policy of England was well calculated to produce an unfavourable effect upon the mind of the distinguished statesman to whom her share in these important negotiations was entrusted. Lord Castlereagh had long been the advocate of what was called Catholic emancipation, and there is nothing exaggerated in the notion that he was desirous of furnishing a practical proof of the compatibility between the profession of the Roman Catholic religion, and the fullest enjoyment of constitutional privileges under a Protestant govern

ment. If he could successfully point to Holland and Belgium, and say, see how beautifully these people get on together-how little of jealousy or bigotry has found its way into their deliberations, from the time that, with equal rights, they assembled together in a common chamber, he was of opinion that a material point would be gained in advocating his favourite measure, and that the promotion of this Roman Catholic people into an incorporation with that Protestant state, would be but the precursor to the removal of the civil disabilities which at that time, it was the fashion to say, paralysed the energies of the Catholics of Ireland.

This we know, that at a subsequent period, precisely that use was made of the incorporation of Holland and Belgium. Mr. Galy Knight, at present, we believe, a sound conservative, wrote a pamphlet which was quoted both in the Houses of Lords and Commons, in which he advocated Catholic emancipation, chiefly from what he had observed of the working of what he was pleased to call a similar measure in the case of the countries last mentioned. It was needless to reply that that case was but an experiment-that time was as yet wanting to see how far it might or might not succeed-that even then symptoms might be discerned which boded any thing rather than the permanence of the newly-formed union and that we ought to be very sure, indeed, of the grounds upon which we proceeded before we risqued an unsettlement of the ancient foundations of our domestic policy, from a desire to comply with the requisition of a party who had ever evinced an implacable hostility to our ancient institutions. Liberalism was then the rage; and liberalism has ever been remarkable for a neglect of observation as well as for a contempt of experience. Lord Castlereagh did not live until the seeds of dismemberment which he had sown upon the continent produced their natural fruits. He had presided over the marriage of the match and the gunpowder, (indeed he gave the bride away,) and died without ever suspecting such a thing as the possibility of an explosion. He lived not even to witness the consummation of his favorite measure of domestic policy, or to exult

in the degree in which it had been facilitated by his continental arrange ments. Had he been spared, it is our belief that much would have been done to ward off, or to mitigate the evils which were the consequences of the principles which he adopted. But he gave the impulse which others by whom he was succeeded could neither control nor moderate; and it is not Holland alone that has reason to rue the measures taken, with a view to a final settlement of difficult and complicated questions of foreign and domestic policy, and to say,

"Quicquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi."

Wisdom, after events, we are told, is cheap; but it is strange that the differand of character, which so widely ence of religion, of language, of habits, discriminated the Belgians from the Dutch, should have never suggested to the great European arbitrators and diplomatists, that the union which they which nature had forbidden the banns. were bent upon effecting was one of The following observations of the author of the work before us exceedingly well founded :—

are

Independent of the allies disdaining to consult the feelings of the Belgic people, they appear to have lost sight of the moral history of the Netherlands, and to have forgotten those deep-rooted hatreds, jealousies and dissensions, both religious and political, that had divided the two people since the time of Philip the Second. In their eagerness to consummate their work, they overlooked all the discordant elements and jarring interests of which it was framed, and proclaimed fusion,' as if national fusions were to be obtained by the mere diplomatic transfer of one people

to the dominion of another.

"It is well, (says a Dutch author,) for the Almighty to say, 'Let there be light; but when men attempt to ape the language of the Divinity, they expose themselves to produce the blackest darkness where they hoped to shed floods of light.'

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Only one of two things could have produced this desirable fusion--that is, that either one or other of the two nations should have renounced its principles and prejudices to embrace those of the other; or that both, forgetting those commercial rivalries, differences of religion, habits, interest, tradition and language, which render them absolute anti

podes, should have met half way, and endeavoured to bury all individuality in their mutual exertions for the general good.

"But this concession could not be expected from Holland; for, independent of the tenacity of her national character, the treaty of Paris literally asserted that Belgium was given to her as an extension of territory.' This phrase was apparently acted upon in many instances by the government, as if the many had been made over in fee to the few, and as if Belgium was intended to serve as a mere ere corrollary to Holland. On the other hand, who is there who had studied the Belgian characteristics, and considered the preponderating influence of the clergy, the bigotry of the people, the jealous pride of the aristocracy, or the numerical superiority of the population, that could await concession from them, without sufficient guarantees being given in return? And, without concessions on the one side or the other, all prospect of fusion, or even co-existence, was utterly hopeless. In this matter the numerical disproportion was an invincible obstacle; for history may offer various instances of the gradual amalgamation of inferior with superior bodies, but it is against all reason and precedent to anticipate success when the proportions are reversed. This disproportion produced another evil that will be shown presently.

"It is not, therefore, too much to affirm that the allies founded their conclusion on false premises-that being impelled by an over eagerness to re-establish the equilibrium, and to erect a barrier, they placed too great confidence in the wisdom and

influence of the King of the Netherlands; in the security of the restored dynasty in France; in the reciprocal pliancy of the people whom they were resolved to unite; and in the philanthropic but deceptious hope, that time, mutual conciliation, and prudent government, would soften the long existing differences that separated the two nations, and so temper down their animosities as to guarantee the security of an edifice, which the powers looked upon as a model of diplomatic

skill."

One element of confusion the writer overlooks, and it is that without which all the others which he enumerates could scarcely have produced the results, which it is the object of his history to detail; that is, the mischief which must always arise from confer

ring constitutional liberty on those who are unfitted to receive it. Our modern patriots, when they contend for "the cause of liberty all over the globe," never take into account that it can only be a blessing to those who are qualified to use it aright, and that it may prove a curse, and not a blessing, where it only gives a license to passion and prejudice, at the expense of interest and reason. Holland was too free a country, its king too paternal, its government too mild, for conceding with safety an equality of participation in all constitutional rights and privileges, to a proud, à mercurial, a bigoted, and an ignorant people. And had the Belgians been transferred to the Prussians and not to the Dutch, a much more permanent incorporation would have been made, although the precise object which the allies had in view, (and in which they so miserably failed,) might not have been completely answered.

At the period of the union, thẻ population of Belgium was 3,337,000; that of Holland, 2,046,000; if, therefore, the deputies were proportioned to the population respectively, the former should have 63, and the latter 42. But this would be to place the interests of Holland entirely at the contended that the colonies, who aemercy of Belgium; and, as it was knowledged the mother country, and submitted to its by-laws, must be taken into account in any estimate of its numerical strength, it was finally arranged that an equal number of deputies should be sent from each portion of the union, thus, as the Belgians complained, giving to the minority an equality in the national representation.

It was far easier to foresee than to provide against the frequent and angry collisions, which must, of necessity, arise between parties thus equally divided. In reality, the political partnership to which the Belgians were called was a vast improvement in their previous condition. They now had some voice in the legislature, where they before had none. But the comparative inconvenience of their new position outweighed, in their apprehension, its positive advantages. It was not enough that they had plenty of bread, while their co-partners, the Dutch, had bread and butter. Nor

was it unreasonable that, while any such apparent disparity existed, they should seek to have it removed. And, had the simple removal of any specific grievance been the object on which they were bent, and had this object been pursued in a constitutional manner, there can be very little doubt that they would have ultimately, and in no long time, succeeded. But the grievances of which they complained were not so much the causes as the pretexts of the discontent which they exhibited; and however they might have been redressed, their removal would never have obviated national jealousy and religious exasperation. While, therefore, we agree with our author in seeing much to lament in the conduct of the Dutch government, we utterly dissent from him in the opinion, that, by any management, the union could be preserved. The materials of which it was composed were too heterogeneous ever effectually to amalgamate; and, although by vigour and discretion, it might have been continued for some time longer, yet it would have been something like the clay and the brass in the image of Nebuchadnezzar, a union of adhesion rather than of incorporation, of which all that was certain was that it could not endure.

Let it not be thought that we undervalue the difficulties which the allied sovereigns had to overcome, when the task was imposed upon them, of remedying the disorganization of Europe. No such thing. Those difficulties were great; and much was done to surmount them. The sovereigns have been accused of despotic predilections: but never was any accusation more unjust. They erred, and most grievously erred, in leaning too much to popular liberty. There were only two occasions on which they were called upon to frame new constitutions, and they gave a constitution to France which led to the revolution of the barricades ;-and to Belgium, by which the authority of the reigning sovereign was speedily set at naught, and the peace of Europe endangered.

The reader has seen that the very constitution of the representative body was calculated to engender discord; much more, when it is considered, that the deputies from the respective portions of the union spoke a different language.

But even this, although a source of real difficulty, was rather a pretext for discontent, than in itself a grievance; for, had there been any disposition for mutual accommodation, the matter might have been easily adjusted. There were few of the deputies from Holland who could not speak French, and few of those from Belgium who could not speak Dutch; as was frequently exemplified in those ludicrous collisions which took place in their house of assembly, where the Belgic deputy was obliged to translate the speech

which he had delivered in French into Dutch, for the benefit of the Hollanders; while the latter was under the necessity of translating his speeches into French, for the benefit, or rather the gratification of the Belgians. It was impossible that matters could go on smoothly, or, indeed, that any business could be satisfactorily done, by a body thus at variance respecting the very medium in which they were to hold their communications. One would almost think that the contrivers of this precious system were under the impression that the building of the tower of Babel was aided, and not prevented, by the confusion of tongues; for they even improved upon that notable device; as, in the case of the tower of Babel, the workmen would understand each other, but could not; here the deputies could understand each other, but would not.

It is not, however, to be denied, that a very great degree of inconvenience must have been experienced from the imposition of the Dutch language, both in their houses of assembly and their courts of justice, upon the Belgic people.